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Chiapas al Día, No. 130
CIEPAC
Chiapas, México
September 29, 1998

The Causes which Led to the Armed Conflict and the Historical Debt to the Indigenous People
(Part Two/II)

If it were not to be the path of mobilization, of political pressure in the streets through marches, which for decades had been met with deaths and prison; if it were not to be the electoral path in order to solve the root problems - then the indigenous, the smallest and most forgotten, the poorest, now launched the wholly unexpected and incredible in the decade of globalization: defending their dignity through arms. Civil society did not believe in this method, and it called on both sides to negotiate in order to avoid the spilling of indigenous blood - of both armies - in exchange for their just demands. This September it will be two years since the suspension of those negotiations. The response to their demands has been the same. The political process since then has gone through at least 4 stages:

I.

The first stage of dialogue was 1994. The First Declaration of the Selva Lacandona demanded work, land, shelter, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace. The first 12 days were a time of open warfare. Afterwards, in March, the Dialogues in the Peace Cathedral began, with the federal government and the EZLN in conflicting positions, leading to the end of this chapter in June. Civil society actively participated, and the figure and the role of Bishop Samuel Ruiz as mediator for Peace appears, leading to the creation of the National Commission of Intermediation.

This year the EZLN convokes more than 6000 persons in the Selva in order to hold the National Democratic Convention (CND). It is the year the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) goes into effect, of Mexico's acceptance into the club of the world's richest countries, the Organization for Commerce and Economic Development (OCED), and the year of the presidential elections. It is also the year of the taking of lands by the indigenous, now almost all expelled by police forces, of the formation of Municipal Councils which do not recognize the official election results, and of the birth of campesino and urban fronts such as Autonomous Multi-Ethnic Regions (RAP) and the State Democratic Assembly of the Chiapaneco People (AEDPCh). The year ends with the dialogue process in profound crisis, with the breaking of the siege and the appearance of the EZLN in 42 municipalities in Chiapas and, finally, with Don Samuel Ruiz' indefinite hunger strike as a peace offering, against the imminent war and for the re-establishment of dialogue.

II.

From 1995 to September 1996, the next chapter occurs, with the initiation of dialogue and its suspension once again. At the end of Don Samuel Ruiz' hunger strike, another door opens in the search for the solution to the age-old issue of injustice to the indigenous. The EZLN releases its Second Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, and the first rapprochments are made with the Federal Government. However, in February of 1995, the government offensive puts out arrest warrants against the Zapatista leadership, and Javier Elorriaga and Jorge Santiago are jailed, accused of belonging to the armed group. The Mexican Army invades more indigenous towns.

Once again the indigenous count on the dialogue process; the meetings in San Miguel are held, with the CONAI's role becoming an indispensable element for mediation in order to achieve peace. The civil camps are born, as are the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), made up of Senators and Deputies from the Congress of the Union, and the Law for Dialogue. The format for the negotiating tables is defined (invitees, advisors, dynamics, etc.), and Table 1, Indigenous Rights and Culture, is opened in October of 1995. This Table's resolutions are signed after a long process in February, 1996, after the Indigenous Forum, which gave rise to the creation of the National Indigenous Congress. Despite the difficulties, violence and increased militarization, the indigenous return to the dialogue with the beginning of the negotiations of Table 2, Justice and Democracy, on April 2, 1996.

In the middle of the negotiations, Javier Elorriaga is sentenced and the Forum on State Reform is held, convoked by the indigenous, with more than 1000 persons, over 8 days, reflecting and making proposals on the country's future, a truly democratizing process; the Intercontinental Gathering for Humanity and Against Neo-liberalism is also called, as is a national consultation on the political role of the EZLN; all the while, complaints were reverberating concerning the increase in human rights violations, violence by the Public Security police against the residents of Nicolás Ruiz, militarization, the increasing number of prisoners, etc. Meanwhile, the rules of procedure were redefined prior to the signing of the Table 2 accords, and the tripartite (EZLN-CONAI-COCOPA) meetings are held. However, the circumstances and provocations reached an intolerable level for the political and historical patience of the indigenous, who see themselves as being betrayed once more.

In the month of September, 1996, the EZLN stipulated 5 conditions for their return to the negotiations and another opening occurred: 1) demilitarization of the indigenous communities; 2) release of the Zapatista prisoners and a solution to the problem of violence and paramilitarization in the Northern Zone; 3) the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture (Table 1 of the negotiations signed in February of that same year); 4) formation of the Commission of Monitoring and Verification of the Accords (COSEVER); 5) a new government delegation, or a new attitude on the government's part towards dialogue and negotiation with the indigenous.

From September 1996 to December 1996, the effects of the suspension of dialogue are felt. Of the 5 conditions, the Commission of Monitoring and Verification (COSEVER) is formed, which has been inactive ever since. In order for the San Andrés Accords concerning Table 1 to be carried out, both sides propose that the COCOPA draw up the proposal which will transform what was signed into law and into Constitutional amendments. However, the government refuses to keep its word and rejects the proposal which will then go to the Congress of the Union for its approval. The Fourth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona arrives, and, months later, the first direct elections in history for the Chief of Government of Mexico City, which the opposition wins and is the first ever loss by the PRI of its majority in the Chamber of Deputies. These 15 months see increases in the displaced population, militarization, paramilitary groups, political prisoners and expulsions. Nonetheless, the indigenous do not surrender, and they call for a Second Intergalactic Meeting; 1111 Zapatistas make a pilgrimage to the Federal District to see if in that way their demands will be heard, including those added since the uprising: demilitarization, the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords and the disarmament of paramilitary groups.

IV.

From December 1997 to June 1998, the new strategy of a government offensive is in place. More deaths are again necessary. The Massacre of Acteal is the next turning point, provoking unprecedented reactions at a state, national and international level; at least 10 peace initiatives are announced, in an attempt to stop the violence and to move towards democracy and justice. The demands go beyond the indigenous arena and transcend, not only the borders of the poorly labeled "conflict zone" in Chiapas, but also the national arena.

The President of the Republic shuffles his cabinet and his government team, as well as bringing in a new governor for Chiapas, imposing, once more, another interim: Roberto Albores Guillén. With him, another stage begins in the repression of the indigenous and of the EZLN, in the dismantling of Autonomous Municipalities by means of large police-military operations. More than 100 foreigners are expelled, the Diocese of San Cristóbal is attacked, as are national and international human rights organizations and opposition parties; paramilitary groups grow, as do the wounded, the dead, the displaced and the prisoners, among other victims. This stage finally ends with three relevant events: the massacre at El Bosque against EZLN indigenous, the dissolution of the CONAI and the breaking of the Zapatista silence with the Fifth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona.

The floods in September, two years after the suspension of dialogue, and the elections in Chiapas for choosing the 40 deputies who make up the State Congress and the 111 municipal presidents, will be mark another turning point in the process of seeking peace, justice, democracy, shelter, health, work, land, food and education.

THE WORSENING OF THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE CONFLICT

Democracy is at a loss. During these days of the election campaigns in Chiapas, claims and accusations have been made against the government of having used public funds for their campaigns, and of having utilized humanitarian aid meant for the victims of the floods, for political and electoral ends. Health conditions, as well, are growing worse. Over the last few years, there has been an increase in malnutrition, diabetes, hypertensive coronary disease, metabolic and degenerative diseases, and others, in the marginalized zones. At the end of 1997, a marked increase was noted in AIDS cases, with 55 being reported, generally accepted as reflecting, in fact, that 11,000 persons are infected with the disease, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). There has also been an increase in hemorrhagic dengue and pulmonary tuberculosis. Eighty percent of the population of Chiapas - a little more than 3 million people out of a total of 3,584,786 inhabitants of the state - still currently lack access to social security services, and, of those, 450,000 do not have regular access to health services. Last August, the Secretary of Health noted that 2026 cases of malaria had been recorded in the state thus far this year.

Between the political and the natural catastrophes, the housing situation was exacerbated. Since the indigenous uprising, the former had left almost 20,000 persons displaced, uprooted from their lands and homes. In addition, 80% of the predios taken over by the indigenous have now been dispossessed. As for the latter, the floods in various regions of Chiapas did away with at least 10,000 homes and destroyed thousands of hectares of crops and transportation routes. Even before this catastrophe, BANRURAL had refused supports to Chiapas for the construction of 2400 homes, which would have meant an investment of 300 million pesos (mdp), which would have created 25,000 jobs; for which losses can be calculated of 84 mdp to the builders, as well as thousands of jobs.

These catastrophes have also had negative consequences in education, with thousands of schools having been damaged, others occupied by military or police forces. In Nuevo Limar, municipality of Tila, the "Gabriela Mistral" primary school is without teachers; in the Arrenza I and II parishes, in the municipality of Chamula, 30 children are not in school because of the prohibition against evangelicals; 6 schools are closed in Chenalhó (Polhó, Acteal and Chimix: 3 primary and 3 kindergarten); a thousand children have no basic education due to insecurity and to inattendance by more than 30 teachers in the Northern, Los Altos and Selva zones; 30 groups with no classes, especially in Las Margaritas and among the displaced of Chenalhó; 3 schools are closed in Las Margaritas because of the conflict; in the municipality of Oxchuc, public security police took over the primary school in the "Tres Nudos" community; in February, 3000 students were affected by the teachers' strike of Section 40 of the National Union of Education Workers, where 3000 teachers simultaneously mobilized in the municipalities of Pichucalco, Simojovel, Palenque, Ocosingo and San Cristóbal; in May another 2000 teachers went out on strike; also during May, Educational Services for Chiapas (SECH) confirmed that 11,000 of the 42,000 teachers in Chiapas were in work stoppage (teachers in the municipalities of Palenque and Salto de Agua won around 1000 pesos per month, a little more than 100 dollars monthly); due to the police-military operations over the last months, educational activities were halted in schools in the municipalities of Nicolás Ruiz, Venustiano Carranza, Ocosingo, La Trinitaria, San Andrés Larráinzar, Mitontic, Pantelhó, and others. As if this were not enough, Peter Brown is expelled from the country for supporting the education of the indigenous through the construction of a school in Oventic, municipality of San Andrés Larráinzar. At the end of 1997, some government institutions confirm that there are 540,000 illiterate persons in Chiapas, leading the country in illiteracy rates, and, of the 150,000 indigenous persons who do not speak Spanish, five out of every ten are illiterate.

Nor does peace arrive. In the Public Security Agreement, 127.5 million pesos (almost 13 million dollars) is budgeted for the purchase of weapons, equipment and the hiring of 267 judicial police, 40 experts and 50 public ministry agents. In the same arena, a salary increase was announced for public ministers, who went from 3000 pesos to 10,000 or 15,000 pesos monthly (one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars). This in addition to the 5000 police officers whom Governor Albores had already hired at the beginning of the year. Further, 12 million pesos are going to repair barracks and rehab police stations in Tapachula, Pichucalco, San Cristóbal de Las Casas and Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

It should be noted that one soldier in Chiapas has a monthly salary of 4000 pesos (USD400). Using the most conservative figures and the highest numbers of troops in Chiapas, we can conclude that, for the 50,000 soldiers in the state (assuming all of them are regular soldiers), there would be a monthly outlay for salaries of around 200 million pesos (20 million dollars), without taking into account the cost of food, patrols, maintenance of war equipment, purchase of arms, and so forth. In the case of the paramilitaries, the press has stated that, in some cases, they have been paid 850 pesos monthly for their training. The Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and the Electoral Councils earn around 104,000 pesos monthly (US$10,400), while the indigenous still see neither justice nor democracy, and with 500,000 chiapanecos not even receiving one peso per year. Thus, instead of doctors, there is an increase in soldiers. Today there is approximately one soldier for every 50 chiapanecos, which, in some of the so-called "conflict" zones, primarily indigenous, reaches a level of one soldier for every 3 inhabitants.

Since the massacre at Acteal, in the municipality of Chenalhó, the army has intervened in 24 municipalities, 17 of them considered highly marginalized. They have utilized checkpoints, harassment of residents and communities, land patrols, over-flights by planes and helicopters, house searches, physical attacks on campesinos, photographing, the stealing of belongings, threats, interrogations and detentions, among other actions, and, in the saddest case of all, in the municipality of El Bosque, the massacre of 8 campesinos.

Before the dissolution of the CONAI, Governor Roberto Albores Guillén had 145 police vehicles, provided 66 Public Security Municipal Councils with 45 million pesos and announced the hiring of 4800 persons in the name of "security," who were added to the already existing 500 anti-riot policewomen. Meanwhile, more than 300 employees were laid off from the program for Municipal Institutional Development, which supports municipal development projects. It was also reported that a special group from the Presidential General Staff and the Mexican Army were designing a training program for the police in the handling of weapons, as part of the restructuring of police bodies in Chiapas, in addition to the allotment of more than 60 million pesos from the state administration for the purchase of arms, and other amounts for the construction of 10 new penal centers. At the end of 1997, in the municipality of Arriaga, Coastal Zone of Chiapas, an attachment of the 21st Naval Zone of the Military Navy was formed for the first time, headquartered in Puerto Madero. Additionally, the Navy Department reported it was maintaining 50,000 troops in the country, and, for 1997, its budget was 5 billion pesos, which it was trying to have increased for 1998. It was later reported, despite the fact that the navy had its budget reduced by 180 million pesos, it would be able to replace its fleet at a cost of 34 billion pesos.

This year more than 100 groups from the Central and Frailesca Zones, representing more than three thousand campesinos, complained of the government's failure to carry out its support commitment through the Emergent Program of Rural Employment. Similarly, 2000 maize growers in Soconusco municipalities, belonging to the Local Producers' Association, complained of the government's failures under the Shared Risk Trusteeship (FIRCO), since they had not yet been paid the 90 days' wages per grower in compensation for the lowering of price guarantees for maize. These groups and organizations announced they would hold mobilizations if they did not receive the promised government supports. This situation carries the risk, in the light of the upcoming elections, of the possibility of the influencing and buying of votes by the official party; or the possibility of mobilizations, which could weaken those organizations in the elections. Later, these same regions were devastated by the September floods.

"THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF THE LAW: IMPUNITY"
(Excerpt, Part XXI)*

TITLE IV: CIVIL POPULATION

Article 13:

1. The civil population and civilians will enjoy general protection from the dangers generated by military operations. In order to make this protection effective, the following rules will be observed in all circumstances.

2. The civil population as such shall not be the object of attack, nor shall civilians. Acts or threats of violence whose primary purpose is to terrorize the civil population shall be prohibited.

3. Civilians will enjoy the protection conferred by this Title, unless they participate directly in the hostilities and only while that participation lasts.

(...) When the unit arrived at the highway and filed towards San Cristóbal, the police fired their weapons over the people at the side of the road. Guadalupe Méndez López, 25 years of age, was mortally wounded, and her daughter, Isabel Santiz Méndez, whom she was carrying in her arms, was wounded. (Balboa, J. La Jornada, 1/13/98, p. 6).

Soldiers guided by indigenous persons, with dogs, metal detectors, and some of them with their faces painted, went in to the coffee plantations and fields in the communities and set up checkpoints in the municipalities of Tila, Palenque and Ocosingo, confirmed independent indigenous organizations and political parties.

(...) the soldiers have used dogs to search some lands which are owned by EZLN sympathizers, and they have caused the campesinos to stop working their fields.

Many of the soldiers have their faces painted and are aggressive with the residents, say leaders of the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo. (Balboa, J. La Jornada, 1/23/98, p. 12).

"Since the first of January we haven't been able to get firewood, or beans, or maize, or coffee. Everything is rotting. The men can't go to work the fields," says Rosa, a tzeltal and mother of three children. "The soldiers want to come here in order to train, and they tell us they're going to come in because they're going to come in." (Intifada indigena. Masiosare, 1/25/98, p. 10).

(...) several families "abandoned the community (Tzajalnich, municipality of Chanal) and took shelter in the mountain, because the children and women got scared and were crying in fear," they said.

(...) the purpose of the soldiers' "incursion" is to "harass us and trample on our individual rights," in addition to its "disturbing the tranquility and co-existence in the community," the indigenous in this community said in a brief press bulletin. (Henríquez, E. La Jornada, 2/5/98, p. 6).

"Peace and Justice" acts more and more aggressively; this sends us the signal that there is no hope of resolving the conflict," a representative from the northern zone noted.

According to the residents of Amparo Aguatinta (Autonomous Municipality Tierra y Libertad), night patrols are in place in the urban area of the community, with up to 15 tanks sweeping the streets, pointing towards the houses and yelling "Zapatista bastards."

"They show up in the places of work looking for people already pointed out by the PRI informers, and they point their weapons, at the same time offering money to the children if they'll give them information and tell them who the Zapatistas are in the community."

The army opened a new focal point of tension in the jungle when they set up a military camp in early February, five kilometers from La Realidad. The war materiel and the 500 soldiers stationed there constitute an offensive military deployment which hangs threateningly over that tojolabal community.

The residents in the area are suffering from the increased military presence. During the rainy season, like now, the water level makes it impossible to cross the Euseba by walking or swimming. Now no one uses the old hanging bridge. The campesinos have to make huge backtracks in order to avoid the military camps. Meanwhile, tension prevails, and the over-flights of the military planes and helicopters are constant.

Twice a day the tojolabales see the Hummers and artillery tanks go by, the machine guns, the high-powered rifles, the soldiers lying in wait behind the scopes of their automatic weapons or behind a still or video camera. The children become sick with fear. (Masiosare. La Jornada, 11/23/97, p. 12).

Since last weekend, the soldiers' attitudes have become less reserved and more insulting, including the use of obscene hand gestures and remarks, such as:

"This is going to explode, bitches," directed towards a group of tojolabal women who were watching them as they went by, prepared to waylay them when they stopped.

The families have not gone out to their fields for two days, and in order to gather firewood, they go in groups, and then only to the nearest orchards.

The Mexican Army and the Attorney General's office of the Republic have, for four days, been maintaining "intensive and threatening" over-flights - up to 30 a day - over various communities in the Northern, Los Altos and Selva zones.

(...) "This caused terror and panic in the residents of those areas, and they couldn't go out to their work, because they were watching for, and terrified of, a possible attack by the federal Army." (Balboa, J. La Jornada, 3/17/98, p. 8).

The combat planes soaring above La Realidad make nosedives, as if they're practicing for machine-gunning. (...) the land patrols have doubled, and now the military convoy goes by four times a day. (...) What they're trying to do, most probably, is to drive the women and children crazy with fear. (Avilés, J. La Jornada, 1/17/98, p. 4).

"It's been five days now since we've gone out to work," says Maximiliano, "for fear that they will attack us. From one minute to the next, the helicopters act like they are going to land, and so they fly incredibly low."

The residents of La Realidad live in anxiety and fear. The planes fly so close to the roofs that many small children start crying. (Bellinghausen, H., La Jornada, 3/20/98, p. 6).

(...) according to testimony from the campesinos there, a helicopter hurled two black bags onto an indigenous person who was working in his field, and when they fell they broke open, and they were full of snakes.

There is a constant in this underlying and overt violence: it is directed against communities where EZLN support bases live, "threatened with being a violent organization," as the denunciation by the ejidal authorities of Roberto Barrios expressed it, after the assassination of their compañero, Trinidad Cruz Perez. (Bellinghausen, H., La Jornada, 3/17/98, p. 7).

"We (the COCOPA) are suggesting the withdrawal from the communities (of the Army) because it (its presence) breaks the agricultural cycle, the festival cycle, the daily life of the communities; because the women cannot go down to the rivers, the men cannot go to work, there are conflicts in the community (Cuéllar, M. La Jornada, 1/16/98, p. 6).

María Peréz, from Las Limas community, knew from December 20 that the paramilitaries were going to attack Acteal. Her husband, the mayor of the Chenalhó council, was one of them. Maria Perez wanted to warn her parents, who were in refuge in Acteal. Her husband wouldn't let her. At her own request, she was put in the jail in the municipal seat. They released her the day after the massacre. Since December 24, she has been in Polhó, in refuge with thousands of others. And with fear.

"The application of force by the State is not the solution to the problem, and the government has not exercised nor has it threatened to exercise that force; that has been the case since the first day, and how it will be until the last day, of my government." (Ernesto Zedillo, President of the Republic, 1/23/98).

"Zedillo says that the government has not used, nor will use, force in order to try to resolve the conflict in Chiapas. And the betrayal of the 9th of February of 1995? And the indigenous of Guadalupe Tepeyac, who are now living in exile in the mountain because their town is a combination of barracks, brothel and bar for the federal troops? Was it not by the use of force that dozens of citizens were taken prisoner for the crime of being Zapatistas? And the preparation, equipment, training and activation of the paramilitary squadrons? Was the Acteal massacre a demonstration of a willingness to dialogue? And the persecution of the Zapatistas which the federal army has been carrying out since the first of January of 1998? The history of Zedillo's regime is the history of the unkept word. The government has only the reason of force on its side. On our side are history, reason and truth. The demands of the Indian peoples are now supported by these three forces, they are without the law to crown their struggle with justice, but now it is seen that force will do everything it can to not give the shelter of the law to those rights which history cries out for, which reason supports and which truth gives life." (SCI Marcos, for the CG-CCRI of the EZLN. 1/29/98).

*Excerpt from the document "The Unbearable Lightness of the Law: Impunity; Three Months from Acteal," by "Alternative Popular Communication, Working Group," from 4/11/98

Gustavo Castro Soto
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C.
CIEPAC

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Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A. C.

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AUTHOR
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C.
CIEPAC is a member of the, Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade (RMALC) www.rmalc.org.mx, Convergence of Movements of the Peoples of the Americas (COMPA ) www.sitiocompa.org, Network for Peace in Chiapas, Week for Biological and Cultural Diversity www.laneta.apc.org/biodiversidad, the International Forum "The People Before Globalization", Alternatives to the PPP http://usuarios.tripod.es/xelaju/xela.htm, and of the Mexican Alliance for Self-Determination (AMAP) that is the Mexican network against the Puebla Panama Plan. CIEPAC is a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Economic Justice http://www.econjustice.net and the Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean (EPICA) http://www.epica.org.


Note: If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to: ciepac@laneta.apc.org and indicate whether you wish to receive the bulletin in plain text or as a Word 7 for Windows 95 attachment.

Note: If you use this information, cite the source and our email address. We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their comments on these Bulletins. CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to continue offering you this news and analysis service. If you would like to contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your remittance to the bank account in the name of:

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Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
CIEPAC, A.C.
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Translated by Witness for Peace for CIEPAC, A. C.


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