THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELECTIONS

On October 4, two election processes were carried out in Chiapas. The first was the election of the municipal presidencies in the state, who are re-elected every three years. Elections were held in 102 of the 111 municipalities, and they were suspended in 8 due to last September's floods and to the subsequent inability to guarantee optimal conditions for election day. They were also suspended in the municipality of Chamula, where the PRI's followers made the holding of the elections conditional on the release of several of their imprisoned leaders. It should be remembered that the municipal presidencies are a key piece in the context of the militarization, paramilitarization, the management of state and federal budgets, Low Intensity Warfare, the strengthening of the Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities and the state government's proposal for redistricting (the creation of new municipalities), among other elements. In short, the control of local political, economic, social and police-military power. Thus the determination of the federal government and the official party to recover those regions with a Zapatista presence or with strong party and social opposition presence.

The other process was the re-election of the State Congress, made up of 40 deputies elected in 24 electoral districts (24 deputies elected directly and 16 so-called "multi-nominal" deputies, who are determined according to the percentages of the previous votes by political party). However, in three districts the elections for deputies were suspended for the same reason, the catastrophe of the floods. At the current time, the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) has a majority in the State Congress. The Congress is another key piece, ensuring the application of the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank through the federation for Chiapas. With the majority of the deputies from the official party, approval of various initiatives will be easier, including the state budget, foreign investments, social policies, legal changes in agrarian matters, redistricting, a unilateral proposal by the state government concerning indigenous rights and culture, privatizations in all arenas, among other items still on the agenda. In short, the control of the political power of the Congress.

For these reasons, and despite the interim imposed governor's speeches about creating optimal conditions for democracy, the government and the official party did not abandon the old fraudulent practices of past elections. The elections were, then, a (lost) opportunity for the regime to open democratic spaces in order to resolve the causes which gave rise to the armed conflict, and to avoid a reign of violence over the next three years.

THE PRE-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE

In Bulletins 114 and 128, among others, we spoke of a number of events which took place within the pre-election scene, which increased and became much more serious as October 4 grew closer. We will mention just a few of those events:

Militarization: Various communities in Los Altos, the Selva and the North reported an increase in military patrols. In the Selva Zone alone, on September 28, approximately 100 Mexican Army vehicles traveled from Ocosingo towards San Quintin, passing by La Realidad, leaving for the municipality of Las Margaritas, which the Command of the Seventh Military Region of the Department of National Defense (SEDENA) argued were "provision of supplies" for the troops and "relief." At the same time the communities confirmed there was a build-up of the permanent checkpoints. A communique from the "Ricardo Flores Magon" Autonomous Municipality, in the municipality of Ocosingo, denounced that soldiers "were shooting and carrying out military exercises" outside the camp which is set up in the primary school, while the State Public Security Police, official party members and the alleged "MIRA" paramilitary group were exerting pressure on the communities. It was similarly denounced, in the town of San Jeronimo Tulija, municipality of Chilon, where another military camp has been established, that their Zapatista brothers "are being harassed and threatened, which is keeping them from being able to carry out their normal agricultural activities." On the day of the elections, the army remained in its barracks, but the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO), which participated in the elections in support of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), denounced that in the Can~ada of Monte Libano, soldiers in civilian dress were set up at the entrances to the communities, asking those who passed by whom they were going to vote for.

Throughout the year, the police-military, administrative, migration and legal persecution operations were carried out in communities with a Zapatista presence and in communities in which the PRD, National Action Party (PAN) or social forces in opposition to the regime were present, such as: Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Bochil, El Bosque, Sabanilla, Tila, Tumbala, Ixtapa, Soyalo, La Trinitaria, Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chilon, Jitotol, Nicolas Ruiz, Simojovel, Sitala, Palenque, Tenejapa, Amatenango del Valle, Venustiano Carranza, San Andres, Chenalho, Pantelho, Oxchuc, and so on, with the now well-known consequences, such as prisoners, deaths and displacements.

Civic Alliance, a national organization for election observance, stated at a press conference that, prior to the elections, they had carried out an investigation in order to learn about the situation prevailing in the state, concluding that the necessary conditions were not in place for carrying out the elections. They verified the increased military presence in Huitiupan and Ocosingo and the intimidation of their townspeople; that the political, social highway infrastructure and climatological conditions were not present. Civic Alliance reported that, of the 111 municipalities, 30% are militarized, with the presence of armed forces, which means that 36% of the voting age population does not enjoy the full guarantees of the freedom to exercise their political rights. According to reports by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), of the federal government, and Civic Alliance, a sampling of public opinion carried out in the Selva, Los Altos and the North showed 7% believed the Army was of some benefit to them, 13.88% that the Army guaranteed them peace and tranquility and 75% expressed fear and rejected the Army's presence. For their part, the EZLN said that "their mere presence as an armed group has contributed to the creation of a general climate of tension in the conflict zone"; their position regarding elections has varied on different occasions. Nonetheless, on the 2nd of October, the EZLN, through a communique, expressed their intention of not interfering in the election process, thus there was no burning of polling booths and other actions, as there had been in the federal elections in July of 1997.

In addition, there is a strong presence of, and pressure from, the paramilitary groups on the population in 20 or so municipalities in Chiapas.

Coercion and vote-buying: In Tuxtla Gutierrez, the Union of Bicycle Taxis denounced that they were attacked and their bikes were stolen if they did not vote for the PRI. In addition, the PRD and the PAN denounced that the official party was paying 100 and 200 pesos per vote in the neighborhoods of Patria Nueva, Francisco I. Madero, Diana Laura and Arroyo Blanco in the state capital. The timeless demands of the communities, such as potable water, highways, credits from government programs such as Procampo and Progresa, the paving of streets, etc., were used as bribes by the authorities a few days before the elections.

Repression: communities in the Northern Zone, Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbala and Salto de Agua, denounced that leaders of the alleged "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group were threatening to expel the people if they did not vote for the PRI. Residents in other municipalities suffered similar actions, in addition to expulsion from their lands, the enforcement of purported arrest warrants against social leaders, etc.

The displaced and the victims: Those displaced by political violence and the victims from the natural disaster represent 40% of the total state election rolls, taking in Electoral Districts XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX. The more than 15,000 internally displaced are in more than 10 municipalities; as for the flood victims, it is estimated that at least 30 municipalities were affected to some degree, very few of which coincide with the presence of the displaced.

The communications media: The report by Civic Alliance notes the substantively unequal presence of the political parties in the electronic and print media. The monitoring (of two radio stations in San Cristobal and of the state newspaper Fourth Power), which was carried out by Civic Alliance, reported that 43.4% of the space was allotted to the PRI, 21.8% to the PAN and 11.9% to the PRD. Although many of the spaces are paid, the financial resources received by the PRI for its campaign are much larger than those of the other parties.

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The elections took place under a high degree of mistrust, with a series of errors, irregularities and pressures. One of the first problems confronted by polling officials was the schedules. It should be remembered that Mexico observes Daylight Savings Time in the summer, putting the clocks ahead one hour, although many schools have not complied with this, nor have many rural communities. In some cases, the booths were installed an hour behind, in other cases there was a two hour difference. In addition, there were other forms of illegalities: some booths were placed in locations which differed from what had been announced; once again people were bussed (actually "trucked") to the polls in exchange for voting for the PRI; "Procampo" government credits were given out simultaneously and next to the election booths; death threats were made against opposition polling officials in the zone of Palestina and Santo Domingo, municipality of Ocosingo; impediments were put in the way of political party representatives remaining in the polling places; campaigning by PRI spokespersons during the first few hours of voting (which is illegal); the giving of gifts and cash in exchange for voting for the PRI; the regional caciqueism (political bosses) which has traditionally held power in many places through their gunmen and "white guards", who induce votes in favor of the official party or who terrorize, such as in the municipality of Venustiano Carranza, where gunmen were paid 50 pesos each for intimidating the opposition population; the lack of training of the polling officials, etcetera, etcetera.

There were also contradictions within, as well as between, opposition parties, which worked against the reaching of common accords for the defense of the vote, as well as against the designating of the best candidates for positions in the popular election, primarily for two reasons: because currents inside the parties wanted to impose persons of like mind, which occurred in some municipalities in the PRI, as well as in the PRD and in other parties; on the other hand, within the opposition, social organizations have always been trepidatious over having their best leaders caught in the web of State bureaucracy and corruption.

The electoral observation, national and international, consisted of 813 observers accredited with the State Electoral Council (CEE), among them: 13 from the United States organization, Global Exchange; 8 Canadian (4 from the Parliament and 4 from First Nations of Can~ada); 248 from State and National Civic Alliance, and others from the Mexican Front Pro Human Rights, the Tabasco Electoral Institute and Mexicans for Democracy.

The Zapatistas did not take a unified position on the election process, it appeared that they left it up to their support bases to decide what to do in the elections. Their participation varied depending on the conditions in each zone, in some municipalities voting for opposition candidates whom they considered it important to support; in other places they abstained (such as in San Andres and Chenalho) and preferred to follow the system of uses and customs, and at the times which they had established for the strengthening of the Autonomous Municipalities. If the Mexican government had carried out the Accords signed at San Andres, the indigenous would not have had so many problems in the past election process. At the same time, the excessive militarization being experienced in Chiapas was verified, which did not lend itself to the exercise of full political rights by the citizenry.

Although the figures vary according to the source, around 1,587,989 citizens were registered to vote (electoral rolls). According to the CEE, 3697 voting booths were set up in 102 municipalities (out of 111), distributed in 21 Electoral Districts (out of 24). In addition to an abstention rate of 54%, 38,268 ballots were voided for various reasons, a number which exceeds the total votes cast for the smallest political parties: for the Labor Party (PT), for the Green Ecology Party of Mexico (PVEM), for the Democratic Chiapaneco Party (PDCh) and for the Civic Front Party (PFC). None of these parties won a mayoralty, and the PFC and the PT lost the municipalities which they had held: Coapilla, Pichucalco and Simojovel.

The results for the municipal presidencies were the following: 82 municipal presidencies for the PRI; 15 for the PRD (Chicoasen, Francisco Leon, Jitotol, Nicolas Ruiz, Ocotepec, Pueblo Nuevo, Villa Las Rosas, Villa de Acala, Bejucal de Ocampo, Berriozabal, Chapultenango, Suchiapa, Tapalapa, Totolapa and Union Juarez); 5 for the PAN (Ixtacomitan, La Libertad, Ocozocoautla, Tuxtla Gutierrez and Rayon). Thus the PRI remains the primary political force in the state (and first at a national level), the PRD is in second place (third at the national level) and in third place is the PAN (second at the national level).

The PRD lost 16 of the 18 municipalities which it governed, retaining only the municipalities of Jitotol and Nicolas Ruiz. Those lost were: Ixtapa, Bochil, Reforma, Huitiupan, Sitala, Chilon, Altamirano, Frontera Hidalgo, Suchiate, Tuzantan, Villa Corzo, Amatenango del Valle, Mazapa and Amatenango de la Frontera, which passed into PRI hands. Of the 18 municipalities it held prior to the elections, that political group now holds 15. Thus the PRI regained all of the Selva and Northern zones, and almost all of Los Altos, leaving the municipalities of minor political importance to the PRD. The PRI went from 84 municipalities to 82, including the municipality of Ocosingo, which is governed by a Municipal Council - the only instance in the state - made up of 5 from the PRI and 5 from independent campesino organizations.

The PAN retained only the state capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez, losing the other three municipalities to the PRI (Arriaga, Sunuapa and Osumacinta, since the elections were suspended in Huixtla), winning in 4 other different districts. This party remains with the same number of municipalities as previously.

The results in the deputies' seats to re-elect the State Congress were as follows: 18 uni-nominal, the majority, for the PRI (of only 21 Electoral Districts installed, out of a total of 24); 2 for the PAN and 1 Deputy Seat for the PRD (Cuarto Poder newspaper, 10/9/98).

For the distribution of the remaining Multi-nominal Deputy Seats, and to complete the 40 seats in the State Congress, one seat more is awarded for every 1.5% of the total vote in the 24 Districts. Since elections were suspended in three of them, these multi-nominal seats could not be apportioned until the elections were held and the total votes counted by party. Nonetheless, illegality appeared again. The CEE divided up the seats based on the 21 Districts and awarded 7 more seats to the PRI for having gained 46.15% of the votes, 4 to the PRD with 26.43%, 3 to the PAN with 13.50%, and one to the PT (Labor Party) with 4.07% and another to the PFC (Civic front Party) with 1.54%.

And thus the State Congress will be imposed on November 16, with the same 25 Deputies' seats for the PRI as it currently holds; 5 for the PRD, 5 for the PAN, 1 for the PT and one for the PFC. In this way, the total number of opposition deputies (12 seats) will not be able to offset the PRI majority in the Congress' decisions. Once the voting is held in the three missing Districts, the small parties could lose their seats, if the global voting does not favor them.

The electoral experience is still not over. There were 25 appeals for review which were rejected by the State Electoral Court and 7 others turned over to the Electoral Court of the federation judiciary. The elections in the 8 municipalities of the Sierra and the Coast are yet to be held, as is the resolution of the elections in the municipality of Chamula. Of the 24 Districts, elections were not held in 3 (XV, VI and XVII) due to serious damage from the natural disaster, taking in the municipalities of Pijijiapan and Escuintla governed by the PRD; Mapastepec, Acacoyagua, Motozintla, Villa Comaltitlan and Siltepec governed by the PRI; and Huixtla, governed by the PAN. Of these 8 municipalities, at least 5 could remain in the hands of the opposition, as well as one district, which could change the make-up of the deputies, but the government will have already installed the State Congress.

In the municipality of Chamula, a 100% PRI municipality, the 59 voting booths were prevented from being installed, since the PRI's made them conditional on the release of 5 of their leaders imprisoned in Cerro Hueco, accused of violating the human rights of expelled evangelicals. Even when the governor of the state had warned that he would enforce the state of law -in clear allusion to the Autonomous Municipalities and the "Las Abejas" indigenous organization of Chenalho, where they would not allow the installation of the polling booths - in the case of Chamula he merely stated the law was not "up for bid," once more demonstrating his partisanship in the elections. There are 27,480 persons of voting age in Chamula, corresponding to 34% of the XXII District, enough to void the district elections according to the electoral laws. Nonetheless, voting in the district was validated, leaving only the election for the municipal presidency still pending.

Governor Roberto Albores Guillen did everything possible to install his Congress. For their part, opposition parties raised at least three questions: 1) the illegality of the purported official party victories in some municipalities and district seats where they claim irregularities and fraud; 2) the illegality and illegitimacy of the next State Congress, and 3) the illegality of the PFC representative, without all the votes in the state having been counted.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

1. The elections could have been an instrument for peace and the beginning of a transition to democracy in Chiapas, but it was not so, that hope faded with the verification that the PRI had repeated the same fraudulent practices and tricks as ever, in order to continue in power. The alliances of the Political Parties with the social organizations fixed their hopes on the election process, holding the possibility of finally moving towards the building of peace and democracy, the securing of justice and liberty. In some regions the EZLN support bases even participated in these alliances, or simply decided to vote for particular opposition candidates. This, once again the political, electoral and peaceful solution remains closed by the official party, which is opposed to the democratization of the state and the alternation of power.

2. The elections left much to be desired, and once more the social organizations were deceived, because the electoral process lacked credibility and trust. The hope that was placed in the elections vanished on learning that the PRI, by means of its well known tricks, took control once again of the majority of the municipalities and of Congress. And so the State Congress is once more built on sand and lacks legitimacy and legality, as do many of the municipalities where there was electoral fraud.

3. The PRI recovered the majority of the municipalities which had been previously won by the opposition, retaking economic, social and political control of the Selva, Los Altos and Northern regions. The government is trying to isolate the Zapatistas, taking power away from the opposition in strategic municipalities in the conflict zone, and breaking the natural buffer which had been formed around this zone. This buffer had been an attempt to stop the paramilitarization, militarization and the presence of police forces, since it is widely known, and well documented, that the municipal presidencies are the means for transmitting the confrontation plan among the communities as part of the Low Intensity Warfare. In this geographical-political municipal logic, the government sought to recover Ocosingo, Altamirano, Chilon and Sitala, regions with wide EZLN and autonomous municipality influence. The municipalities which the PRD won are some distance from the zone generally referred to as "conflict," creating the possibility for the government to assemble a new counterinsurgency plan for the Can~adas of Altamirano and Ocosingo, based on the redistricting project.

POST-ELECTION TRENDS

1. Civil resistance movements are approaching, of protest, of challenges to the election results, marches, the taking over of municipal presidency offices, blockades, etc., based on the freedom to protest, opposition and organization, in order to prevent the imposition of municipal authorities and Districts, but also based on the experience and tradition of the struggle of the people of Chiapas, which presents the possibility of a reorganizing of the social movement and its actors; opposite case: the trend of the process of paramilitarization and greater militarization will be irreversible in the conflict zone. In the municipality of Pantelho, where the official party dispensed bribes during the election, and where the vote total exceeded the number of ballots received, 35 to 50 people took over the mayor's office demanding justice. For their part, the State Democratic Assembly of the Chiapaneco people (AEDPCh) called for the creation of parallel governments in Los Altos, Northern and Fraylesca zones. In the municipality of Sitala, where the polling booth was closed early, with 150 yet to cast their votes, the majority PRD, and where two polls are being challenged for fraud, where the PRI won by just 75 votes, the people went out in the streets to protest the fraud. The PRD is also calling for mobilizations for "stealing" the elections in the municipalities of Cacahoatan, Tonala, Oxchuc, Cancuc, Venustiano Carranza and 50 other municipalities. Fraud has reached such a level that PRD members and "democratic PRI's" of the municipality of Oxchuc joined together to denounce the giving out of gifts during the election, as well as materials for roofs, and where they even counted on the support of evangelical leaders and community authorities in order to force the people to vote for the PRI. In the municipalities of Altamirano, Ocosingo, Venustiano Carranza and Pantelho coalitions have been formed between opposition parties and campesino organizations in order to defend the vote.

2. The Governor of the State, Roberto Albores, seems to suggest that the trend is to separate the Chiapaneco conflict from the national scene. The search for a peaceful or violent solution is in his hands, obviously with the advice of the federal government and the armed forces of the country, where they do not wish to have their military honor stained, and thus are using the Public Security Police as a spearhead against the communities in resistance. On the other hand, the governor stated two days after the elections that Subcomandante Marcos is "sick," and "every day he's looking more and more like a candidate for action by the State Attorney General's Office." In addition, the election results will facilitate the redistricting project as a counterinsurgency strategy, in order to be able to reposition PRI bases in the Can~adas of the Selva Lacandona and to confront Zapatista bases and independent organizations. In response to the state governor's lust for taking Subcomandante Marcos prisoner, Emilio Rabasa Gamboa appeared on the scene, not defending the Zapatistas, but more to justify his role as "Coordinator" for Dialogue in Chiapas, by declaring that Subcomandante Marcos is protected under the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Dignified Peace in Chiapas.

3. It can be anticipated that legal authorities and the state police will continue as the main actors in the repression, utilizing the paramilitary groups, counting on reinforcements from the federal Army and the National Migration Institute, denying the existence of political prisoners, calling on the EZLN for dialogue, preparing national and international public opinion for an offensive against the Zapatistas. And, places like San Andres, where the municipal presidency is in the hands of the opposition and which is in civil resistance, are the targets "…more and more for candidates of the State Attorney General's Office." The self-justifying speech stresses the "establishment of the state of law," although in the name of the law they continue assassinating the indigenous in resistance, filling the jails with political prisoners, making them pass as criminals, and the activities of the paramilitary groups, justifying them as inter-community conflicts.

4. For the municipalities of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano, Chilon and Sitala, a strengthening of the paramilitarization can be anticipated, and the displacement of communities in resistance, for the purpose of deconstructing the EZLN social bases and the independent social organizations, or for better accommodating the redistricting project.

5. An increase in attacks and death threats can be anticipated, against NGO members and human rights defenders.

6. In this sense, the recent electoral process is a giant step backwards in the search for democracy and peace in Chiapas, and it opens new scenarios for war. In this sense, the challenges for civil society and civil organizations, and for those who seek democracy, are large, in the building of new spaces and points of dialogue, tolerance, respect and new proposals for avoiding war.

7. It is not just democracy and the peaceful paths which have suffered setbacks. With the decision of the judges in collusion with the bankers that the charging of interest on interest by the bankers is legal, thousands of Chiapaneco debtors, who will be again affected, will also begin to resist. The crisis has crossed the borders of the indigenous and poor population of the state. The chambers of commerce, construction, professional groups, debtor associations, leaders of production centers and of public transportation, will send a proposal to the Congress of the Union proposing that Chiapas be declared an emergency and catastrophe zone, so that a "grace period" may also be given to businesspersons and agricultural producers, and they will not have to pay taxes to the Department of the Treasury and to Social Security. The National Chamber of Commerce (CANACO) states that, of the 36,000 businesses in the state, some 3600 establishments close every month in Chiapas; the National Chamber of the Restaurant Industry (CANIRAC) states that tourism in the coastal zone could suffer an 80% loss. Because of this, the natural catastrophes have also set back the economic growth, which goes hand in hand with setbacks in the conditions of life. Now, the Nutrition School states that Chiapas heads the list of the states with the most malnutrition in the country, reaching 60% of the population, and with the least growth in infant birth weight. As if this were not enough, the last few hours and days have seen the announcement of another state of emergency in the coastal region due to the presence of new adverse weather conditions, more rains and more floods.

Onesimo Hidalgo and Gustavo Castro Soto
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. (CIEPAC)

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