(Part I/II)

Note: The following newspaper sources from Chiapas and Mexico City have been used in the preparation of this Bulletin: Cuarto Poder, Expresso, El Observador de la Frontera Sur, La Jornada and Reforma.

The first anniversary of the massacre in Acteal, in the municipality of Chenalhó, December 22, brought increased attention to the issue of "paramilitaries" in Chiapas. In their "White Book", the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (PGR) stated, among other issues put forward in their report, that the massacre was precipitated by inter-community conflicts, and, if government institutions had been present, such a massacre would not have occurred. The reaction of political parties, of national and international human rights organizations, of civil organizations, of intellectuals, and of many other sectors, and the general consensus among all citizens, was to repudiate such statements. Thus, government officials are continuing their cynical strategy of denying the obvious in order to create confusion, but, in reality, their evaluations and analyses are no longer creating consensus. For some time now the term "autism" (" the pathological psychological tendency to be disinterested in the outside world, and to close oneself up in oneself", according to the Larousse dictionary) has been imputed to the government. The Acteal massacre led to the recovery of the social and political legitimacy of many concepts, which had been previously rejected by government structures, and by groups close to, and unconditionally supporting, the regime. Among them, the word "paramilitary", which, strictly speaking, refers to groups which are officially armed, trained, uniformed and led by the military structure and command. Since this "official nature" does not exist under the law, it is enough for authorities to deny their existence, as interim Governor Roberto Albores Guillén recently did. Nonetheless, the proof of their existence is in the deeds. Days before the massacre, the also interim acting Governor, Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, emphatically denied the "militarization", when it was already in control of the state apparatus and of many municipalities, and of the "displaced", of whom they said there were only 600 persons, all of whom were currently in the process of returning, and now there are more than 20,000. The "paramilitaries" were saying that the only armed group was the EZLN, and, days later, Acteal was filled with blood and the "ungovernability" which is now accepted in order to justify a "State of Law".

And so, in Chiapas, Mexico and the world, everyone sees the paramilitaries and the results they leave in their wake, among them many deaths, but the government still does not see them. Contradictorily, last December, Governor Albores announced a legislative proposal to grant amnesty to the "armed groups" and to give them money for purported development programs in exchange for their weapons. This event - while almost fifty indigenous families were leaving Union Progreso, municipality of El Bosque, to take refuge in the mountains following their persecution by the Police and PRI groups from Los Plátanos - was repudiated by many groups. The problems presented by this initiative are various, such as: 1) it permits impunity; 2) the creation of these groups is first facilitated, and then they are pardoned, and, finally, they are rewarded, while excluding the EZLN and all groups identified with them; 3) it puts the punishment of the paramilitary groups, who have savagely assassinated, as in Acteal and the Northern Zone, on a par with the punishment of any common criminal group; 4) it also facilitates the release of prisoners in Cerro Hueco, such as in the case of Los Chinchulines and those responsible for the Acteal massacre; 5) it is completely immoral when compared with the punishments imposed on other indigenous persons during the police-military operations, or those which have been fabricated against them; 6) it will facilitate the transformation of these paramilitary groups into ""Civil Development Bodies", like "Development, Peace and Justice, A.C." claims to be, in the Northern Zone, or into rural guards or rural police of the Security Council, completely legalized.

If the "paramilitarization" process has indeed grown, it is also true that the concept has been used to excessive. There is confusion surrounding the characteristics which define them as such. And so, "white guards", ""gunmen", "armed groups" or "criminals" with some party and organizational affiliation, are not the same. However, it can be a very short leap for them to become "paramilitary" groups. But what distinguishes them? In our judgment, paramilitary groups are in the service of a Low Intensity Warfare strategy. They are not just a group of criminals who rob and assault, but, rather, they carry out specific activities designed to weaken those actors who oppose the current regime. They - directly or indirectly - have some sort of relationship with the state apparatus. Their activities take place during key moments. And, they have well-defined actors and objectives. They are like the already well-known groups in Colombia and Central America, who have played successful roles in counterinsurgency activities. Or, rather, they are nothing new; they are only too well known by the governments and the armies of this continent (A recent and extensive analysis of the use of paramilitaries in Central America, and the role of the US in promoting them, can be found in "Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America 1977 - 1992", William M. LeoGrande, University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

In the Fourth Condition put forth by the COCOPA and the CONAI, on January 22, 1998 for the renewal of dialogue, the problem of paramilitarization is referred to, which both bodies recognize as a fact. The Mediation and the Congress of the Union stated: "The paramilitary groups who are operating in the different zones of the State of Chiapas should be disarmed, and their responsibilities in the commission of crimes should be fixed. In the case of the EZLN, the fate of their weapons should be a matter for the agenda of the negotiation, and a consequence of a mutual accord between the Parties, based on the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and the Dignified Peace in Chiapas". The EZLN, in their third condition (An end to military and paramilitary harassment), state that the paramilitary bands have created refugees as a consequence of the conflict of the war, and that the return of the displaced will take place when political, social and economic conditions exist. After Acteal, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (PGR) confirmed the need for disarming and punishing the "paramilitary groups". Later, the government once more tried to deny these concepts, calling them "armed civilian groups", while at the same time, in the local press, on 6/1/98, it was reported that Department of National Defense (Sedena) personnel were promoting the use of weapons in communities in the Selva and Border regions, such as La Trinitaria, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, La Independencia, Tzimol and Comitán, insisting always and when they were not for the 'exclusive use of the army.'

If we review the groups which have announced themselves publicly from 1994 until the present, whether or not they have a name (those without one, we shall identify by their municipality of influence), and whether they are recognized as paramilitary groups or as criminal groups, but, rather, using the common denominator of being armed groups, we find that: in 1994, 2 groups were known: Los Aguilares and the OCOPECH; in 1995, 3 others appeared: Peace and Justice, Chinchulines and San Bartolomé de los Llanos Alliance; in 1996, 3 more: Red Mask, Los Chentes and Social Justice; in 1997, 7 more appeared: Chenalhó (those responsible for the Acteal massacre), the Indigenous Revolutionary Anti-zapatista Movement (MIRA), Clandestine Revolutionary Organization (OCR), Amatenango de la Frontera, Simojovel, Frontera Comalapa and Chicomuselo; in 1998, 12 more were reported: Los Tomates, Los Puñales, Los Plátanos, Los Quintos, Los Carrancistas, Civil Front, OCOPECH, OPDDIC, Tenejapa, La Trinitaria, Nicolás Ruiz and Chamula. A total of 27, and it would be 31 if we take into account four "paramilitary" groups who, in our judgment, no longer have any influence, but who are counted by other human rights groups: "Los Degolladores" in San Juan Chamula, "Tomás Muntzer in Ocosingo, "Primera Fuerza" in Chenalhó and the "Tzintzines" in Yajalón.

From the previous, we can infer that the process of arming civilian groups in the counterinsurgency scheme picked up in an unprecedented manner between 1997 and 1998, the year when the formation of these groups was more heavily promoted, and concomitant with a process of suspended dialogue. From 1994 to 1997, the process took the following trajectory: from the Northern Zone to Los Altos Zone and, finally, to the Selva Zone. During 1998, it grew in those 3, and advanced into the Border and Soconusco Zones, following the advance of the consolidation of the zapatista autonomous municipalities, and hand in hand with an increase in the military and police camps. From the 5 armed groups known prior to the suspension of dialogue (September 1996), to the 27 known at this time (December 1998), the rate of increase has been 440%.

The armed groups and paramilitaries denounced up to now have influence in at least 37 municipalities in the state: Altamirano, Amatenango de la Frontera, Bochil, Berriozábal. Cancuc, Comitán, Chamula, Chanal, Chenalhó, Chicomuselo, Chilón, El Bosque, Frontera Comalapa, Huitiupán, Huixtán, Ixhuatán, La Independencia, La Trinitaria, Las Margaritas, Palenque, Nicolás Ruiz, Ocosingo, Oxchuc, Pantelhó, Sabanilla, Salto de Agua, San Andrés, Simojovel, Sitalá, Suchiate, Tapachula, Tecpatán, Tumbalá, Tzimol, V. Carranza and Yajalón. This represents 33% of the municipalities in Chiapas and 7 zones (out of 9): Central, Selva, Northern, Los Altos, Border, Sierra and Soconusco.

Among the federal and local PRI deputies who have been identified by the press, and denounced by the communities, as being associated with the armed and paramilitary groups, are: Samuel Sánchez Sánchez, Rafael Ceballos, Eucario Orantes, Norberto Sántiz López, Alonso López Gómez, Ali Cancino Herrera and Walter León Montoya.

The characteristics of the alleged paramilitary and armed groups in Chiapas are: 1) active in the indigenous regions; 2) active in the municipalities with the greatest marginalization and poverty; 3) active where the greatest part of the police and military bodies are concentrated, through check-points or camps; 4) active in municipalities governed by the official party; 5) identified with a PRI local or federal deputy; 6) generally of the evangelical religion; 7) identified with, sympathizers of, or PRI activists; 8) with "ex-military" or "ex-police" activists; 9) active where there is the presence of the EZLN, the Autonomous Municipalities or their Support Bases; 10) with militant municipal presidents or "ex-municipal presidents" or with some position of authority in the municipality; 11) the majority within the boundaries of the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas; 12) the primary targets of their attacks are the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, the PRD, the EZLN, Civil Organizations, foreign observers and human rights defense organizations; 13) they are accused of receiving payments for training; 14) they are identified with high-caliber armaments; 15) they operate in areas where there are strong economic interests in land, production or investments.

Among their principal activities are 1) homicide; 2) ambushes; 3) kidnappings; 4) displacement of populations; 5) impeding freedom of worship and the closing of churches; 5) destruction of homes; 6) stealing of the infrastructure of production (mills, farm tools, storerooms, etc); 7) stealing of domestic animals; 8) stealing of production (maize, coffee, etc.); 8) check-points and the collection of money; 9) coercion into joining their paramilitary militancy or the official party; 9) harassment; 10) death threats; 11) collection of money for the maintenance of the paramilitary group, etcetera.

During 1998 alone, there were many activities related to the problem of the paramilitaries. In the first half of the year, several Chinchulines were released from jail; also released was the young man, Miguel Toporek, who tried to assassinate Bishop Samuel Ruiz García's sister, when he was not able to find the Bishop in the Diocesan Curate on November 5, 1997; on March 12, 1998, two members of Peace and Justice were released who had assassinated a campesino on January 1. Once again, armed groups, Peace and Justice and other PRI militants were accused of being responsible for the closing and destruction of 32 churches in 9 municipalities (Huixtán, Ocosingo, San Andrés, Salto de Agua, Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbalá, Chanal and Chenalhó) and for the harassment of priests of the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas. On March 7, it was denounced that 50 armed men in Huanal, Tila were found 'prowling around' zapatista sympathizers, new death threats occurred in Masojá Chucjá and armed PRI's fired shots in Miguel Alemán, Tzaquil, Panchuc and Masojá Grande. It should be remembered that the PRI municipal president solicited weapons, boots, uniforms, radios, etc, from the community of Jimbal. The legal authorities have documentary evidence of this, but, up to this time, nothing has been done regarding it. This leads us to recall that the former municipal president of Chenalhó, currently imprisoned, Jacinto Arias, asked President Zedillo, during one of his swings through Chiapas prior to the massacre, for permission to carry weapons. In Altamirano (on March 14), in San Miguel Chiptik, armed men wearing ski-masks were prowling about the zapatista sympathizer communities; on March 25, PRI's and Cardenistas agreed to prevent the presence of priests in the parish of the municipal seat; on March 28, NGO's denounced that 20 armed youths were moving about Maravilla Tenejapa; among many, many other activities. Despite so much evidence, already accumulated over almost 5 years, on July 3, 1998, the Under Secretary of Government denied that there were paramilitaries in Chiapas.

The year of 1998 was the year of the paramilitaries, the military and the Public Security Police. On July 7, 1998, the SEDENA [Department of National Defense] said that the military should not leave Chiapas, because it is the main route for drug trafficking and that 90% of their budget goes to current expenses, and the rest to social work in the country; that there are no indications of paramilitaries; that the Mexican Army receives training in the US, France, Brazil and Russia; that they will not accept their leaving Chiapas, but they will accept repositioning, if there are orders from President Zedillo; that the Mexican Army "has always kept itself within the framework of legality, and in accordance with the responsibilities assigned it in the Constitution". On July 5, 1998, the press reported that the Mexican Army, after 4 and a half years, had built more than half a dozen military and housing buildings in San Cristóbal, Tuxtla, Comitán, Altamirano, and communities such as San Quintín, Flor de Caté, Amparo Aguatinta, Maravilla Tenejapa, Toniná, Las Margaritas (Maravilla Tenejapa). In total it is calculated that there are 150 departments for 700 persons from all over the republic. A top-ranking military officer of the 12th Non-Squadron Infantry Company supervises the work of the 200 masons who lay bricks in the construction works. In Altamirano, the new facilities take up 50 hectares, and in Toniná, approximately 60, according to the press. However, the few classrooms of the Technical University of Ocosingo, recently opened, with a capacity of 500 students, is pitiful, especially in comparison with the neighboring military buildings in Toniná. Meanwhile, on July 24, 1998, it was confirmed that the Army had installed 20 new control points, checkpoints and other areas of control and presence (Juan Balboa, La Jornada).

It was the year of the Public Security Police. On July 9, 1998, more than 3,675,000 pesos went to the Municipal Public Security Council of Sabanilla. On July 30, 1998, the Secretary of Government, Francisco Labastida, signed the Public Security Convention, allocating 127.5 million pesos from the federal budget; a pay increase was announced for Public Ministry officials in the amount of 3000 to 10 to 15,000 pesos monthly; and 267 judicial police, 40 specialists and 50 Public Ministry agents were contracted, in addition to the 500 anti-riot women contracted in January of that year.

In the "Chiapas Al Día" Bulletin No. 92, of January 28, 1998, we made a recounting of the alleged paramilitary groups. It is useful to bring this up to date now, at the end of the year. We are recording here all of those revealed by the national and local press. Nothing more is known of some of them, others functioned openly, and others' names are not specifically known. If you wish to know more details, read the second part.

"THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF THE LAW: IMPUNITY"

(Excerpt, Part XXVII)*

(Note: We are speaking of the additional Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relative to the protection of victims of armed conflicts of a non-international nature, approved on June 8, 1977, by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of the Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which went into effect on December 7, 1978, and which has not yet been signed by the Mexican government, since, among other things, it would be a tacit recognition of the EZLN as a belligerent force, and the government does not want to associate itself with international conventions in conflicts of war).

Article 18: Aid Societies and Aid Activities.

1. Aid societies established in the territory of the contracting Helping Party, such as organizations like the Red Cross (Red Crescent, Leon and Red Sun), may offer their services for the carrying out of their traditional functions relative to the victims of armed conflict. The civil population may, even on their own initiative, offer to pick up and attend to the wounded, ill and victims.

2. When the civil population is suffering extreme privations due to the lack of supplies indispensable for their survival, such as food and sanitary supplies, they will undertake, with the consent of the interested contracting Helping Party, aid activities for the civil population, of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature, and carried out without any distinctions of an adverse nature.

One of the victims of the governmental pounding of the discomfiting witnesses to the chiapaneco conflict has been the International Committee of the Red Cross, which we have come to know in Mexico as the International Red Cross (CRI) () the CRI mission in Mexico received, in January of this year, the categorical order to suspend all activities in Chiapas. Medical attention to the displaced was, thus, cancelled. The economic resources intended for the chiapanecos through the Red Cross also stopped flowing () above all, the presence of an impartial humanitarian body was withdrawn, one with absolute credibility in the world, whose testimony could not be controlled or distorted through national political channels () it is highly suspicious that this government threw the CRI out of Chiapas right at moments like those experienced over these recent months, when the temptation to renew the war in the southeast has been re-opened () in the CRI's case, their legal status is not even remotely similar to that of an NGO, but rather that of a body whose scope of activities in Mexico has been recognized by the government itself through the signing of various conventions, one of them the International Conference held in Geneva in 1986. (Hernández López, J. Astillero. La Jornada, 3/17/98, p. 4)

According to the statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross "the CICR may take all humanitarian initiatives which correspond to their role as institution and intermediary; that right is recognized and approved by all the states in the world". That, clarified Phillipe Gaillard, mission chief (in Mexico) of the International Committee of the Red Cross, "does not mean that the governments have to accept it, but, by offering their services, the CICR is not interfering, since the States have recognized that right of initiative. We are at the service of the Mexicans, let them decide". (Ballinas, V. La Jornada, 1/24/98, p. 8)

The International Red Cross (CRI) explained that the government is the primary opponent of that body's having a presence in Chiapas. "Things aren't clear, the Chancery and Emilio Rabasa have told us that. They asked us to have some patience, and we'll have all in the world". Their delegate, Phillipe Gaillard, said they are ready, when the government allows it, to talk with the paramilitary groups and to serve as chauffeurs between the State and EZLN negotiators when the peace talks are renewed () The work of protection means speaking with all parties, "even with the badly or well named paramilitary groups, in order to make them understand that there are some basic rules of law of war which cannot be exceeded". (Muñoz, A. La Jornada, 3/5/98, p. 17).

Cornelio Sommaruga, president of the CICR, said that he was concerned about the manner in which the paramilitary groups in Chiapas were operating, also referring to the fact that the Mexican government was withdrawing authorization for humanitarian intervention by personnel of the institutions, owing to problems with the army () That means that there is still much work for the International Red Cross, first, to disseminate humanitarian principles, and then to help the victims, among whom are very many internally displaced persons () "Our first intention is to resume our neutral and humanitarian intermediary role, in order to get the parties in conflict to sit down at the discussion table in order to avoid new pressures. But this is rather difficult at the moment", he said. () Governments in circumstances of internal violence or civil war do not immediately see that the presence of this humanitarian institution can be necessarily positive, because they believe it will lead to the internationalizing of that conflict, something which is not at all certain. "The CICR has the right to humanitarian initiative, and, based on this right, their services are offered, which are carried out in a perfectly neutral, impartial and independent way. () sometimes, after intensive discussions with the government, we obtain authorization to be present in a particular place, but, a little later, the decision is withdrawn. It is often due to problems with the federal army," he stated.

() The President of the Mexican Red Cross, Jose Barroso Chávez, did not think Chiapas required the help of the International Red Cross, since the Mexican institution had all the human and economic resources necessary to attend to the displaced indigenous, "who trust us".

"In your opinion, shouldn't the International Red Cross participate?"

"It is not my opinion, it is our decision".

In the transfer of the displaced indigenous, he said, only the Mexican Red Cross should participate, and he stressed that, since 1994, humanitarian aid has been delivered impartially. (Nuñez, K. and Cervantes, J. La Jornada, 1/16/98, p. 6)

Members of the academic and artistic community demanded the intervention of the International Red Cross in the Northern zone of Chiapas, in order to break the "siege of hunger and terror which prevails" () they accused the government of misinforming the public concerning the situation of the chiapaneco indigenous, who were suffering "harassment by the military" and who were searching their communities and preventing free movement, in addition to receiving death threats from the paramilitaries, whose numbers have increased. (Velasco, E. La Jornada, 3/16/98, p. 6)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR) stopped participating in Chiapas after a year, because there had not been any conflict, and nor are there talks between the EZLN and the federal government, stated José Barroso Chavéz, President of the Mexican Red Cross. He explained that next week the donation of 1.5 million dollars might be finalized, from the German and Spanish Red Crosses, through the European Union, which will be used to support the return of the displaced indigenous to their communities. Each week, he went on, the Red Cross spends 700,000 pesos in Chiapas, and it has maintained a constant presence there since the beginning of the conflict. In addition to sending clothing, food and construction materials, the institution performs medical services, recording 200 consultations daily (El Semanario Tiempo adds - and proves it with photographs - that, among the pharmaceuticals delivered, there were slimming medicines and expired DOXYCICLINE HYLATE. This medicine is a form of tetracycline, a medication which, in contrast with others which lose their efficacy after their expiry date, turns toxic). But the humanitarian aid from the Mexican Red Cross continues to occasion polemics. In the first days following the Acteal massacre, the Mexican Red Cross transported only those in the most serious condition to the hospital in San Cristóbal de Las Casas. (Gil Olmos, J. La Jornada, 1/10/98, p. 11).

The Mexican Red Cross only attends to the most serious cases, and it uses an ambulance for that, which is always available, in front of the improvised consulting office at the entrance to Polhó. But there are no medicines being offered. (Gil Olmos, J. La Jornada, 1/16/98, p. 7)

Afterwards, the disgust with the Mexican Red Cross grew: A large Mexican Red Cross trailer remained parked for two days at the entrance to the village (Polhó). It had come filled with medicines which had just been unloaded. Yesterday they took four boxes of various medicines, which came from the trailer, to the clinic which was installed in the school. Half the pharmaceuticals were useless or past their expiry date. Torn seals and guarantees, boxes of antibiotics almost empty. The salbutamol aerosol had expired in 1994, the pantomicina in 1997, the flavit and the erythromycin in 1996. Several AZT containers seemed out of place. The costly anti-viral drug which is used with AIDS is apparently not needed here, luckily. The health promoter in charge of the first aid post says that the pharmaceuticals which are really needed do not appear in the donations: effective antibiotics, anti-parasitics, cough syrups, analgesics, iron () The health promoter admits that the Mexican Red Cross medicines are indeed helping the sick, but not enough. (Bellinghausen, H. La Jornada, 1/20/98, p. 6).

This event was communicated by Polhó officials to the Mexican Red Cross: "The person in charge of the shipment asked us to unload the shipment, when our promoters realized that many of the cartons were past their expiry dates or at the point of expiring. () We asked the person in charge of the shipment what the Mexican Red Cross' motive was in sending us expired medications. Sr. López' response was that it was not his responsibility, that they had been packed in Mexico, and that they should make their selection here and return what was useless." The dissidents stated: "He told us, and the press and the other witnesses as well, that the boxes had come sealed from the laboratories. Why does the (Mexican) Red Cross waste so much money and time transporting delicate medicines to Chiapas which are no longer any good to anyone? Is it a joke? Is that how much they despise us? (Bellinghausen, H., La Jornada, 1/21/98, p. 5)

A response from the President of the Mexican Red Cross, Barroso Chávez, to these statements, was not long in coming: "An expired medication, which has been prescribed, does no harm. They can still be used three months after their expiry, and if some doctor tells me otherwise, then he doesn't know medicine" () "The Mexican Red Cross can attend to the sick in Chiapas; the International Red Cross' help is not necessary. We don't need it, we can take care of the conflict ourselves". (Ballinas, V. La Jornada, 1/23/98, p. 8)

But representatives of the displaced communities and officials of the autonomous municipality of San Pedro Chenalhó, sent an "urgent request' today (1/20/98) for humanitarian aid to the International Committee of the Red Cross, with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. In it, they asserted that "since December 1997, we have been gathered together in this community: more than 6000 men, women, children and old persons, displaced by the Mexican government's dirty war. () Since we were dislocated and took refuge outside our communities, already 15 children, 8 women and 10 men have died from illnesses such as diarrhea, fevers, respiratory infections, tuberculosis, parasites, ulcers, foot infections, malnutrition, etc." (Bellinghausen, H. La Jornada, 1/21/98, p. 5)

The Secretary of Health also spoke on this issue, and denied that the Mexican government needed assistance or mediation from foreign bodies, such as the International Red Cross, in order to deliver humanitarian aid. () "It is we Mexicans who must find the solution to our problems," he said. Upon visiting a clinic there (Yabteclum), the official received a complaint from Dr. Asunción Pérez Santiago concerning the low salary levels of the 52 doctors, nurses and technicians of the General Directorate of Epidemiology who had been sent here, and concerning the lack of work contracts to support them. Hours later, the doctor was suspended by the health officials themselves, after having found out about the government medical team's working conditions: () they are working under the pressure of not revealing to the media the conditions under which they were sent, without contracts, making them sign blank forms and without recompense for their expenses. "It's a cover-up," he said. (Gil Olmos, J. La Jornada, 1/17/98, p. 6)

Meanwhile, Mexican humanitarian organizations, in a formal request delivered to the International Red Cross representative in Mexico, noted that there was concern, because government health services had caused a lack of trust and their subsequent rejection, especially when they try to distribute them through the federal army in the communities of the displaced. (Balboa, J. La Jornada, 1/3/98, p. 6)

In addition, today it is known that, in 1988, the Secretary of Health authorized the National Company of Popular Staples (CONASUPO) to distribute 2,436.35 tons of milk, contaminated with radioactive cesium in the Chernobyl nuclear accident, throughout the country. (Cuéllar, M. and Perez, E. La Jornada, 4/5/98, p. 11).

Señor Barroso has been questioned concerning the alleged irregular management of donations sent by the national and international community to the Mexican Red Cross for Hurricane Pauline victims. These criticisms have caused the annual collection to decline in Acapulco, which went from 402,000 pesos in 1997, to 100,000 this year. (Gutiérrez, M. La Jornada, 4/4/98, p. 49)

He has also been criticized for his statements regarding the use of condoms for AIDS prevention: The National Council of Directors of the Mexican Red Cross will review and discuss their President, José Barroso Chávez' statements concerning the effectiveness of condoms for preventing contagion from the human auto-immune virus (HIV), because they flagrantly violate the fundamentals of the institution () Barroso Chávez forgot about neutrality, impartiality and humanity, three of the seven basic tenets which guide the International Committee of the Red Cross. (Cruz, A. La Jornada, 2/17/98, p. 39)

The following statements demonstrate, once more, his bias: There is no conflict in Chiapas, what exists is "the insistence of a group of persons on their revolutionary army," stated José Barroso Chávez. He said that all the needs for medical care and for food for the indigenous are being resolved, and therefore neither help nor economic aid is needed from the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the Mexican government is not obligated to accept their participation, because, up to now, it has not ratified Protocol II, addendum to the Geneva Conventions concerning the protection of victims in domestic conflicts, he stressed. He even rejected the possibility that the CICR would guarantee the security of the EZLN members if the dialogue is renewed, because "the International Committee is two persons, and the work has in fact been done by volunteers from the Mexican Red Cross." Nonetheless, he noted, the participation of the Mexican Red Cross in the peace bands, if the dialogue table were to be re-established, is subject to whether or not the federal government were to request it. "If the government doesn't accept it, it's their problem, not ours." () the militants "have never requested intervention or non-intervention. At the point at which they ask us for it, then we'll see what our attitude is." () he indicated that medical and assistance services are functioning perfectly with the donations provided by civil and business organizations () he denied any substance in the petition by a group of intellectuals for the intervention of the CICR. (Cruz, A. La Jornada, 3/23/98, p. 6)

Barroso Chávez pointed out that, if the Mexican Red Cross is asked to intervene as mediator in the Chiapas conflict "we will do so with much pleasure" () the only thing he noted during his trip to the state was "there was much cordiality among those who were there, indigenous and non-indigenous, with the soldiers. I didn't see any animosity or any hostility with them, rather the opposite," he asserted, after indicating that one of the activities carried out by the Red Cross is convincing the close to 8000 displaced to return immediately to their communities of origin. (Gil Olmos, J. La Jornada, 3/24/98, p. 7)

The displaced insist that it be the International Red Cross which plays a role in humanitarian care. It seems like an "interventionist" proposal to the Mexican government, without remembering that, on other occasions, the body has been brought in successfully. The International Red Cross has most certainly offered their help. (Petrich, B. A Month Has PassedPerfil de La Jornada, La Jornada, 1/22/98, p. 4)

"As far as I've been able to see, a situation of war exists in Chiapas. Or, if it's not a situation of war, it is a military occupation, which, in the end, is not much different. It is not a war in the usual sense, with a front and two parties confronting each other. I have only seen one confronting party: the army and the paramilitaries. The other party, the indigenous communities, are not confronting each other, they have no means. They are surrounded, they don't have food or water, they don't have the most minimal living conditions. If there has ever been, in the history of humanity, an unequal 'war', there has never been anything like this. (José Saramago, writer. 3/17/98)

"Officials are maintaining an absurd position on the viability of the International Red Cross entering Chiapas. It is incredible how the government supports international problems and minimizes its own." (Emilio Álvarez Icaza, Director of the National Center for Social Communication. 1/20/98)

"Beyond what Rabasa says, his chief, President Zedillo, has clearly stated what the government's real policy towards Chiapas is. And this can be summed up in two points: the refusal to recognize the San Andrés Accords, and the use of force in order to try to beat the indigenous rebel." (Luis Hernández Navarro, writer. 1/20/98)

*Excerpt from the document, "The Unbearable Lightness of the Law: Impunity; Three Months from Acteal", by "Alternative Popular Communication, Working Group", from 4/11/98

HAPPY NEW YEAR!

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