1998: We can confirm that this has been Chiapas' most difficult year since the armed conflict began in January of 1994. Natural, political and social catastrophes devastated attempts for democracy and the search for peace.

Situations change when relationships between forces are modified, owing to alliances between different actors who, thus, achieve greater power (crossing economic, political, ideological and military lines), whose interests or programs determine the fate of the nation or of the majority of Mexicans. This is the crucial question for 1998: Did the situation change?

In the economic arena, the country fell into the worst economic crisis it has ever experienced. The price of oil fell to less than 7 dollars per barrel, by more than 50% and cheaper than Coca Cola. Inflation reached 18%, and the peso was devalued by more than 23%. Gasoline and diesel prices rose; the prices of milk and tortillas were freed - five years after the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which will save the government close to 6 billion pesos which it had earmarked for the poor - and other increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs. In addition, the country's budget was cut three times, impacting on the programs for fighting poverty, causing poverty and marginalization indices to rise. The IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral bodies accepted this catastrophic reality for the country.

In 1998, the greatest and most scandalous fraud to date occurred: the Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA), whose almost 70 billion dollars plunged society into an intense discussion. This was because President Zedillo had asked the people to pay for this fraud - as a public debt - which had enriched businessmen, bankers and the official party itself, as well as the current President of the Republic, through the assumed diverting of these funds into the 1994 political campaigns. As if that were not enough, anatocismo (the payment of interest on interest) was legalized, battering thousands of bank debtors. Other scandalous frauds demonstrated who is being punished, and who is benefiting, from the economic program. Angel Isidoro Rodríguez, Cabal Peniche, Raúl Salinas de Gortari, Operation White House orchestrated by the US, the Air Mexico fraud for the support of the official party: these were some of the examples we saw during 1998.

Simultaneously, the worst catastrophe in Chiapas' history was occurring, caused by forest fires, which ended up destroying more than 200,000 hectares in the first half of the year. This had alarming consequences for ecology and agricultural production, which, when combined with other fires in the country, led to the importation of about 15 million tons of basic grains. This created a deficit in the agricultural balance of trade, benefiting our partners to the north. Two months later, in September, the debt was paid for the deforestation caused by those fires, for the excessive felling of trees and - for others - for the fires set by the paramilitaries and military in order to back the EZLN even further into a corner. They led to the worst natural disaster since the Mexico City earthquake in 1985, as President Zedillo himself said, with rains and floods wiping out the communications infrastructure (bridges, highways, roads, railroad lines, etc.) and plunging thousands of families into mourning, who saw their dead, and thousands of homes, buried under the mud. Once more, more than 100,000 hectares were lost under the mire, as well as much of the social infrastructure (schools, clinics, sports fields). Added to this was the announcement of a drastic increase in the numbers of businesses closing, as well as in the number of debtors. And so, the economy of Chiapas appeared to have collapsed, to be in ruins, devastated and set back decades in just one year. A reversal that will take decades to recover from.

All of us saw and experienced this economic tragedy in Chiapas and in the country, except the government, which, at the end of the year, was widely asserting in the media that the country's economy had grown, and it was stronger than that of the greatest powers of the globe: Canada, the US, Japan and Korea. Nonetheless, the loss of credibility in the current regime and its economic policies is following a more rapid course than that of even the few days remaining until the year 2000. The government's challenge for the end of the millenium is not to improve the standard of living - since the neo-liberal program and globalization are already intrinsically exclusionary and impoverishing, as we are already experiencing - but to convince the people of the virtual development we are enjoying, to manage to repeat the lie in order to convert it into the truth when it comes time to vote in the election for a new president, to manage to impose itself once more through electoral fraud, or to persuade through abstention in response to the fear of the new, of a new government, of a new millenium; or to impose itself through force in response to the social discontent, which now goes beyond the arena of the country's more than 40 million poor.

Thus, the opposition parties (PRD, PT, PVEM) were not able to block the economic program in the face of the alliance between the PRI and the PAN, which approved the FOBAPROA proposal, the investment law and the 1999 budget. The economic battle was lost in the Congress of the Union and in the State Congress. However, the people of the country and of Chiapas gained a moral victory. The debates concerning the frauds, the FOBAPROA and other events in Chiapas, bore witness to the government's double language.

In the political arena, the Acteal massacre produced a change in the federal government cabinet, with the arrival of the third Secretary of Government in the current 6-year term, as well as of other officials. And, once more, another interim governor was imposed on Chiapas, who replaced the interim of the interim, and along with him arrived new Secretaries of State following the resignation of the previous cabinet, which had been accused of being involved in the massacre. This new governor manipulated the so-called Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Chiapas, in an attempt to legitimize the actions of his government, which, in fact, were guidelines from President Zedillo's group of advisors. In light of his imposition on the political landscape, followed by the repudiation of his imposition, he furiously lashed out against all dissent and opposition to his government. Social organizations felt the yoke of interim Governor Albores: at the beginning of the year, there was a police-military operation in San Cristóbal against leaders of evangelical indigenous organizations, and three of their leaders were imprisoned. In January, campesino leader Rubicel Gamboa was assassinated, and an indigenous woman in Ocosingo was assassinated by policemen during a campesino march. Between April and June, at the hand of the military forces, operations were launched against the EZLN in the "Flores Magón" Autonomous Municipality in the community of Taniperla, against "Tierra y Libertad," Nicolás Ruiz, 10 de Abril in Altamirano, and ending with the killing of EZLN indigenous in the municipality of San Juan de la Libertad, in the community of El Progreso and Chavajeval.

During this period, the federal government wanted to disentangle the peace dialogue, and so it channeled its unilateral initiative on Indigenous Rights and Culture through the Congress of the Union, precipitating all kinds of reactions. Finally, the EZLN broke its silence, which had so enraged the federal government, issuing the Fifth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona. This Declaration set in motion a great national mobilization, in order that the people of Mexico, through a Consultation, could decide whether or not they considered the legislative proposal drawn up by the COCOPA on Indigenous Rights and Culture - at the request of both parties - to be valid. The EZLN once again came out into the public light, making numerous declarations and analyses concerning the direction of the country and the actions of the federal and state governments in Chiapas. Curiously, it was the year which saw the greatest number of presidential visits to the state.

During this year, despite peace initiatives by various actors attempting to facilitate dialogue and negotiation - among them, the PRD, Manuel Camacho Solís, the COCOPA and the CONAI, the Creators, Academics and Intellectuals (CAI) group - the government was clear about its mission. Between double language and confusion, it wanted to turn lies into truths, to end all dissent, to retake the political initiative and the capability of creating, directing and controlling the political scenarios. While many peace initiatives were launched by the federal government - and echoed by the state government - it managed to put an end to Mediation - the CONAI - to weaken and ridicule the COCOPA, to expel foreigners, and it attempted to stifle all possibilities of international observation of human rights violations, which it had consciously unleashed during the year. It also attacked the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas with greater force, as well as the indigenous, eliminating their possibility of survival when they were displaced and when prices of the previously mentioned basic foodstuffs rose.

Among the most dangerous things which we should be alert to this year is the audacity with which the Mexican government defied international public opinion in 1998, daring to cross the threshold of the political costs and its image, which, up until recently, it had scrupulously guarded. When it is no longer concerned about international instruments, prominent voices and personalities, the analyses of prestigious institutions of recognized world renown - and even less about any expelled citizen - we are coming closer to the possibilities of violent, military solutions for the popular dissidence, in the same way as the thousands of dead and displaced in Colombia, Africa and other nations of the world. Thus, this year diplomatic personnel, Jose Saramago (Nobel Literature prize winner), Justo Mullor (Papal Nunciate), parliamentarians from various countries, and others, passed through Chiapas.

This year Chiapas was once again the victim of fraudulent machinations in the elections for the mayoralties and the State Congress, two key elements for driving the government's legal strategy for 1999. With the elections over, the interim governor announced the following legislative proposals: amnesty for armed groups, an Indigenous Rights and Culture proposal and redistricting, just to mention three of the fundamental points for controlling the conflict from the legal arena. The PRI and the state government recovered 16 municipalities that had been being governed by the PRD in the Selva, Northern and Los Altos Zones. In order to accomplish this, they defied the PRD municipal president of Ixtapa and Jitotol and incarcerated another in Soyaló. Candidates received threats and intimidation in Bellavista, Villacomaltitlán, Venustiano Carranza, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapa de Corzo, etc. The PAN was also harassed, and they even went so far as to legally charge the interim governor with using public funds for official party campaigns. Despite everything, fraud prevailed.

In the social arena, at the end of the year, we saw the number of displaced indigenous in Chiapas surpass 20,000, as well as more than 13,000 Guatemalan refugees, who wanted to remain in the country, fighting for their rights and land the same as all poor and forgotten campesinos and indigenous. We saw the jails fill with increased numbers of zapatista prisoners, at the same time that Chinchulines prisoners were being released. We saw violence and the paramilitary and armed groups grow, while they were being offered amnesty. We saw thousands of deaths from political and natural catastrophes. We saw the collapse of thousands of homes and the collapse of hopes for bettering the quality of life. In spite of that, the indigenous and campesino communities resisted the worst of onslaughts.

In the military arena, the Mexican Army took up more positions in the states of the Republic. New accusations came to light concerning human rights violations, to such a degree that Amnesty International, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (CIDH) and other international bodies of recognized prestige, spoke out on the violent acts, while the government condemned and denied them. The government must now struggle to persuade international opinion. The construction of military garrisons, new camps and residential complexes accelerated in rural communities in Chiapas. These used resources which the indigenous had been demanding for decades, in order to build clinics and to use for social investments, all of which would have avoided the armed uprising.

As of this were not enough, an unusual event, rare for the country, took place in the month of December, which will have serious consequences. More than 50 members of the Mexican Army - soldiers, colonels, lieutenants, etc. - marched for the first time in the streets of Mexico City, under the name of the Patriotic Command for the Raising of the Peoples' Awareness. They were demanding the elimination of the military legal jurisdiction, asking for the replacement of the Secretary of National Defense, demanding the release of unjustly incarcerated military prisoners and accusing the government of implementing policies which impoverish the country. In addition, there were other demands, all of which scandalized the public, causing the Army itself, and the Executive branch, to tremble. Thus, the actor which supposedly provides the Nation-State with unity, the tool which the Executive is now using to control and to encroach upon the State structure - and which will guarantee the control of the power in response to the current dissidence and discontent, and that which is yet to come - the actor which governs Chiapas, splits apart in front of Mexico's eyes. And, days later, military personnel saw their wages increased, in an effort to avoid new splits or support for the dissident soldiers.

It once again became clear that the armed forces are not monolithic, that there is division, and this gives them less credibility in the public's eyes than they already had after these last few years. This actor - which has more and more relevance in the country and in Chiapas - has now been accused of having been infiltrated by drug trafficking: generals and other members have been fired for these shameful incidents. They have been named in human rights violations, involved in corruption and assassinations. They know themselves to be, and they feel, illegal on chiapaneco lands, which makes them uncomfortable. And some refuse to pursue drug trafficking crime, when it is not their role, but they agree with not allowing civil power, legal powers, to control the country. All of these are dangerous signs for a nation which is going through a painful democratic transition, carrying with it high political and social costs. This actor has much power, a large budget and political arenas in which its members run for mayoralties, governorships and seats in the Congress of the Union as deputies and senators. It enjoys autonomy and independence in respect to the judicial and legal authorities. It is protected by a long-standing taboo involving not questioning either the military or its structure. All of which lead to ignorance on the part of society as a whole as to its life and its internal workings. No other actor in the country enjoys so many prerogatives. It should be remembered that the federal government's National Human Rights Commission itself stated that, in 1998, 30% of all the complaints against the Army came from military personnel themselves.

The loss of credibility of the economic program, of foreign policy, of the armed forces, of the constant impositions of interim governors in Chiapas without ever seeing democratic exercise, of the analyses of the Acteal massacre, among others, puts the current regime in a very difficult dilemma facing the year 2000. Still, for 1999, the struggle for the analysis of the country's situation, of the economic program, of the Chiapas conflict, of militarization, of paramilitarization - in order to gain the consensus of the people - will revolve around the statements of the EZLN on the one hand, and of the Department of the Government-Presidency-Azteca TV-radio programs supportive of the program-etcetera, on the other.

In the midst of these social, political, ecological, economic and democratic setbacks for Chiapas, we ask ourselves: where are the signs of hope? In the economic program - which is indeed being imposed, because it is no longer the result of either the consensus or the consent of the nation, but rather of the hijacking of its fate by the PRI and the PAN in the Congress of the Union - lies their inherent destruction. The foundation is being laid for a true transition to democracy and justice, which, regrettably, will cost the country and all Mexicans as much as the official party which resists transition, change, the leaving of power, wants to impose. It is true that Chiapas and the Mexican southeast is not all of Mexico, but it is indeed the door through which the country has to pass and to resolve.

In 1998, the government tried to eliminate its adversaries and to impose its own paths and consensus. It did not achieve that. It did not do away with the EZLN, nor with the foreigners, nor with the Diocese of San Cristóbal, nor with the indigenous resistance. It only imposed, with coercion, through legal, electoral and military means.

1999: The crucial questions for this year will be: will there be events and alliances between certain actors which will be able to modify the situation? What changes will the relationships bring? What will be set in place so that the country might be different in the very near future?

In the 1999 budget, the presidential initiative proposes an increase of 43 billion 669.5 million pesos for the payment of the public debt, while earmarking 45 billion 742.4 million for programs to fight poverty in the country, or, 1.8 dollars per year for every one of the more than 40 million poor persons in Mexico. This amount represents 35% of the cost of the country's foreign and domestic debt (160 billion 855 million pesos). In addition, the budget will be cut by 14 billion 200 million pesos. Some of the most dramatic changes are: while 101 million will be cut from the Department of National Defense (SEDENA), the Department of Public Education (SEP) will have 183,360,000 eliminated, and the Department of Agriculture and Livestock, 305,800,000. A total of 1,693,820,000 will be cut from the fund reserves for retired persons from the Mexican Social Security Institute - in the same year in which the UN will honor Persons of Age - and 724,473,000 from the Department of the Navy, Natural Resources and Fisheries.

Chiapas begins the year with a weak economy, with more than 80% of its income coming from the federal government, which is predicting more budget cuts for 1999, and with few expectations of investments. Some of its finances will be completely subsidized by the federation, and there will be more poverty, which now reaches beyond the Conflict Zone, the Northern Zone and the Selva, and takes in the Coast, the Center, Fraylesca and the Sierra. And, as if this were not enough, Governor Albores Guillén has reduced the shares in his budget proposal for 12 municipalities, among them Chenalhó, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Simojovel, Tila, Sabanilla, etc., which went from 17% to 49% in comparison with 1998. Because of this, any scenario proposed for 1999, will have to take into account a severe economic crisis, which will be worsening as 2000 approaches.

In 1999, several anniversaries will occur: 5 years from the signing of the TLC and from the EZLN armed uprising; it will be 5 years since the establishment of the CONAI, and one since its disappearance; 2 from the Acteal massacre; 4 since the integration of the COCOPA and the Law for Dialogue and Peace in Chiapas; 3 from the suspension of the dialogue, among other anniversaries, around which various political agendas will revolve.

Important events are drawing near. In January, the fourth visit by the pope will bring consequences and reaccomodations within the Catholic Church in Mexico, which could have repercussions for Chiapas and its bishops. Bishop Samuel Ruiz García will leave his bishopric in one year, leaving the Diocese of San Cristóbal in the hands of Bishop Raúl Vera López. The role of the bishops and of the diocese has been crucial, and it is now one of the most powerful trenches for resistance and hope for the poor and for the condemnation of the program of death which is practiced in Chiapas. This is based solidly in the Third Diocesan Synod, which will end this year, a unique process in the country, both for its characteristics and its dimensions. Thus, the Diocese of San Cristóbal is not weakened, rather it is strengthened, and a measure of that will be the attacks which follow it this year. It will be one of the government's principal targets, since, increasingly, the opposition parties in the State Congress do not represent an enemy to be defeated, and nor are the campesino organizations having their best moment.

In February, the President of the United States, William Clinton, will arrive, if he survives the political judgment, weeks before the Congress of the United States draws up its Certification for Mexico concerning the anti-drug fight and the possible approval of the Leahy resolution, which will demand that the Mexican government disarm the paramilitaries, respect human rights and peacefully resolve the conflict in Chiapas. These and other issues will be accepted with difficulty by the sovereign pride of the country's foreign policy, which speaks of "foreign interference" in human rights matters, and otherwise when it comes to commercial or investment matters. However, the government will not be able to avoid the arrival of Ms. Robinson, the head of the UN's Human Right Commission, to the country, nor of other international bodies. Neither will it be able to avoid discussion concerning the acceptance of the OAS' jurisdiction on the issue, nor the approval of its resolution on indigenous rights matters. The approval of the Multilateral Investment Agreement (AMI) will also be under way and moving forward. This is the commercial agreement with the European Union, or bilaterally with its members, eliminating the clauses concerning democracy and human rights.

If, at the end of 1998, the federal government had to weather the storm of finding a solution to the FOBAPROA and of approval of the budget and the Investment Law - with the constant alliance with the PAN -, this year it will have to deal with possible budget cuts once again, due to the volatility of the price of oil. In response, the government will have several options to assure its investments and to pay its foreign debt: punish tax evaders more heavily or strengthen "the geese that lay the golden eggs," such as Tourism.

For political parties in the country, 1999 will see changes in the respective parties' national leaderships, and they will begin the race to define their participation and candidates for the presidency of the Republic in the year 2000, with four new political parties planning on participating in the electoral contest. These are moments of splits and divisions inside these political bodies, of the creation of dissidence, new forces, etc. The opposition parties, with the exception of the PAN, lost two battles in the Congress of the Union: the FOBAPROA and the 1999 budget. It is possible that there will be silence from the public about Chiapas, at the same time as the violence increases, as has already happened, or that it could become a campaign issue for the political parties, offering solutions in order to win votes.

For political and social forces, including the EZLN, the National Consultation in the month of March will attempt to be the event which will lay the foundation for changing the relationship of the forces in the country, and thus the conditions for creating new social and political processes. The so-called "great national mobilization" will be the gauge which registers the possibility of different sectors of civil society expressing themselves. And this expression will be the reflection of those who hold consensus and credibility, not just concerning the indigenous rights and culture situation, but also of the paths for facilitating dialogue. Because of this - and since the government is aware of the significance of this process and this event - it will try, by all means possible, to avoid this expression of popular opinion, and, simultaneously, to announce new paths for the renewal of dialogue, avoiding the loss of control, initiative and the creation of political scenarios revolving around the conflict. In response to the voices, and they are not few, which are calling for the revival of mediation in order to achieve the renewal of dialogue, the federal government, so as not to find itself, like the Colombian government, face to face with the guerrillas, is proposing a mediation with three characteristics: 1) that it be national (in order to avoid interference from any foreign bodies and the rekindling of discussion concerning the Second Protocol of the Geneva Convention, having to do with domestic armed conflicts, which the Mexican government has refused to sign, something which is obvious to everyone); 2) that it be "as professional as possible" (the "possible" is not capable of being measured); 3) and that it not be "protagonistic" (that it not have moral authority and that it can be controlled, others would say).

The government has now gone on to formulate new alternatives for peace, proposing a scheme which it announced to diplomatic personnel and ambassadors, rather than directly to the nation, much less to the COCOPA legislators, who once again are being belittled by the Executive branch. This initiative's characteristics are not much different from what was already announced last year, such as the reactivation of investments which will pull the indigenous and campesinos out of poverty, among other elements, indistinguishable from campaign promises. Other examples of what could happen in 1999 can already be seen: the Department of Government spearheads the fight against crime, which is translated into more police forces and a bigger budget, leading to the announcement of the creation of the Federal Preventative Police, which will reach 5 to 6000 members prior to the year 2000 elections. In early January the arrival of 600 more soldiers in Chiapas was announced, and, in Chenalhó, new paramilitary mobilizations and more harassment have been denounced. The "coordinator for dialogue" for the federal government once again takes off after the EZLN, stating that their program has failed, that their positions are "illegal" and "immoral." On what side of illegality and immorality are the war, poverty and marginalization which now engulf the indigenous peoples?

And so we see that there is a crisis in the dominant sector, with an official party divided into three wings, and with a Chamber of Deputies that can no longer be so easily controlled. We are also experiencing an economic crisis, with an increase in coercion in response to the lack of consensus, accompanied by a military crisis which hardly astonishes.

The federal government will favor the following scenarios: 1) the Congress of the Union: where it will try to avoid having a decision made concerning Indigenous Rights and Culture and where it will control the economic program; 2) the Chiapas State Congress: from where it will launch various initiatives designed to corner all dissident forces; 3) public opinion, with the following traits: double language; a repetition of the same rhetoric, far removed from reality; characterizing all dissent as illegal, unpatriotic and "immoral," from the EZLN to the Church, the political parties, human rights groups, etc.; 4) military: continue to corner the EZLN even more; fostering the creation of displaced; impunity for the paramilitary groups, and provoking confrontation in the zapatista autonomous municipalities, with the principle thorn this year being the autonomous municipality of Polhó in Chenalhó.

In this arena, interim Governor Roberto Albores' statements of the last few days are eloquent. He calls the bishops of San Cristóbal de Las Casas "prophets of disaster," and is grateful that Monsignor Felipe Aguirre (bishop of the Diocese of Tuxtla Gutiérrez) "does not promote the resort to arms," and he ends by telling the bishops that "the state government supports life and not death, one hopes that you are in agreement with us." He calls the EZLN "intransigent," while rejecting that his "Amnesty for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups" proposal means amnesty for the paramilitaries, because "there has been no official institution which has proven the existence of any group with those characteristics."

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