The representative for, and coordinator of, the government bodies for dialogue with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Emilio Rabasa, is the person in charge of executing the federal government's strategic activities this year. Nonetheless, he looks like a solitary actor, confronting everything having to do with Chiapas. For the time being, talk about Chiapas by the Department of Government, by President Zedillo, by the Army, and by other actors, have disappeared from the scene. Their strategy of immediately responding to any statement, provocation, criticism or point of view on the situation in Chiapas regarding the EZLN and the situation in the state, have led to their running out of words. They have repetitiously, continuously, skated around the same evaluations.

1) To isolate and to wear down the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), made up of the political parties present in the Congress of the Union and in the chiapaneco State Congress. The press has carried comments from various political actors asserting that the suspension [of the talks] puts the COCOPA in danger, that it could possibly disappear, that its inactivity will - sooner rather than later - lead to its breaking up and its decline. For the time being, the legislators are between a rock and a hard place: they have nothing with which to implement political initiatives, now that they have distanced themselves from the National Consultation, which was called by the EZLN in order to gather the opinions of Mexicans on the COCOPA's proposal for constitutional changes on indigenous rights and culture, as a result of the San Andrés Accords, arguing that it was not agreed to by both the Parties. Meanwhile, PRD legislators remain in the public eye, responding to every move the government makes regarding Chiapas. PRI Senator and COCOPA member, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, who has maintained a critical position towards governmental actions and those of his own political party, finds himself immersed in a battle against him, led by members of his own political party, who have even tried to expel him from the PRI. In any regard, the COCOPA will now be the actor which the federal government finds troublesome, and which has a certain "moral" and "legislative authority," enabling it to give its opinion on the peace process. Regrettably, the COCOPA will be rendered ineffective as long as its functioning continues to be subject to the consensus of its members, since, thus far, the veto by the official party, the PRI, is sufficient to stall any move which contradicts government strategy.

2) Divert attention from the EZLN's National and International Consultation through the Consultation on the Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in the State of Chiapas, which has led to much confusion for many, due to the way it is being carried out and to disinformation. The text of the disarmament proposal has not been distributed, let alone in indigenous languages. In addition, this consultation on amnesty to paramilitary groups is being utilized more for the purpose of encouraging a call for the disarmament of the EZLN by organizations aligned with the official party.

3) To tie the results of the EZLN's and civil society's National Consultation to the supposed consultation by the state government on the amnesty proposal for armed groups, in March, when the Congress of the Union session begins. Both proposals will be fighting for their place in the Congress. Meanwhile, two elements which are decisive for Chiapas will be being argued: a) The proposals for a law on Indigenous Rights and Culture (the PAN's, President Zedillo's and the COCOPA's), and, 2) the proposal for the Disarmament Law for Civilian Armed Groups in Chiapas.

4) To eliminate the possibility of political pressure as a result of the Consultation. In order to accomplish this, the second level of government - the state government - will be utilized. If President Zedillo believes that the approval of his unilateral proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture - sent to the Congress of the Union in March 1998 - will be difficult to obtain, then he will devote himself to seeing that the COCOPA proposal will not be approved either. The solution: for interim Governor Roberto Albores to propose legislation in Chiapas, over the next few weeks, on the same matters, obviously driven by federal strategy, which will be difficult to repeal once it has been approved by the majority PRI deputies. In this way there will be more stumbling blocks placed in front of the EZLN, who is demanding that the Accords be carried out in the way they were signed with the federal government: by approving the COCOPA's proposal.

5) Wrest political territory from the EZLN through the approval soon of new municipalities through the State Redistricting plan, as a strategy for countering the process of the Autonomous Municipalities. Once more, with the PRI majority in the State Congress, the federal and state governments will have, for the time being, the opportunity to control this scene, by having in their hands two important factors: a) the redistricting process, and b) the approval of an indigenous rights and culture law for Chiapas.

6) To use a new focal point for justifying the legitimacy and the legality of military activities in zapatista lands: drug trafficking. The operation which the army carried out in January in the community of Aldama (Magdalenas) - in the municipality of Chenalhó and next to San Andrés - was an affront to the zapatista communities and to public opinion. In the face of evidence that PRI groups were responsible for these plantings, neither the government nor the army could prove that the EZLN was involved in drug trafficking. The government was criticized by various political actors in the country in response to such an affront. The accusations made against them of having endangered the dialogue and the already heightened state of tension in the state - and, above all, the reaction of the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA) - led to the federal government's explaining that it had never accused the EZLN of drug-trafficking, nor would it do so. Meanwhile, local spots began appearing in the radio with the message that the Army harmed no one and that it did not plant marijuana.

It is possible that the strategy revolving around the fight against drug trafficking in the country will intensify, in order to achieve the certification which the US will be making in March concerning various countries' work in fighting drug trafficking. The Secretary of Government, Labastida Ochoa, has traveled to Washington in order to present the new plan in this regard. It should not be forgotten that some American congresspersons are concerned about the indications that the Mexican government is using funds granted by the US for fighting drug trafficking in the counterinsurgency war with the indigenous communities, and about alleged human rights violations. For this reason the statements by Attorney General Eduardo Montoya are of concern. He has asserted that the geographic region which contains the greatest number of narcotics plantings are in the conflict zone, where the zapatista presence exists, which could later be used to justify operations against the Autonomous Municipalities. Later, General Fermín Rivas García, from the 39th Military Zone, after heading an operation to destroy poppy plants in the municipality of Las Margaritas, stated that the planting and cultivation of narcotics had grown at a rate of 500% since 1998. Interim Governor Roberto Albores also expressed himself on the subject: "wherever they are, we have to go and fight them."

It is worth reflecting on this, given that many campesinos and indigenous do not even know the weed. Where did the marijuana come from? How are the indigenous able to move the drugs by air or by land when a bird cannot even fly above chiapaneco lands without the Army being aware of it? When they are surrounded by military camps and checkpoints? When there are more than 50,000 soldiers in the state? It would be difficult, then, to imagine that there could be drugs in the state, without the knowledge and consent of the Army, which has already been accused of being involved in drug-trafficking. On the other hand, it is enough to know of the many cases in which police bodies have been associated with drugs and of the evidence of how drug addiction and alcoholism have followed them and the soldiers into the communities. It is the same for prostitution, which is nothing new either.

7) Administer the conflict while proposing a new dialogue scheme, which, in reality, has little to say and which is not new. Namely, there will be three "new" criteria proposed by the government:

a) Continuity in the negotiations. This criterion is an attempt to prevent the counterpart from retiring from the ring before he is completely defeated. The government tries to show that the negotiations have not been interrupted, while at the same time carrying out police-military operations, executing arrest warrants, jailing more zapatistas and creating more military camps and detachments in the rural communities. In doing this, they are violating the Law for Concordance and Peace which posits the truce, the repeal of the arrest warrants, etcetera. This government has demonstrated unto exhaustion that it cannot - nor does it wish to - fulfil this criterion.

b) Confidence in the advances which are made. This criterion could be an insult to the intelligence, since, the Accords already signed have still not been carried out. There is no assurance that things will be improving in Chiapas and in other states with an indigenous population. This criterion is doubtful.

c) Effective results. The signing of the San Andrés Accords has had no effect. The government, with deaf ears, has applied the results unilaterally, controlling the initiatives: peace courts which are not functioning, redistricting in order to divide and confront the people even more, unilateral indigenous laws, amnesty for the paramilitaries, etcetera.

8) Control the negotiation process, proposing a new "simplified and austere" dialogue scheme, "which encourages private meetings and public results." This new scheme proposes three characteristics:

a) Direct dialogue. That is, neutralizing participation by civil society, as it existed in the San Andrés process.

b) Discreet dialogue. That is, without the press, without witnesses, and without political pressure on one of the parties which would violate what has been agreed to.

c) Simple dialogue. That is, without the three stages for each of the negotiating tables, which the previous format contained, that it be quick, or fast-track. In addition, they are proposing a simplification of the negotiating process of the agenda agreed to on September 11, 1995. This is of vital importance, since three more tables were contemplated in the negotiating agenda. In the second table, Justice and Democracy, the government exerted pressure in order to interrupt the negotiations on state reform, which it was not willing to negotiate with anyone.

9) To weaken a new, inevitable "Mediation," which is demanded by their counterpart and by many sectors of civil and political society. For this, the government proposes:

a) That it be National. This is for the purpose of eliminating any possibility whatsoever of the participation by the United Nations or other multilateral bodies. The COCOPA could be in agreement on this, in order to prevent the downgrading of their roles as representatives of their political parties and of the Congress of the Union in the dialogue process.

b) That it have moral prestige. If the federal and state authorities do not believe that Don Samuel Ruiz García and the members of the former CONAI have moral authority; and that nor do those representing the popular vote - that is, the Congress of the Union, the political parties: what, then, would be moral for the current regime, whose own policies have none?

c) That it be discreet. That it, that it not have the moral authority to tell a counterpart, as the CONAI did - which was presided over by Bishop Samuel Ruiz García - when accords and procedures which have been agreed to are not being carried out.

d) That it be professional.

Nonetheless, the interim Governor of Chiapas has, on repeated occasions, insisted on "mediation, no. A dialogue without intermediaries, direct, with positive proposals leading to progress, yes." Nonetheless, just a little common sense makes it obvious that, without mediation, there will be no dialogue in Chiapas. In this way, the government is doing the same thing it criticizes: setting conditions.

10) Deny and remove from public discussion the carrying out of the "minimal conditions" which would allow a return to dialogue. That is: the release of the zapatista prisoners, demilitarization, a serious proposal on Table 2 (Justice and Democracy), the willingness to dialogue and the capacity for decision-making on the part of the government's delegate, and the disarmament of the paramilitary groups. Indeed, the situation is now growing worse, between amnesty for the paramilitary groups, the sentencing of zapatista prisoners and the plan to create a new military barracks in the municipality of Yajalón over a 9 hectare area. This has led legislator and COCOPA member, Gilberto López y Rivas, to ask: "How do you ask the zapatistas to renew negotiations when military invasions are continuing in their communities, and the military presence is growing?" Meanwhile, the Secretary of Government of Chiapas categorically stated that the Mexican Army would "never" withdraw from the state, as long as there were no peace. On other occasions, government remarks have centered around insisting that peace, prosperity and the conditions for investment exist, that the EZLN's program has failed, that the problem exists in only a few municipalities in the state, etcetera. And, concerning the minimal conditions, Emilio Rabasa stated that "they cannot be accepted as a pre-condition" for the negotiations, because "some of them, almost in their entirety, necessitate an exchange of viewpoints."

11) Increase the pressure of talk about social investment, as they do every year, arguing that 1999 will see the highest level of federal spending. It is worth noting that state investments are decreasing, which will lead to an increase in federal subsidies to the chiapaneco economy. This will lead to a form of illusion concerning public investment, given the obvious poverty, which is worsening. The 1999 Chiapas budget will be made up of 56% federal government funds, and 37% from federal fiscal participation. Only 5% will be from their own investments. It is also worth noting that, according to the Chiapas Federation of Chambers of Commerce, there are more than 50 businesses which are currently not producing and which are shut down in the state, 170 businesses have temporarily closed over the last few months, and an equal number have shown a loss, with at least 30 having closed for good. Because of this, if the Chiapas economy does not recover, it will it be possible to maintain it artificially either.

12) Continue with the double language and the publicity campaigns. Thus, Emilio Rabasa reveals his own strategy by responding to the EZLN communiqués: "the democratic antidote to this technique of authoritarian social communication is to unmask the falsehoods of talk which tries to hide the state of misery and the profound deterioration in the living conditions in the indigenous communities where the EZLN maintains its dominance, and its rejection of dialogue in order to peacefully solve the conflict." At other times, he reverts once more to the usual talk, accusing the EZLN of being "intransigent," and of refusing to renew the peace talks, and of having replaced its earlier aim of defending indigenous rights with a program of national and international dimensions He states that Subcomandante Marcos suggests the "substitution and condemnation of neo-liberalism," which differs from the objectives of the First Declaration of the Selva Lacandona. He adds that the dialogue was "unilaterally" suspended by the zapatistas.

In brief, while the EZLN wants to come out into public life, peacefully and politically, with civil society, the government is trying at all costs to close these doors and to corner the EZLN militarily even more. The government is trying by all means possible not to return to dialogue, but without, apparently, having to pay the political cost.

There are two other important events:

Residents of La Mendoza, in the municipality of Chanal, denounced that on February 6 two indigenous persons were detained at a Mexican Army checkpoint on the outskirts of the village of Las Tazas, accused of transporting arms and ammunition. "The soldiers tore up their backpacks and threw everything on the ground. They began to interrogate them, and they blindfolded them, as well as the driver of the truck they were traveling in." They put them face down on the ground, and "then they began to torture them and to kick them in the head, the back and in other parts of their bodies." In the denunciation, they added: "we see that, in response to our just demands for land and peace in our communities, the government only responds with torture and mistreatment. In response to these events, the residents of La Mendoza demand: a thorough investigation and punishment of the intellectual and material authors of these events, payment and indemnification for the property which was seized and destroyed, an end to the repression of the indigenous communities, respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples, the return of the Federal Army to their barracks, the complete carrying out of the San Andrés Accords."

In the Cuarto Poder newspaper, on February 10, a news item of extraordinary importance appeared on the front page. General Julio César Santiago Díaz, former advisor to the Public Security coordination and prisoner in the Cerro Hueco jail - who is charged with homicide and injuries through omission, related to the Acteal massacre, in the municipality of Chenalhó - stated that the arms which were used in the massacre were purchased by Public Security police officers in Carmen Xhan, Guatemala. He said that, during the night, they purchased AK-47, R-15 and M-16 weapons on the outskirts of that border town, which were then taken to municipalities in Los Altos, primarily to Chenalhó, where they were sold for between 5 and 7000 pesos to paramilitary groups operating in the zone. Santiago Díaz states that the same police group assigned to the zone, state police officers and former members of the Mexican Army had been "the main providers of high powered weapons to paramilitary groups operating in the region."

At that time, former Executive Secretary of the Public Security Council, Jorge Enrique Hernández Aguilar, "was constantly traveling to Chenalhó, he was even there just days prior to the killing of the 45 indigenous persons, on December 12." The General also stated that the former municipal president of Chenalhó, Jacinto Arias Pérez, who is also a prisoner in Cerro Hueco, "openly tolerated the operation of paramilitary groups, because there were orders from 'above' to not disarm anyone," even when the authorities were aware of the fact that AK-45 and R-15 rifles were being carried by indigenous residents of the Puebla community, where the former municipal president is from. Santiago Díaz added that the town of Los Chorros (municipality of Chenalhó) is "where the main paramilitary training camps are, where the soldiers from the 31st Military Zone of Rancho Nuevo were contracted to give training to the anti-zapatista indigenous," and one of them was Pablo Hernández Pérez.

This news item was the birthday president for interim Governor Roberto Albores Guillén on February 10. Not many days later, the government continued saying that the conflict was caused by inter-community problems, and he separated himself from all responsibility. Today, 86 indigenous prisoners, 7 former Public Security officers, 2 Public Security police chiefs from the area and General Santiago Díaz are all imprisoned in Cerro Hueco. Arrest warrants are also outstanding for public officials. What does one call this?

Note: If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to: ciepac@laneta.apc.org and indicate whether you wish to receive the bulletin in plain text or as a Word 7 for Windows 95 attachment.

Note: If you use this information, cite the source and our email address. We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their comments on these Bulletins. CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to continue offering you this news and analysis service. If you would like to contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your remittance to the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C.
Bank: Banamex
Account number: 7049672 Sucursal 386
San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, México.
You will also need to use an ABA number:
BNMXMXMM

Thank you! CIEPAC

Telephone:
in México: 01 967 674 5168
from outside Mexico:: +52 967 674 5168