Background of the Current Strategy

Interim Governor Roberto Albores Guillén took power in Chiapas on January 3, 1998, replacing Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, as a consequence of his indirect involvement in the massacre of the 45 indigenous at Acteal. Since his taking office, and until March of this year, Albores Guillén has devoted himself to legitimizing to the public his imposition in the government, with the media playing a dominant role.

In February, Albores Guillén launched his State Accord for Reconciliation in Chiapas, making its broadcast mandatory, and consulting in educational centers, with businesspersons, campesinos and indigenous from the PRI, cattlemen and other activist groups within the official party. In the schools, the students, teachers and parents were pressured to express positive opinions on the accord. Ultimately, it allowed the government to legitimize talk about reconciliation, peace and the "re-establishment of the state of law," and, later, in April, to initiate an offensive that was manifested in the following ways:

a) The dismantling of the Autonomous Municipalities: Ricardo Flores Magón, Tierra y Libertad, Nicolás Ruiz and San Juan de la Libertad, arguing that constitutionally established powers had been usurped.

b) Repression towards the municipal presidencies governed by the PRD that were of great importance politically and strategically, because they had not been involved in the paramilitarization program: Ixtapa, Altamirano, Chilón, Bochil, Jitotol, and the exaggerated audits of the Municipal Council of Ocosingo, which was governed by the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO).

c) Repression against social organizations: the assassinations of campesino leaders Rubicel Ruiz Gamboa and Antonio Gómez Flores; the jailing of the leader of the CIOAC in Soyaló; the threat to execute arrest warrants against the leaders of the COAO in Ocosingo; the reactivation of 29 arrest warrants against leaders of the Flor de Amatán, etcetera.

d) Repression against EZLN support base communities: San Miguel Chiptik, 10 de Abril in Altamirano, Chavajeval, Unión y Progreso and Alvaro Obregón in El Bosque; Sibacjá in Ocosingo, to mention just a few examples.

e) The expulsion of more than 180 international observers from the country, who had come to be in solidarity with the struggle of the chiapaneco indigenous, whom the President of the Republic himself had accused of "revolutionary tourism."

The state strategy was reinforced from the Federal Executive branch, through a series of visits to the state by President Ernesto Zedillo. These were to strategic areas, and, depending on the place his speeches were being given, sometimes involved a call to the EZLN for negotiations, of course without responding to the five conditions set by the EZLN for the renewal of negotiations with the government. On other occasions his speeches involved attacks against the former CONAI, the Diocese and its Bishop, Samuel Ruiz García. The more than 14 visits to Chiapas, were followed by violent actions, on the part of state and federal police bodies, that were justified by the words of President Ernesto Zedillo, such as "theologians of violence," "messianic leaders," etcetera, clearly alluding to Bishop Samuel Ruiz and Subcomandante Marcos.

The speeches and the events they triggered served to weaken those municipal presidencies governed by the PRD and the social organizations, to lead to the dissolution of the CONAI, to lessen the presence of international solidarity and to create more police-military subjugation in EZLN support base communities.

The Current Strategy

With the groundwork laid, the 112 new municipal presidents - elected during the last elections of October 4 and December 6, 1998 - took office in January 1999. During those elections, the PRI recovered strategic municipal presidencies, such as Chilón, Sitalá, Altamirano and Ocosingo. The elections were marked by a high degree of militarization, leading to control and generating mistrust in the communities, inhibiting opposition voting, and, thus, favoring the PRI. The official party reverted to the same old tricks, buying votes, delivering gifts and credits, in addition to pressure and threats from the paramilitary groups against opponents of the official party. There were widely documented denunciations of these events by the State and National Civic Alliance. The municipalities recovered by the PRI have a large presence of EZLN support bases. For this reason, their recovery was of vital importance for the government within the framework of the new strategy for the communities of the Selva and the North of Chiapas.

The PRI won 89 of the 112 municipal presidencies; the PRD, 17 and the PAN, 6. Meanwhile, of the 40 Nominal and Multi-nominal Deputies, the PRI continues to maintain its majority with 24 seats. The PRD has 6; the PAN, 5; the PT, 2 and the PFCH, 1. All the opposition parties together do not reach enough of a force to be able to support popular initiatives.

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Redistricting and the Law for Amnesty and the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in the State of Chiapas

a) The Redistricting Law: With the foundation laid for the promotion of the new program, Albores Guillén began his new offensive.

It is indeed true that the issue of Redistricting in the San Andrés Accords must be carried out, but it must be done so in accordance with what was agreed to between the EZLN and the Government, that is, with the participation of the indigenous communities, state government representation, the political parties represented in the State Congress and the EZLN. Nonetheless, the redistricting initiative has been, from the beginning, unilaterally imposed by the state government, ignoring the other parties.

The proposal is rather tendentious and badly intentioned, because it plans to install new municipalities in zapatista lands and in the places where the EZLN support bases have themselves chosen to be new municipal seats. The government proposal only changes the municipal seat where there is a PRI majority next to the Autonomous Municipalities' seats. The only seats that coincide are: Moisés Gandhi, Sibacjá and Amador Hernández, in Ocosingo; and Morelia in Altamirano. This will lead to confrontations between PRI's, zapatistas and other independent organizations, that is, disputes over land can be foreseen. Conflicts will increase, and they will serve to justify the Public Security police entering into the zapatista zone, as a launching pad for the new government strategy. This proposal will complement the Law for Amnesty and the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas, through justifying the possible disarmament of the zapatistas. However, the redistricting program does not take into account the times and the moments into which it will be carried out.

b) Law for Amnesty and Disarmament of Civilian Groups in the State of Chiapas: This legislative proposal that Governor Roberto Albores Guillén is promoting has several problem areas that must be thoroughly explained:

From the beginning, Governor Albores Guillén began a publicity campaign and a "consultation" with different groups and sectors, which has meant the strengthening of local power groups, who have been becoming bolder and carrying out attacks against the popular movement. It is not a coincidence that, with each visit by Albores Guillén to the municipalities, seeking to legitimize his Disarmament Law, there are actions such as the dismantling of the citizens information kiosks - built by civil society - in San Cristóbal, carried out by the "Authentic Coletos." There were also statements and provocations by cattle ranchers in Altamirano and Ocosingo in order to recover the predios taken over in 1994. There was the assassination of 4 workers from the Tzajaben ranch in Ocosingo and the ambush by PRI's of CIOAC activists in Chanival in the municipality of Huitiupán, both between January 5 and 7 of 1999. Two PRD activists were detained in La Grandeza municipality of Amatenango del Valle. We could cite very many similar incidents.

What is true is that this consultation is being carried out with the most reactionary power groups in each one of the municipalities, such as with: the "Authentic Coletos" in San Cristóbal; the shopkeepers of the CANACO; the cattle ranchers in Ocosingo, Ocozocoautla, and other municipalities. It is significant that the consultation was begun in areas considered to be in the conflict zone. Nonetheless, the population that is being affected by the paramilitary groups - such as the 21,159 displaced persons from the Northern and Los Altos zones of Chiapas, the social organizations who have been attacked by the paramilitary groups, PRD activists, etcetera - are not being consulted on anything.

These "consultations" are being manipulated in such a way as to give the appearance that there is a general "opinion" that no one should be armed in Chiapas, and that the people are "asking" for the disarmament of the EZLN, because it is "hindering" development in the region and the establishment of the government's programs and projects.

In the Law, the government does not recognize the existence of the paramilitary groups, the concept never appears in the text. Nonetheless, the retired Mexican Army general, who in December of 1997 was acting as an advisor to the Coordinator of the State Security Police, Julio César Santiago Díaz (today a prisoner in the Cerro Hueco jail, accused of having protected the PRI's of Chenalhó, who massacred 45 persons in Acteal) told the "Radio Press" news show for the first time at 8 AM on December 16, 1998 that he was a "scapegoat." He stated that he was only carrying out orders from his superiors, and that the intellectual authors of the massacre were higher up. On February 9, he once again told the press that "police officials from Public Security went to the border town (Carmen Xhan, Guatemala) to buy AK-47, R-15 and M-16 weapons, that were then taken to the municipalities in Los Altos, primarily to Chenalhó, where they were then sold to paramilitary groups operating in the zone" He stated, "that the very police body assigned to the zone, state police agents and former members of the Mexican Army, had been the primary providers of high powered weapons to paramilitary groups operating in the region." He added that, on December 12, 1997 (ten days prior to the Acteal massacre), the former Attorney General of the State himself, Jorge Enrique Hernández Aguilar, was in the Chenalhó area. Lastly he stated "those armed men then gathered in the town of Miguel Utrilla Los Chorros, where the main training camps are located, where soldiers from the 31st Military Zone of Rancho Nuevo were contracted to give training to anti-zapatista indigenous, and one of them was Pablo Hernández Pérez." He also said that the former municipal president of Chenalhó, Jacinto Arias Cruz (a prisoner at Cerro Hueco), openly tolerated the paramilitary groups because there were orders from above [to do so]" Because of all of this, the general considered himself to be a "hostage of the government for the Acteal massacre." (Cuarto Poder newspaper, February 10, 1999, p. 55).

Nonetheless, innumerable newspaper reporters, denunciations from human rights defense organizations - state as well as national - and the communities themselves, have denounced the existence of paramilitary groups, giving the first and last names of those responsible for each one of them, leading me to ask:

Why does the government deny the concept of the paramilitaries in the Law? Why do they not follow the line of investigation into "those higher up," mentioned by Julio César Santiago Díaz? Where did the superior orders come from that Julio César Santiago Díaz received? Why are they not investigating the names of those officials and former officials of the Tila municipal presidency, that La Jornada newspaper published on October 4, 1997 (p.4), as being those responsible for Peace and Justice - who have set up checkpoints and attacked the solidarity caravans, which have been so often denounced by the press? Why are they not investigating the whereabouts of the 4,600,000 pesos that the state government gave to Development, Peace and Justice, in the agreement signed on July 4, 1997, in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and that was published by journalist Jaime Avilés on October 4 in La Jornada newspaper? This agreement appears to be signed as an Agreement of Economic Development, then: why has no development organization signed that agreement, while, nonetheless, the signature of the Commander of the VII Military region, Mario Hernan [sic] Castillo appears as an Honor Witness? Why is former Deputy Samuel Sánchez Sánchez not being investigated, when he told the Cuarto Poder newspaper that Peace and Justice is an armed group, and that it would not disarm as long as the "red guards" of the Diocese of San Cristóbal were not disarmed? Why is the PRI Deputy from Venustiano Carranza, Eucario Orantes, not being investigated, who appeared in front of the press and at the podium table when San Bartolomé de los Llanos was being formed? When that group is accused by the OCEZ of being a paramilitary group?

While, on the other hand, journalist Julio César López published in the "Debate of the Southeast" magazine published, in January 1999, that, during his stay at the Rancho Nuevo barracks, he located a map where the Army identifies the following as being paramilitary groups: Arriera Nocturna, Los Ztzizimes, Los Chinchulines, Civil Society, Peace and Justice Quichán Chanob, Los Aguilar, Pantelhó, San Bartolomé de Los Llanos, OCEZ, Barrio El Convento, Armed Bases of the People, Comuneros of the Peoples' House, Paraíso Grijalva, Comuneros Basicos 3 de Marzo, OPEZ and Social Justice.

This appears to be a mix of groups of independent organizations with paramilitary groups, which, if the Disarmament Law were to be approved, would justify a series of police actions against organizations of the left who have traditionally fought for the land in Chiapas, such as OCEZ, OPEZ, Arriera Nocturna and the organization of the displaced in the northern zone, Quichañob. And the paramilitary groups who have operated in Chiapas would be left in impunity, who have been widely documented by the "Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas" Human Rights Center, the "Agustín Pro" Human Rights Center, the Mexican Committee for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, etcetera. However, officials are today accusing those human rights centers, and demanding that they produce evidence, as they are also doing to some journalists, "as they have already done to Fredy Martín Pérez, a reporter for El Universal newspaper" (Debate del Sureste, January of 1999, p. 3).

On the other hand, this Law mentions, in Article 4, that "the benefits of amnesty will be obtained as long as all forms of weapons are delivered within the time period of ninety days, starting from the time the present Law goes into force" Regarding this, statements in the press have noted that, once the 90 days is up, police operations could be initiated for disarmament, and the Amnesty and Disarmament Law could replace the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law (Cuarto Poder, February 4, 1999). In the face of such statements, how will the police bodies differentiate between zapatistas and the paramilitaries? Perhaps they have a thorough census? Will they continue to violate the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and the Dignified Peace in Chiapas? In this case, it is no accident that the Coordinator for Dialogue in Chiapas, Emilio Rabasa, has left open the possibility of asking the Congress of the Union to repeal the March 11, 1995 Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and Dignified Peace in Chiapas, "in order to force the zapatistas to renew talks" At the same time, Rabasa denied the existence of paramilitary groups in Chiapas (La Jornada, January 13, 1999, p. 12).

However, PAN and PRD State and Federal Deputies have expressed their opposition to this approval being approved, since it would create impunity for the paramilitary groups and it would polarize the situation in the communities.

There are three possible scenarios for this legislative proposal:

1) The Law could not be approved, and the government of Chiapas would then withdraw it, which is highly unlikely.

2) The Law could not be approved, and the government would not withdraw it, but the proposal would remain in the political freezer, to be brought out again when conditions improve.

3) The Law could be approved, bringing the previously noted consequences and worse. At that point, we would not be surprised to see a legislative proposal for the creation of a rural police force, as happened in Colombia, with which they legitimized the existence of the paramilitary groups.

Even if this Law were to be approved, it will not have any future if the government does not first accept, with absolute clarity, the existence of paramilitary groups and organized gangs, along with a true and thorough investigation into them, where their actions have been against the popular movements demanding democracy and justice. The violence by those groups cannot be eradicated as long as it is not accepted that they are driven by an official policy of fighting the popular movement. The situation that exists in Chiapas is very similar to that of Colombia. Where paramilitarization and violence are ripping apart the life of the civil population.

The Current Situation in the Communities

In the milieu in which these proposals are to be put in place, the situation of the communities is already difficult enough in itself, because they are suffering under the presence of more than 70,000 soldiers, in addition to the existence of the paramilitaries. Other factors of community division are:

a) The Procampo and Progreso credits, which are handed out based on the population's willingness to affiliate with, or to rejoin, the PRI.

b) The implementation of the Certification Program for Ejidal Rights (PROCEDE), which is nothing less than the privatization of the land.

c) The introduction of alcoholism and prostitution, which is more and more destroying harmony and community unity, bringing as consequences illnesses, destruction of the family units, a deterioration in the family economies, etcetera.

d) The introduction of Protestant churches, some of whom openly proselytize against the Diocese of San Cristóbal and seek to confront catechists and Servants of the Word. While others are seeking rapprochement and community dialogue and solidarity in response to the situation being experienced.

For all of these reasons, a search for greater spaces for civil society and their organizational expressions is necessary. It is here that the National Consulta called by the EZLN for March 21 fits in, which is more and more being echoed in the people.

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