This April 10 marked the 80th anniversary of the assassination of General Emiliano Zapata, after 65 years of the government's holding Zapata's image hostage for the purpose of reinforcing their agrarian policies (with the exception of General Lázaro Cárdenas), in order to maintain the structure that has primarily benefited landowners, cattlemen and ranchers. Through its bad manipulation of Zapata's image, the government assassinated the revolutionary spirit of the chief of the Mexican Revolution. Organizations affiliated with the PRI, such as the National Campesino Confederation (CNC), Antorcha Campesina, the Mexican Agrarian Confederation (CAM), Teachers Campesino Solidarity (SOCAMA) and Campesino Alliance, among others, have done the same thing, serving as a counterweight, and, in the case of Chiapas, as shock troops. Especially during the 80's, they carried out a series of ambushes against members of independent campesino organizations, in order to stop the distribution of land and to drown the current cry of LAND and LIBERTY in a campesino blood bath. Nonetheless, starting in the early 80's, with the formation of a national coordinating group of social organizations, grouped under the Plan de Ayala National Coordinating Group (CNPA), a new stage in the independent campesino movement was begun, which continues to raise the demand for land, and which has attempted, for more than 15 years, to reclaim General Zapata's image. The path to achieving these heartfelt dreams has been long and hard.

The legal foundations of the reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution was a cynical and shameful act on the part of Carlos Salinas de Gortari's government in 1992. And, in the name of Emiliano Zapata, the process of land privatization was begun. This not only removed the legal possibility for campesinos to gain access to a piece of land, but, in addition, ejidal lands could now be leased, purchased and seized, which benefited the large agro-industrial businesses and the credit banks. Current agricultural policies are directed towards realizing these practices, through the Certification Program for Ejidal Rights (PROCEDE), the program for ejidal division, which divides, confronts and damages the lives of the indigenous communities. The program, however, has not been successful in Chiapas.

Until, in 1994, with the appearance of the EZLN, Zapata lives once again in the Selva Lacandona, demanding "Land and Liberty" with dignity. With this, the image of Zapata was reclaimed, and it continues to live today and to makes its presence felt through the demand for the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords, through the rebellion of the Autonomous Municipalities, through the civil and peaceful resistance, through the marches by indigenous and campesino organizations. These marches are held every April 10 in the public plazas in various parts of the country, demanding a piece of land and an end to repression in the countryside.

It is within this context that, three days prior to April 10, the governor of the state, Roberto Albores Guillén - who is the only one who believes in the desertion of the 15,311 zapatistas - committed the political imprudence of reclaiming by force the San Andrés municipal building, which has been in the hands of EZLN support bases for three years and four months, and who had given it the name of San Andrés Sacamch'en de Los Pobres. The governor's grandiosity led him to commit a political error, allowing the zapatistas to recover the political initiative, because - in front of regional, state, national and international society - the government had failed to consider that San Andrés, as a symbol of peace, signified the following:

a). - Even though the federal and state governments - through their tactics of militarization and paramilitarization - had forced the zapatistas to suspend negotiations, San Andrés, as the seat of the Peace Dialogues between the government and the zapatistas, is still the symbol of peace for civil society, who demonstrated with great force on that January 12, 1994 for an end to the war.

b). - The government does not listen to civil society's cry for peace, and that is why it makes war. Today, with that symbol under attack, this civil society cries out, demonstrates and appears once again, demanding respect for the space that keeps hope alive for a renewal of the dialogue and for the possibility that the nation's political life can be redirected.

c). - San Andrés is a municipality with about 37 settlements and communities. There is a zapatista presence in all of them, whether it be a majority or a minority. This makes the correlation of forces favor the zapatistas at a regional level. This is why PRI authorities have not been able to be imposed.

d). - On April 10, San Andrés once again became the seat of protest, for the 80th Anniversary of Zapata's assassination, by more than 5000 zapatistas who came from different regions to be in solidarity with the indigenous of San Andrés. This event unmasked Governor Roberto Albores and his talk of the desertion of 15 or 20,000 zapatistas. It also led to a "momentary halt" in the policy of dislocating the zapatista communities.

The Flag of War

While the protest was underway in San Andrés, Albores Guillén snatched the San Cristóbal Cathedral plaza away from civil society. This plaza, which has served as a symbol of resistance for different regional and national actors, was officially delivered by him to the shock group Authentic Coletos, with the raising of a white flag, purportedly for peace. However, the shield of the conquistador, Diego de Mazariegos, which is drawn in the center of the flag, reveals the truth. Later, the governor went to Chenalhó to celebrate one more Anniversary of Zapata's death, hypocritically, with the PRI bases of the paramilitaries who committed the Acteal massacre, where those who died did so because of asking the government for "Land and Liberty."

Communities from the Chol region later reported that, while they were celebrating the sad act for Zapata in the Jolnixtié community, municipality of Tila, they were harassed by the federal Army. Their electricity was cut off at midnight, and the army mounted a house by house search, with the men, children and women being forced to flee to the mountains.

The policy of striking against the communities and of creating confrontations has not stopped, it is, in fact, increasing. This week alone, there were reports of inter-community conflicts and incursions by the army into several communities and municipalities of zapatista influence. In other places, it is the PRI's who do the attacking, who cut off the water and the lights, and who make life impossible for the communities in resistance. It is this policy which seems to be being refined and reinforced: the seeking of community conflicts among different groups, triggered by official bodies, such as the Department of Social Development (SEDESOL) through the Social Service Centers (CAS); the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) - who order the PRI's to cut off the electricity to those in resistance - ; through the municipal presidencies who give orders to the Ejidal Commissioners or to community representatives. These representatives are constantly threatened with the possibility of not receiving credits from Procampo, Progresa, Credits for the Word, or funds for economic projects, if they do not carry out the orders they receive from authorities or officials.

Community contradictions and confrontations are instigated - such as in San Andrés and through other recent events in different places - in order to then set up supposed dialogue between the opposing parties, which will have the following consequences:

a). - Through its state and/or regional bodies, the government will set itself up as the mediator of conflicts, and will, therefore, not take responsibility for creating those bodies. It also avoids responsibility for having to resolve specific demands.

b). - Establish negotiating tables for regional conflicts, which exempts the federal government of its responsibility for negotiating with the EZLN.

c). - Dilute the EZLN's negotiating capacity, which will lead to internal conflicts. And also, in its speeches it insists on negotiating with one actor (the EZLN), which it sees and understands to be regional in nature. All of this is done without addressing the causes which led to the suspension [of dialogue]. These causes form the basis for the EZLN demands for the renewal of the talks: the release of EZLN support base prisoners (which today total around 55); the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords in matters of Indigenous Rights and Culture; the breaking up of the paramilitary groups (which today total about 14); the establishment of the Monitoring and Verification Commission (COSEVER - which was formed on November 7, 1996, but which has nothing to verify since the accords have not been carried out); and the naming of a government delegation with the capacity for decision and resolution making (Emilio Rabasa was named, not as Governmental Delegate, but holds the title of Coordinator for Dialogue in Chiapas).

d). - Today, strikes are being directed against centers of civil resistance, such as San Andrés. The police-military operations are continuing in places such as Jolnixtié, which is one of the most important centers of resistance for Chols in the municipality of Tila; in the New Population Center of Nueva Revolución, in Sabanilla, previously the Morelia finca; with the entrance of the army into Xolomtoj, which is a center for the displaced in Chenalhó, next to the Autonomous Municipality of Polhó. It is possible that, within this framework, strikes could continue against the communities of Chulakhó in Tumbalá, Lote 8 in Salto de Agua; Roberto Barrios in Palenque; Nicolás Ruiz and El Bosque, among many others.

The police-military operations are justified by the government as restoring the "state of law," when, in fact, something that has never existed cannot be recovered. Their purpose has actually been to defend the exclusive, authoritarian and repressive political order. The best evidence of the lack of a state of law in Chiapas has been the continuous changes of government, a consequence of the systematic repression that has provoked political instability. The last six-year term was led by three individuals, and, thus far in the 1995-1999 term, two governors have been dismissed, with the current governor, Roberto Albores Guillén being the third on the list for the present administration. He has not learned the lesson, and he continues to repeat the same policies as his predecessors.

These events are taking place at the same time as the government and the Coordinator for Government are calling on the EZLN to dialogue, something which will not be possible as long as the government continues with its two-faced policies. In fact, this situation is bringing a possible confrontation between the Federal Army and the EZLN even closer. Thus, government policy is directed towards the chiapaneco conflict's dying on its own, and that the actors who get in the way of the government's program will be worn down. And, if some voice with political weight dares to speak out - not to denounce what the government is doing now, but rather to offer a negotiated solution different from the government's - there is an immediate confrontational and disparaging official response. This has been done to Manuel Camacho Solis (the federal government representative in the Cathedral negotiations in 1994) and to the PRI Senator for Chiapas, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, who have both expressed their opinions on events in Chiapas, proposing different solutions than the governments'. They have also pointed out the errors the government has committed in its handling of the chiapaneco conflict. And those who have felt themselves referred to, respond quickly, such as the Secretary of Government, Francisco Labastida; the Coordinator for Dialogue, Emilio Rabasa; Governor Roberto Albores and other officials.

What is being demonstrated by this attitude is a lack of political vision in the handling of the public debate. This is how Labastida Ochoa discredits himself and falls in his own trap, by taking on a policy of confrontation that takes political weight away from his presidential aspirations. It also confirms that the conflict in Chiapas is not being managed by Roberto Albores Guillén, but that he is rather merely carrying out Labastida's orders. There are other individuals around him who are closing the political pincers that have been put back in place in Chiapas. They are:

1. - Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who, from the Department of Government, is the one who says what is to be done and what is not to be done in Chiapas. Albores Guillén, then, acts as the Department of Government's operative, and he is responsible for fencing in the chiapaneco situation, so that it does not become part of the national agenda in Francisco Labastida Ochoa's possible campaign for the presidency in 2000. This is how the chiapaneco conflict is a hostage to the continuity of the political program that he is trying to impose for the next government.

2. - The arrival of Eduardo Robledo Rincón (the first governor dismissed in Chiapas in 1995) as head of the Department of Agrarian Reform (SRA), who is trying to end agrarian distribution in Chiapas and to favor a group of chiapaneco cattle ranchers and landowners. Today they are trying to strengthen the Department of Agrarian Reform, because, for them, the development of the countryside is next on their agenda, without admitting that the land takeovers are still continuing today.

3. - Julio César Ruiz (the second governor of Chiapas dismissed in 1998 as a result of the Acteal massacre), named recently as the Mexican agricultural representative to the United states. This is within the framework of foreign investment in Chiapas and in other parts of the country.

Mexico's future is at stake in Chiapas, because the resolution of the chiapaneco problem will be a demonstration of the resolution that can be made of the demands for democracy, justice and liberty, which are the common denominators of the country's problems. Not just by the government and the group in power, but by the different social actors who are seeking a change in government and the building of a new society.

For this reason it is important to remain attentive to future actions that could occur within that sector of civil society that participated in the March 21 Consulta. The primary challenge will be in identifying the most important problems facing the country, the drawing up of proposals to solve them and the establishment of a new kind of relationship between society and the government. This program is committed to not letting those values that govern the political and cultural lives of the Indian peoples go unnoticed, which must be incorporated into the new model for the country that is being constructed.

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