In previous bulletins, we considered the trend towards a resumption of the offensive in zapatista territory by the various police forces and the army. This was confirmed at the beginning of June, and we also believe that it will last for six months, the time period during which the parties will be holding discussions in order to select their candidates for the presidency of the Republic. These discussions will serve as an internal distraction, allowing the government to stress repression in the indigenous communities.

The repositioning of power groups within the PRI is creating more tensions, and the chiapaneco conflict finds itself in the middle of the crossfire. This creates, for the government, a suitable environment in which to increase violent actions in Chiapas and in the rest of the country, according to a study by Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) of Cuernavaca, Morelos. It mentions that the states with the highest numbers of political assassinations are Guerrero, followed by Chiapas, Oaxaca and Hidalgo, in that order. Destabilization and public insecurity are increasing. Today, the actors in the political process have changed. The circumstances and conditions are not the same as in 1994, making it more difficult to understand the political outlook. It is worth remembering that the assassination of Cardinal Jesús Posadas Ocampo, in the Guadalajara Airport in 1993, marked the beginning of a phase of violence that extended to the political assassination of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 1994.

On June 7, in Mexico City, Francisco Stanley was murdered, who had hosted a television program in that city. This is indicative of one more stage of violence in the country, and we do not know where it will lead. Public and political insecurity are felt to be increasing within the pre-election circumstances. Curiously, the chief of government of the Federal District - and possible opposition presidential candidate - Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, was attacked. Simultaneously, his mother's car was being stolen. Vicente Fox' chauffeur was wounded by a gunshot: Fox, a possible candidate for the PAN for the presidency has had to reinforce his personal security, denouncing that he has been threatened. This leads us to believe that one cannot dismiss the possibility of assassinations such as those of Luis Donaldo Colosio and Francisco Ruiz Massieu. This is because accommodations are no longer possible within the PRI power groups, causing them to resort to other methods for settling their differences.

It is within this context that the military incursions in Oaxaca, Chiapas, Hidalgo and Guerrero have been increasing, and within this climate that the police-military offensives have been renewed against the indigenous communities of Chiapas. This means:

a). In police-military terms: the 15 operations that have been carried out in different parts of the North, Los Altos and the Selva thus far in June by Public Security police and the army involve a strategy that is utilizing the police as the frontal assault force against the zapatistas, reinforced by the activities of the army and of other police forces. These provocations are attempts to have the zapatistas respond with weapons. If that were to be achieved, the army would then have an excuse to step up their actions in order to destroy the EZLN. This would not take place as a 'surgical operation' - as has been mentioned -but rather in a 'slow motion' action.

b). In geo-strategical terms: the provocations are initially occurring in Las Cañadas of Ocosingo. This is in order to reinforce the police-military siege that is in place from Ocosingo to Emiliano Zapata, very close to the Euseba River, a few kilometers from La Realidad. Meanwhile, the containment wall that is being maintained by the federal army between Las Margaritas and La Realidad would only have to wait for orders to act, and the pincers would close on the zapatistas, with the capture of the EZLN General Command. Public Security police and Army personnel present in other regions with a zapatista base would be ready to respond to any reaction, and, depending on the nature of the reaction, the response would come from either the police or from the army. The provocations continue, however, in different ways. The most subtle has been the introduction of caterpillar tractors in La Realidad, under the pretext of building a highway that they say would benefit the 12 communities in the region. Since the zapatistas are in resistance - refusing to accept government support as long as the San Andres Accords are not carried out - they are being accused of obstructing development in the state. Because of this, the government then says that they will enforce the law against them.

The war against the zapatistas is not expected to come as a shocking blow, but rather as a "slow-motion advance," which will not be as costly politically for the government. It is an invasion of the army and the police into the indigenous communities, preventing support bases from moving about the roads and highways.

c). In constitutional terms: the police and Public Security forces are being used as forces of frontal assault and provocation. They are being carried out under the pretext of "establishing order," where differences exist between zapatistas and PRI's; of "anti-gang operations," according to the Attorney General of Chiapas, and of the usual talk by the Army as to how it is fighting drug-trafficking, and so forth. The army cannot intervene openly against the zapatistas, because it is forbidden under the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and Dignified Peace in Chiapas of March 11, 1995. This is not because the law is being enforced, but rather because it is the instrument that supports the government doublespeak of 'the only means of solving the conflict in Chiapas is through negotiation.' This, despite the fact that current actions by the police and military forces are resonating with death in Las Cañadas of the Selva Lacandona.

d). In political terms: the war that is going on inside the PRI prior to their selection of their presidential candidate is so serious that any of the groups could utilize force in order to damage one of the contenders, leading to a military solution to the conflict.

The police-military offensive has been extended, over the last five days of the first half of June, from the Selva to the Northern region and to Los Altos. It is obvious that that this offensive is being directed against the Diocese of San Cristóbal, because the strikes have taken place against the Catholic communities. In the case of San Juan Chamula, orthodox Catholics have been controlled by the PRI. However, the people in the communities have grown tired of living in this way, leading to advances by the Diocese's pastoral work in some fifteen communities in that municipality. As the communities have built chapels, and have opted to follow the pastoral line of a preferential option for the poor, they have been attacked by the Chamula caciques, who are increasingly losing control of the communities. Public Security police have made an appearance in these communities, not in order to detain and punish the cacique assailants, but rather to watch over and to control the Catholics who have rebelled against their internal oppressors.

Within this context, the priest Jerónimo Hernández was detained for the second time, as were two other catechists in the municipality of Chilón, by a group of PRI's. The priest was released a few hours later, and the two indigenous were taken to the Social Rehabilitation Center in San Cristóbal, where they denounced that they had been tortured by judicial police.

Checkpoints by the National Immigration Institute, the Army and the Police in Los Altos have become stricter in their surveillance, checking of documents, taking of photographs and recording of license plate numbers of vehicles travelling through the zone daily. Today they have come up with the idea of investigating "foreigners" in the area, all under the pretext of enforcing the Firearms and Explosives Law, with the army assuming a role that does not belong to it. The army is the one who checks and controls: if foreigners are traveling, they then call on Immigration personnel posted at the checkpoints.

In the Northern zone, repression has become more pronounced, the communities are constantly denouncing the provocations they are experiencing, not just from the army, but also from Public Security police. The people have organized in order to protest, since they hold Public Security police responsible for having assassinated Cándido Arcos Torres, of the Jolnopá community, municipality of Tila. The town took over the municipal president's office in protest on June 6, destroyed files and set a Public Security patrol car on fire.

These actions by police forces indicate to us the hardening of state policy. In Chiapas, the governor does not do anything unless it is ordered by the federal government. With only a year and a half left in his political mandate, an interim governor like Roberto Albores Guillén could be burned politically and sully his image, while protecting the image of federal officials. It should be remembered that the consequence for chiapaneco governments that have behaved in this manner has been their political death. One only has to look at the manner in which the following former governors have passed into history, and the state in which they currently find themselves: Absalón Castellanos, Patrocinio González and Javier López Moreno. Another example is the condemnation of Julio César Ruiz Ferro as head of Agriculture and Livestock at the Mexican Embassy in the United States. Several of the governments that have enforced repressive policies are resting in the political pantheon of oblivion, which unofficial history has recorded as the worst governors of Chiapas.

The police-military solution in Chiapas has brought consequences within the country's Armed Forces. The army is no longer homogeneous. Information published recently in several articles in the weekly magazine Proceso speaks of division, with one group believing that there should be a just solution to the conflict in Chiapas, without the need for the operations that are being carried out today. They believe military honor has been stained, and it is necessary to reclaim it, by acting in a different manner. It is enough to remember that the basic position of the group of 52 soldiers - who formed the Patriotic Command of Raising the Peoples' Awareness last December - was solving the problems which had given rise to the armed conflict in Chiapas and respect for soldiers' human rights. Their main representative even expressed his admiration for Subcomandante Marcos. Another position within the army supports a military solution.

As long as the system of imposition continues to exist at all levels of the country's social structure, division will continue to affect the country's structure, and the Armed Forces will not escape it. The effects of the economic, political, social and military crisis impact on all Mexicans, whether they are military or not.

In response to this, it is necessary to begin to work towards a new kind of relationship between the military and Mexican society, in order to reclaim the army's true task, which is to safeguard the nation and Mexican lives. It is necessary to have an army that defends the interests of Mexicans, and not those of an economic group embedded in political power.

The campaign for the candidacies within the PRI is not presenting anything new. Whichever candidate wins the internal selection - and possibly the presidency of the Republic - they will not be offering us the hope of change. At the end of the day, it will be the one who guarantees the continuity of the neo-liberal program, at whatever cost.

In Chiapas, reactionary groups are generally imposed. During 1994 and 1995, they were characterized by exercising violence against the popular movement. Today they have expressed their support for Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who will be, significantly, opening his first campaign office in San Cristóbal, by way of the "Authentic Coletos" (who stoned the 200 Italian observers who were holding a press conference in San Cristóbal. They had been revealing the human rights violations experienced by indigenous during the violent dislocation of the Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Community in April a year ago. This May 22, the "Authentic Coletos" repeated their attacks against opposition political parties, and particularly against PRD Deputy Gilberto López y Rivas, for having filed a demand with the PGR against paramilitary groups operating in Chiapas). This is an indication that we can expect worse.

Within the framework of political attacks, it is necessary to always understand that the Diocese of San Cristóbal is in the eye of the hurricane. The Diocese is going through a moment of pastoral transition, due to the change in Bishops, but also due to the results of the Third Diocese Synod. When Bishop Samuel Ruiz García turns 75, he will also have completed 40 years of pastoral work in the Diocese. According to canonical laws, he must leave his position, with Coadjutant Bishop Raúl Vera López taking his place. Don Samuel will be leaving the Diocese in November, and it can be predicted that the group that has always attacked him, the "Authentic Coletos," will become bolder and will carry out some action in order to strike out at Don Samuel, so that he will not be able to leave cleanly. This is what they have always wanted to do, and have never been able to do. A violent action would give the Diocese's enemies an opportunity to test Don Raúl, and to take his measure for when he is left without Don Samuel.

What the Authentic Coletos have never understood - in the same way that they have never learned the lessons of their failures - is that, for every action against the Diocese, there is a reaction, not just from the Diocese, but rather from those who see in the Diocese pastoral work the building of a life program and of a better world. The Diocese is ultimately strengthened, through all the national and international solidarity that is generated. While some are promoting a program of death, the Diocese is building a program of life, which is taken on by people with a thirst for justice and for a better life. Today, now that this process is being absorbed by, and taken into the hands of, the people - whatever Bishop may come, and whatever actions might be taken against him - it will be very difficult to destroy what has been constructed. Hope, faith and the love of God transcend borders. It is not just the Diocese of San Cristóbal, nor Chiapas, nor Mexico, it is the building of a just world wherever there are injustices, without regard to color, religion, ethnic group, gender or nationality.

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