The year 2000 is drawing near, and, with it, the elections for the President of the Republic and for the Governor of Chiapas, as well as the hope for something different, since the hypothesis we are now operating on is that the official party, the PRI, and the interim Governor, Roberto Albores Guillén - whose interim government is illegal in itself - are governing only with the support of 12.61% of the chiapaneco population, in real terms. In addition, under the cover of the "State of Law," while responding to the demands of the chiapaneco people, while exercising the "rule of law," while stating that the majority of chiapanecos support them - at the same time, and in contradiction to the previous, they are increasing the repressive machinery, both in numbers and budget. They are also reinforcing its presence in all the municipalities in the state and granting more power to the police forces.

This is what we shall demonstrate here. To this end, we will analyze the political preferences of the chiapanecos from several points of view. We will use two parameters: the results of the October 1998 elections of the municipal presidencies (hereafter "elections"), and the Consultation for the Recognition of the Rights of the Indian Peoples and for an End to the War of Extermination, convoked by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in March of this year (hereafter, 'Consulta").

1). The comparative advantages of the PRI in the elections are already well known: an electoral system controlled by state party interests, poorly located polling places that prevented many chiapanecos from voting; intimidation, the buying and coercion of votes, proven innumerable times by the political parties themselves, by Civic Alliance and social organizations, and by all of us who have experienced these fraudulent mechanisms: ballot box stuffing, media (television, radio and press) at the service of official propaganda, public funds used for PRI political campaigns, and many, many other anomalies and illegal acts. Despite all of this, the official party did not get the votes they expected, yielding scanty results edging towards downfall.

We would especially like to emphasize a hypothesis that is elemental to our analysis: In the vote counting, the official party would tend to invalidate those votes that were not in their favor. We say the official party, because opposition parties have not had the resources to have representatives at the majority of the polling places on election day. The polling places are, therefore, under the control of the PRI.

2). The zapatista Consulta has, for its part, the advantage of the breadth of its voters' universe, since it allowed those over the age of 12 to participate, whereas the constitutional elections set the age at 18. Its disadvantage was that it did not have the official resources, and there was a very strong campaign, both in the media, and in actions, against this initiative. Its success was due to the resources of organized civil society. Its results, although not often noted, have had a social and political impact of such magnitude that they will strongly affect the political life of the country, and of Chiapas, in the mid term.

We also want to put special emphasis on our hypothesis here: almost everyone who participated in the Consulta in Chiapas is opposed to the official party. This is supported by the fact of the extreme political polarization: anyone who participated in the actions convened by the EZLN would be against the Roberto Albores government, and vice versa.

We are making these statements because the analysis of the participation of the chiapaneco people will concern both democratic exercises in terms of numbers, then in real terms. This will be our criteria for measuring the credibility of the official party. Through this indicator, we will be able to interpret the government's actions from now until the upcoming elections in the summer of the year 2000. These elections will be the focus of the analysis of political events during these months.

The PRI obtained votes in all the municipalities. The PRD failed to gain any votes in 6 municipalities (5.40% of the 111 municipalities), and the PAN failed in 40 of them (36.03%). The PT was not far behind, not managing to win any votes in 58 (53.25%), the PDCh in 72 (64.86%), the PFC in 79 (71.17%) and the PVEM in 88 (79.27%). This percentage would be even worse for the minority parties if we were to take into account the fact that they did not receive more than 10 votes in many municipalities. From this perspective, one could state that there are only two significant political-electoral forces in Chiapas: the PRI and the PRD.

From a different perspective, however, it would appear that the PAN is the favorite, since it once again won the state capital, Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The votes in the capital, however, represented 37.86% of all the votes they received in Chiapas. They do not have a significant presence in poor, indigenous regions, or even in the other important cities.

According to official data, the results were in this order: the PRI "won" 86 municipalities (77.47% of the total), with 415,747 votes (44.38% of those voting); the PRD won 18 municipalities (16.21%), with 246,294 votes (26.33%), and PAN obtained 7 municipalities (6.30%), with 123,807 votes (13.20%). From this perspective, it would appear that there is only one political-electoral force in Chiapas: the PRI.

Taking into account only the number of municipalities that were supposedly won, the impression is given that the PRI has not been discredited in the eyes of the chiapaneco public: that it represents the majority, who support the actions of the interim governor. We should not forget, however, that they do not have an absolute majority, but rather 44.38%. This amount will be drastically reduced in real terms further ahead. We shall analyze it scrupulously.

4.5% of the votes were declared void. That would appear to be a small number, but it translates into 42,925 persons having their votes thrown out. This is a higher figure than the populations of 91 of the municipalities in the state (81.98%), who have fewer than that number of residents.

Now let us look at the participation in the Consulta. People in at least 38 "constitutional municipalities" (34.23% of the total) participated, with a total of 461,179 votes. This is more than the votes obtained by the PRI in all the municipalities in the state in the last election.

Of the 86 municipalities "won" by the PRI, there were only a few in which they won by a majority of the votes. In 22 of them, there was a 10% difference in votes, in comparison with their closest competitor (the PRD in the majority of the cases, the PAN in the minority). If we take into account the great mechanisms of electoral fraud (and, in many cases, the voided votes were enough to make the difference in the PRI win), the official party would not, hypothetically, be governing these 22 municipalities, in real terms: Altamirano (with a PRI margin of 8.8%, in addition to 480 voided votes); Amatenango del Valle (7.3%, with 122 voided); Bejucal de Ocampo (3.5%, with 91 voided); Cacahoatán (3.6% and 459 voided); Coapilla (8.4% and 64 voided); Chicomuselo (4.8% and 296 voided); Chilón (10.5% and 910 voided); La Grandeza (8.5% and 40 voided); Huehuetán (4.2% and 310 voided), Huitiupán (7.1% and 397 voided); Ixtacomitán (5.4% and 88 voided), Jiquipilas (1.9% and 411 voided); Las Margaritas (13% with 946 voided); Mazatán (3.5% and 177 voided); Osumacinta (0.8% and 28 voided); Cancuc (0.1% and 406 voided); Simojovel (1.6% and 641 voided); Sitalá (4.9% and 88 voided); Tapachula (8.1% and 1931 voided); Venustiano Carranza (8.7% and 710 voided); Acacoyagua (2.8% and 158 voided) and Pijijiapan (9% and 450 voided).

And so the PRI would be hypothetically governing in 64 municipalities (57.6% of the total), and not in 86 (77.47%). And there is more: this hypothesis would change if we were to take into account another criteria or factor: the Consulta.

In at least 37 of the 86 PRI municipalities, the EZLN convened more people for their Consulta than who had cast votes for the official party in the election. These are: Altamirano, Amatán, Amatenango del Valle, Arriaga, Bochil, El Bosque, Chalchihuitán, Chanal, Chenalhó, Chicomuselo, Chilón, Frontera Comalapa, Huitiupán, Huixtán, La Independencia, Ixhuatán, Ixtapa, Larráinzar, Las Margaritas, Nicolás Ruiz, Ocosingo, Ocotepec, Oxchuc, Palenque, Pantelhó, Pueblo Nuevo, Las Rosas, Salto de Agua, San Cristóbal, Cancuc, Sitalá, Socoltenango, Soyaló, Tenejapa, La Trinitaria, Yajalón y Escuintla.

From this perspective, the PRI would only have relatively greater support in 49 municipalities (44.14%). In some municipalities, there was a difference of from between 2 votes more for the Consulta than for the PRI - as in Chanal - to 12,143 votes more, as in El Bosque, 21,399 more in Tenejapa and 7250 in Ocosingo, to give just a few examples, and just the votes in the civilian population, not counting zapatistas. This is because they reported on the vote total in all the Autonomous Municipalities, which reached 158, 518, a figure that exceeded the total of all the votes obtained by the small parties, and which would be very close to the total - if we add the total votes gained by the PAN, PT, PDCh, PVEM and PFC - of 180,614.

Summing up, then, if we take the 86 municipalities supposedly "won" by the PRI, and subtract those where they received less than 10% more than their primary opponent - as well as those where the EZLN elicited more votes for their Consulta than the total votes cast for the official party - there would, hypothetically, then, be only 40 municipalities (36% of the total) left in which they would be governing. Of these, there are only 14 municipalities in which they won more than 50% of the votes: Comitán, La Concordia, Copainalá, Ixtapangajoya, Juárez, San Fernando, San Lucas, Solosuchiapa, Sunuapa, Tecpatán, Tzimol, Chamula, Tumbalá and Sabanilla. The majority of these are small municipalities. Only one is significant (Comitán), and in two of them the paramilitary group Peace and Justice dominates (Sabanilla and Tumbalá), as well as Chamula, which is traditionally controlled by the PRI.

Of the 40 municipalities previously mentioned, the 26 where the PRI governs with a small percentage and a very weak vote count are: : Acapetahua, Amatenango de la Frontera, Angel Albino Corzo, Bella Vista, Catazajá, Cintalapa, Chiapas de Corzo, Chiapilla, Frontera Hidalgo, Mazapa, Mitontic, Pantepec, Pichucalco, El Porvenir, Reforma, Suchiate, Teopisca, Tila, Tonalá, Tuxtla Chico, Tuzantán, Venustiano Carranza, Villa Corzo, Zinacantán, Motozintla y Siltepec.

Thus the official party's strength, in real terms, is: 14 municipalities (12.61% of the total) in which they had more than 50% of the votes, totaling 52,421 sympathizers (5.85% of all the votes cast in the state).

It is significant that the number of persons in Chiapas who participated in the Consulta convened by the EZLN represents 51.53% of the total votes cast in the last constitutional elections. They were both democratic exercises, the one controlled by the powers, and with hefty economic resources, and the other organized by civil society, with a great capacity for mobilization.

This gradual decline in support for the PRI caused the government to walk a tightrope in order to reinforce their legislative strategy that would give legal justification to the subsequent period of violence and repression. How would they recover the 16 councils being governed by the PRD in the Selva, Northern and Los Altos regions, key for strengthening the proposals? We shall not repeat the actions the interim governor carried out from January to October 1998. The only thing we wish to emphasize is that - in contradiction to what we have expressed here concerning the Consulta - the PRI recovered all these municipal presidencies, in an attempt to gain total control.

As happened last year, audits are now being announced of municipalities suspected of corruption, while other PRI municipal presidents are being dismissed for extensive fraud. The anti-constitutional, illegal and anti-democratic manipulations of the town councils and other municipal bodies is already well known. It has been through alleged consultations with these town councils, however, and through endorsements by the municipal presidents, that the following have been approved:

1). The Redistricting Law, officially creating, in a few days, seven new municipalities, including Chenalhó, Ocosingo, Angel Albino Corzo, Simojovel and Larráinzar, with protest from opposition parties, who accuse the interim governor of imposing unilateral measures and of violating the San Andres Accords. Residents of the community of Guaquitepec, Chilón, are now refusing to accept their redistricting, in the face of government pressure. This speeding up of the creation of new municipalities will bring greater poverty, through the lowering of existing municipalities' budgets, in order for the new ones to create their infrastructures. It will also lead to more military and police camps in their municipal seats, following the imposition of public security agreements.

These new, small municipalities - far from eradicating fincas - will create new fincas of power and new "legal" strongholds for PRI, police and military forces. There will soon be more municipalities (but not more people) being "governed" by the PRI And, following them will come the justification to crush those Autonomous Municipalities who refuse to incorporate themselves into the imposed legal structures.

2). State Indigenous Rights and Culture Law, approved last week, again by the PRI majority, and with the opposition parties against the measure. And so, all those proposals or actions in matters relating to this, will be illegal and likely to be sorted out through violence by way of the "state of law."

3). Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas. Already approved by the State Congress. It will offer impunity to paramilitary groups.

In the context of this law, mention should be made of the internal divisions within the Peace and Justice group over the last few days. Their leadership has been accused of the corrupt use of government funds and, once again, of the collusion of another State PRI Deputy, Raymundo Hernández Trujillo, who is now being accused by members of the paramilitary group itself. They are also demanding the dismissal of their leader, and they are threatening the PRI with not participating in the party's internal elections, if their demands are not met. They have been joined by members of this group from Tila, Tumbalá, Sabanilla and Salto de Agua, which, as we have seen, are important political strongholds of the official party.

Another stronghold, however, is also in the balance: Chamula. This municipality has been a PRI bastion, and it awarded the official party 8893 votes after interrupting the elections with impunity last year and managing to void the count in their district. It is now being assaulted by police forces seeking to disarm the population, since tensions between traditional Catholics and Evangelicals have reached such a point that the government fears another incident such as Acteal. It would be very difficult, again, for the government to distance themselves from the PRI's, from the administrative anomalies and from other illegalities that could come to public light and which they have allowed.

The electoral trends are taking shape. Gilberto de Los Santos - the brother of Miguel de Los Santos, the defense attorney for the Cerro Hueco political prisoners and former municipal president of the municipality of Pijijiapan - is now the new leader of the State PRD. Meanwhile, opposition parties were able to agree for the need for an alliance in order to topple the state party in 2000. In Chiapas, the former PRI Senator and member of Cocopa, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, who could emerge as the unity candidate, is attracting support in many sectors.

In response to the above-mentioned trends, the legislative proposals point towards a consolidation of the "legality" of repression, which should be enjoyed by the state alone - in order to prevent the changes in electoral reforms which opposition parties have been demanding in order to secure more just and equitable elections. Something new is emerging in society. The end of the state apparatus is inevitably approaching. Hopefully this process will not be at the cost of more blood.

All the same, the political parties do not legislate, they do not have the credibility of the people and abstention is resounding. The governor was not popularly elected; he does not have the support of the majority of chiapanecos; he is interim - and, in the eyes of other analysts, even illegal. According to the "Political Constitution of the Free and Sovereign State of Chiapas," in order to be governor, one must "Have no job, position or commission from the Federation or from the State, and, if so, must resign and be separated from them for at least ninety days prior to the election (Article 35, IV)." Roberto Albores resigned from the Cocopa and from his seat in Congress a few days prior to his appointment. Nor does society have the strength yet for any party in power to "govern obeying," or to enforce the fulfillment of the zapatista Consulta and the demands of the people to stop the war, hunger, misery and injustice. Who is governing in Chiapas? It remains to us to analyze the Army. That will be the another issue.

Roberto Albores' government has launched a fierce and costly campaign in the media, and now also on Televisa Azteca, which is trying to create an illusion of political consensus for the PRI and for the actions of its government. This campaign includes the "shows" that are produced of "thousands" of zapatistas joining official ranks, the agreements and the phantom consultas, among other actions. Let this analysis serve as an attempt to destroy this illusion.

Abbreviations:

PAN (National Action Party)

PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party)

PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party)

PT (Labor Party)

PVEM (Ecology Green Party of Mexico)

PDCh (Democratic Chiapaneco Party)

PFC (Cardenista Front Party)

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