THE ECONOMIC ARENA

As we have said previously, the elections for the Presidency of the Republic and for Governor of Chiapas, in August of 2000, is the lens through which we will watch events unfold. It is not just the possible defeat of the PRI for the presidency and for the governor of Chiapas that will be at stake in 2000, but also the political program of the globalization of neoliberalism.

Tension and fear over a change in the country's economic direction, structural readjustment and privatization process are all causing fear at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the midst of this, preparations for a military solution in Chiapas could be speeded up, in order to prevent change or to spread fear of something different.

James McCabe, the President of the American Chamber of Commerce, stated, on August 5, that Mexico requires three conditions in order to assure fixed capital: 1) effectively fight insecurity (which translates into investor insecurity and into more resources to police forces and/or the Army); 2) fiscal reforms that give incentives to investment (which translates into greater guarantees for investors); 3) completion of deregulatory programs (which translates into greater mobility for investment). The OECD stated that the continuity of the economic program is imperative during the next presidential term, and he noted that Mexico has carried out the greatest amount of privatization in the developed world. Indeed, since, of the 1115 government businesses in 1982, only 218 remain, of which, 48 are already up for sale.

President Zedillo is insisting that the Congress speed up privatization of the electrical energy sector, while, at the same time, the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, is announcing the privatization of the electrical arena for the end of the year.

In the midst of the economic crisis, the federal government contracted the services of the transnational firms Eastern British Power International, of Great Britain, and Union FENOSA, of Spain, charged with the restructuring of the electricity sector and of the future privatization of the para-state business. The salaries that the Mexican government pays the Spanish firm's personnel vary from $910 to $1638 per day. And so, the Mexican people are paying not only for the rescue of the bankers, for the budgetary shortfalls due to the sale of para-state enterprises and through higher taxes and the increase in the cost of public services, but they are also paying the incredible salaries for those who are going to modernize what they will be purchasing tomorrow. For 1999, the agreement goes up to 13 million dollars, and this technical advisement has cost $20 million over the last three years, money which has not been spent on fighting poverty.

The sugar sector, made up of 60 privatized refineries in the country (for which the De la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari governments obtained $200 million), including Chiapas, announced the possible bankruptcy of at least 22 of them owing to accounts imbalances that have increased at least 24-fold. In addition, the importing of 20 million tons of fructose is speeding up the failures in this sector. This could be a strategy by the large companies to acquire these refineries, since 90 million bottles of soft drink are consumed in Mexico every day.

For one thing, the 60 refineries, who represent 0.5% of the Gross National Product, are threatening the 280,000 rural workers who live in this sector. In addition, some 350 million dollars of public funds have been invested in order to prevent their failure, and around 18 billion pesos of their debt could pass to public debt. Curiously, some sugar industries were, or are, bank shareholders, and, as such, could be involved in the politics of a financial rescue. For example, PROAZUCAR, of Eduardo de la Vega, former Banoro shareholder, is the owner of refineries in the states of Veracruz, Jalisco, Sinaloa and Chiapas.

The program to privatize historic monuments has raised another sector opposed to such a measure. We recall that, in November 1997, the Mexican government presented more than 30 observations to the "Project for an American Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples" of the Organization of American States (OAS), among them, on the issue which concerns us, the OAS proposes:

"The indigenous peoples have the right to restitution regarding the comprehensive ownership of said heritage from which they were dispossessed, or () to indemnification no less favorable than the standard of international law."

The Mexican government proposed the elimination of this paragraph, and the addition of:

"The indigenous peoples will be able to participate in the administration and care of those monuments, archeological and ceremonial sites, property of the state, that are located on their lands () In cases of indemnification, this should be addressed by domestic law."

Further along, the OAS proposes:

"When sacred tombs and relics have been appropriated by state institutions, they should be returned."

And the Mexican government proposes adding:

"When () they are property of the State, the indigenous peoples shall be able to participate in the administration and care of same."

In summary, carrying out the San Andrés Accords also implies setting up obstacles for investors, for NAFTA and for the globalizing and neoliberal program: the right to education holds the government responsible for carrying out its obligation to provide funds for education. The neoliberal program would free the state from that responsibility and put it in the arena of the investors: "If you want an education, you pay for it." The OAS proposes:

"The indigenous peoples shall have the right to: a) define and apply their own educational programs, institutions and facilities; b) prepare and apply their own plans, programs , curricula and teaching materials, and c) teach, train and accredit their own teachers and administrators ()," to which the Mexican government proposes adding: "The states will guarantee the indigenous peoples the right to participate ()"

By accepting the right to "the use and enjoyment of natural resources" at a constitutional level, not only would a million indigenous in Chiapas benefit, but so would the more than 10 million indigenous in the country. It would also set a precedent for indigenous and campesino struggles in Latin America. If the San Andrés Accords were incorporated into the Political Constitution, the following areas would be affected in terms of investment: oil, current and future investments in hydroelectric energy, the interference of investment in biodiversity, the dividends generated by tourism in the "ruins," the Mayan temples in Mesoamerica, and so on.

In addition, since 1997, Mexico has been paying more and more for the leasing of geostationary space in the satellites that have been sold by the government (La Jornada, August 7). Because of all of this, it is, therefore, not surprising that Mexico has the second highest foreign debt in Latin America, following Brazil, with 161 billion, 316 million dollars. It holds the fourth highest debt with the International Monetary Fund, with 6 billion, 549 million dollars, after Russia, Indonesia and Brazil. At the end of 1998, Mexico's foreign debt equaled 39% of the Gross National Product (GNP), and, between 1995 and 1998, interest payments reached 45 billion, 649 million dollars.

THE POLITICAL ARENA

It is essential for both sides to carry the war to their own terrain. President Ernesto Zedillo, through the Army, has been cornering the EZLN even more over the last few weeks, and is heading towards military confrontation and provocation. The government is stronger than the EZLN militarily, but weaker politically, and, therefore, the cries for democracy terrify them. Democracy within their party, outside it, in society, in the international community, in the armed forces. The demand is broad, and the new parties that are being established do not fail to include the official party's epitaph.

The EZLN, although we could surmise the same in the military arena, has been strengthening its political and social alliances this year. Following the National Consultation in March with civil society, it has extended important bridges with at least five sectors: NGOs, teachers, students, electrical workers and the movement against the privatization of historic monuments. 1) With the NGOs and Human Rights bodies by granting them a high level of credibility prior to the visit by the UN Special Relator for Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions' 2) With the Democratic Teachers at a meeting in La Realidad in August; 3) Another, the "National Encuentro in Defense of the Cultural Heritage, with hundreds of persons, and those from the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH), which is currently being held in the same community in the Selva; 4) With the students of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, also in the same community; 5) With the support demonstrated for the movement against the privatization of the country's electric energy sector; 6) and with students from the National Pedagogical University and teachers from the Rural Teachers Training Colleges on August 9.

Through these actions, the EZLN is focusing on, and promoting, the social reaction in at least four of the government's most important programs: the privatization of education and the UNAM strike, the privatization of historic monuments, the privatization of electric energy and human rights in Mexico.

While the National Encuentro in Defense of the Cultural Heritage (against the privatization of historic monuments) was being held in La Realidad, a short time ago, Subcomandante Marcos reported that between 400 and 500 heavily armed Mexican Army soldiers - 300 of whom landed by parachute and others in 14 helicopters from the San Quintín and Ibarra barracks - took over the community of Amador Hernández. They set up barbed wire around their position, at the entrance to the Montes Azules biosphere reserve. At the same time, there was an increase in military overflights, checkpoints and patrols between Guadalupe Tepeyac and San Quintín, the stretch of road which includes La Realidad. Marcos stated that "the largest oil reserve in the world" is in the Amador Hernández Valley, which also takes in the Corralchén sierra, in the Montes Azules reserve and in the Santa Cruz sierra. Military checkpoints were similarly reinforced between Las Margaritas and La Realidad.

The Commander of the 39th Military Region, General Fermín Rivas García, confirmed that some 400 soldiers went to the community of Amador Hernandez, "in order to protect" the company that was building the (militarily strategic) 19-kilometer road between that community and San Quintín, where one of the most important military facilities in Ocosingo is located.

Coincidentally, on July 23 the Federal Prosecutor for Environmental Protection reported that 700 families (3500 persons from 6 towns) had been relocated in the Montes Azules reserve, arguing that the forest reserve in the Selva Lacandona had been reduced by 40% over the last 14 years. This area has the richest ecosystem in the country (more than half the bird species, 37.1% of the mammals, 40% of the butterflies, etc.). This region has many zapatista families, and it would appear that the Army is preparing a military assault.

Journalist Juan Balboa, from La Jornada, reported that the military encirclement had been stepped up with an addition of approximately 10,000 more soldiers, fifty camps and absolute control of the roads, with 15 checkpoints in the valleys and the Canadas of the northeastern Selva Lacandona. They have also penetrated - for the first time since the zapatistas' appearance - into the communities of the Montes Azules biosphere reserve. This is considered to be the second massive mobilization of troops in this region since 1995, when 5000 soldiers arrived, and another 5000 in July for a purported reforestation program.

The Army is keeping some 30 indigenous communities in the Taniperla cañada and within the reserve under siege. Meanwhile, along the Palenque - Marqués de Comillas highway, on a stretch approximately 200 kilometers long, 20 military camps and 8 checkpoints have been installed. The command posts for these new settlements are located in Cintalapa, Palestina and Taniperla. Among the camps that have been reinforced are those that have been established in Crucero Corozal, Boca Lacantún, Crucero Real, Monte Líbano, Ocotalito, Taniperla, Crucero Palestina, San Quintín, Chancalá, Pico de Oro and San Jerónimo Tulijá, among others. Among those new camps and installations - which are being called Montes Azules Reforestation Camps - are: Frontera Corozal, Bonampak crossroads, La Arena, Laguna Suspiro and the mountains close to La Culebra and Santa Rita. In their passage through the valleys and Cañadas of the Selva Lacandona, they have set up checkpoints, the majority of them intermittent, in indigenous communities such as El Limonar, Cintalapa, La Culebra, Arroyo Granizo, El Paraíso, Crucero Palestina, Ocotalito, La Arena, Calvario, San Jose, Patihuitz, Lindavista, Jardín, Laguna Ocotal, San Gerónimo Tulijá, Monte Líbano and Taniperla. All of these communities are being patrolled day and night.

Meanwhile, the state government is also attempting to strengthen its position. In addition to the seven already established, on August 20 they are hoping to create seven more municipalities: one in La Independencia, one in Pueblo Nuevo, three in Ocosingo, another in Sabanilla and one in Las Margaritas, in the community of El Edén, where the Army has recently installed a new military camp. In addition, they also hope to form another eight municipalities by the end of the year: Senobio Aguilar, Amparo Aguatinta, Taniperla, San Quintín, El Limar, Patihuitz and San Jerónimo Tulijá, from the municipalities of Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Tila and Chilón. All of these are located within areas that are strongholds of the Army, of alleged paramilitary groups, of police forces or of PRI communities.

Prior to the end of the year, the government hopes to establish 22 new PRI municipalities with their own municipal authorities, budgets, and military and police camps. There are some municipalities that are so small and absurd that they would appear to be more "military municipalities" or "police municipalities." In this manner it will be easier for the paramilitary groups to coexist or to be incorporated into the rural police, or to serve as the headquarters for the carrying out of "legal" actions of repression against the zapatista Autonomous Municipalities, or against anyone who is opposed to the program of the state.

The Attorney General of the State, Eduardo Montoya Liévano, named a former soldier (when they are named by the law, they are "former," such as at Acteal), as the alleged assassin of José Hidalgo Pérez, who disappeared on June 10 in the city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas. The capture of the alleged culprit would have appeared to be impossible, not just because of his alleged military connections, but also because the Attorney General himself has admitted that there is a backlog of 37,000 open investigations in Chiapas, and only 6% of the year's arrest warrants have been executed. With this, the fifth Attorney General to serve during this 6-year term begun by Eduardo Robledo Rincón, confirms that 94% of all criminals are walking the streets in the state with total impunity.

The Episcopal Commission for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas (made up of eight bishops: Raul Vera Lopez and Samuel Ruiz García of San Cristóbal, Felipe Aguirre of Tuxtla and Felipe Arizmendi of Tapachula, Chiapas; Juan Guillermo López of Cuauhtémoc Madera; Carlos Talavera of Coatzacoalcos; Jacinto Guerrero of Tlaxcala; Luis Morales of San Luis Potosí) came to the state for the eighth time, following a years' absence. They visited the interim governor, the Cerro Hueco prisoners and Bachajón. Among other things, they stated that they had not come to replace anyone, but rather with a coadvisory program. They also said that it is necessary for dialogue to be renewed and that the peace process not be damaged by the year 2000 election campaign. Nothing could be further from reality.

For better or for worse, the call for dialogue could strengthen the government's strategy, through insisting on that line at the same time as the government and the Army, through their actions, demonstrate their lack of willingness for dialogue. This would serve to back the EZLN into a corner, facilitating public opinion turning against the intransigents. The truth is, under the present conditions and during the elections, it would seem impossible for a process of dialogue and peace to be initiated, at a moment when all the politicians are trying to defeat the PRI in the next electoral contest.

The Chiapas conflict is now on the presidential candidates' platforms. Two candidates stand out among the four candidates from the official party - the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): the former Secretary of Government, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, as the official candidate, and Roberto Madrazo Pintado, the former governor of Tabasco.

Labastida Ochoa, who is loyal to President Ernesto Zedillo's economic policies, during his not very outstanding visit to Chiapas, stated that: "Only if Chiapas develops, can Mexico develop." And, despite the support of the interim governor and the state apparatus, who are carrying out the most aggressive policies against Chiapas, it is "suffering" from the poverty in which millions of indigenous and campesinos are existing. He has offered, if he wins the presidency, to not persecute the EZLN, to appoint a negotiator of stature and to personally participate at the end of the peace process in a "comprehensive solution," to respect indigenous rights, to incorporate the rebels into security forces once peace is signed, and to stamp out the impositions from the center in the definition of the Chiapas government. The "key" point for Labastida Ochoa is the concept of communal exploitation of the land. Certainly what is being contemplated now is exploitation by the international community of the land, of natural resources, biostrategies, and even the Mayan ruins.

The other, Madrazo Pintado, who has ties to former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari - and who has been associated by the public and by opposition parties with corruption, ties to drug trafficking and as having benefited from economic policies - is now criticizing the neoliberal economic policies promoted by the President.

There are two other candidates, less dangerous for their political rivals, but more dangerous for the statements they made on July 14, when the Army began to penetrate the Montes Azules. Manuel Bartlett Díaz, the hard-line former governor of the state of Puebla, said the Chiapas conflict should be resolved immediately, although he said it should not be done through arms, but rather through dialogue. The fourth candidate, however, Humberto Roque Villanueva, stated that Mexico's governability in the future "will have to depend on the armed forces, because, after Chiapas, no one will be equal in this country."

And so, one of the fiercest political battles is being waged within the official party, prior to the selection of their single presidential candidate, who will be chosen on November 7. After the candidate is selected and internal wounds healed with difficulty - which will have negative consequences for the PRI - the official party and the government apparatus will focus its energy against the opposition and their possible alliance, in order to avoid being thrown out of power.

The National Action Party's (PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox, in addition to promoting the sale of Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) and the electrical industry, says, if he were to become president, he would make peace with Subcomandante Marcos within 15 minutes. It would appear, nonetheless, that it might take a bit longer to smoke the peace pipe, given what the press has been reporting over the last few days concerning the presence of guerrilla groups in the country:

Armed Revolutionary Commando of the South (Guerrero), Clandestine Indigenous Command of National Liberation (Oaxaca), Genaro Vázquez Execution Army (Guerrero), Clandestine Indigenous Army of National Liberation (Chihuahua), Insurgent Army of Chilpancingo (Guerrero), Liberation Army of the South (Guerrero), Liberation Army of the Southern Sierra (Guerrero), José María Morelos Popular Liberation Army (Guerrero), Clandestine Armed Forces of National Liberation (Guerrero), Magonista Popular Army (Guerrero), Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Chiapas, D.F., Veracruz y Puebla), Popular Revolutionary Army (Oaxaca, Estado de México, D.F., Chiapas, Guerrero y Puebla), Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent Peoples (ERPI), Popular Revolutionary Movement (Guerrero), 28th of July Clandestine Justice Command, Popular Revolutionary Movement (Guerrero), Armed Forces of Liberation of the Marginalized Peoples of Guerrero (Guerrero), Insurgent Revolutionary Popular Army (Baja California, Sonora, Coahuila, Chihuahua y Durango) and the Veracruz Liberation Army (Veracruz) (Cuarto Poder, July 24 and 27, 1999).

For Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the Chief of Government of Mexico City and the Democratic Revolutionary Party's (PRD) favorite candidate, the opposition alliance stands above his own candidacy. However, the internal divisions in his own party - and the bad image they have been given by the UNAM strikers through the use of police force during the strike - could wrest thousands of traditional sympathizers from the student movement away from him. In any regard, his popularity could pick up once social demands are kept in the forefront, such as opposition to the privatization of PEMEX and electrical energy, the renegotiation of the Free Trade Treaty, the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords, the demilitarization of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca, the renegotiation of the debt, and others. Because of these factors, this candidate would be the most uncomfortable for the interests of the International Monetary Fund, unless an opposition alliance were to force the PAN and the PRD to field a candidate who would balance the interests of both sides and not radicalize positions.

In Chiapas, there is another uncomfortable political actor. Independent Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, former PRI, former member of the COCOPA, architect of - and possible candidate for - the opposition alliance in Chiapas, is now the target of a new government attack. The newly revived problem that has existed for years around the 40,000 hectares of Los Chimalapas, an area of land between Chiapas and Oaxaca, has provided a launching pad for a new attack against the Senator. He is being accused of having ceded the territory to the state of Oaxaca during his term as Secretary of Government in Chiapas, in 1994. This land of alleged trafficking in wood, of economic interests and of arms trafficking, has aggravated the tensions between both state governments, and caused the Army to carry out more patrols in the region and to set up more checkpoints.

Note: If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to: ciepac@laneta.apc.org and indicate whether you wish to receive the bulletin in plain text or as a Word 7 for Windows 95 attachment.

Note: If you use this information, cite the source and our email address. We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their comments on these Bulletins. CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to continue offering you this news and analysis service. If you would like to contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your remittance to the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C.
Bank: Banamex
Account number: 7049672 Sucursal 386
San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, México.
You will also need to use an ABA number:
BNMXMXMM

Thank you! CIEPAC

Telephone:
in México: 01 967 674 5168
from outside Mexico:: +52 967 674 5168