The war in Chiapas is taking on more and more critical dimensions today, and it has been growing especially worse in the Selva Lacandona over the last three months (see Bulletins 168 to 171)

Our central hypothesis posits that what is fundamentally at stake is the implementation of the globalization of neoliberalism and its continuation after 2000. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Bank of Commerce (OMC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE) and the European Union, are all hoping that President Zedillo does not alter the course of Mexico's structural readjustment: elimination of subsidies, privatizations, commercial openings, payment of external debt, strengthening of bilateral free trade agreements with Latin America, optimal conditions in political, social and investment security terms. These and other elements factor into the impetus for a favorable solution to the Chiapas conflict. In a parallel fashion, however, the conflict reflects internally another fundamental political element: the hegemony of the official party, which has controlled the state apparatus for decades. The political class refuses to give up power. This - power for the sake of power - exists aside from the multinational interests of the great powers.

The international agenda is progressing: in 1994 we entered into the Free Trade Agreement with North America (TLC or NAFTA), and Mexico entered the exclusive club of the OECD. In 1995, Mexico participated in the Democracy Commission through Rights and in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; in 1996, in the work of the ad hoc Group on Corruption. In 1998, Mexico participated as an observer in the Committees of Legal Advisors in International Public Rights, Superior Education, Research and Culture. In March 1999, it joined the Group of Experts on Problems of Crime. It is now about to enter as an observer in the European Council, along with the EEUU, Canada and Japan, whose interest in Mexico is that of consolidating its commitment to democratic values, human rights and reinforcing the process of profound reforms that it has been promoting over the last few years in order to consolidate the rule of law, as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Rosario Green, stated. We must add, to all of these, Mexico's commercial accords with the rest of Latin America.

Putting the two trends together, (concern over the diversion of the country's economic program, and the PRI losing political power), the escalation of violence becomes clear. And Chiapas has its own special characteristics that allow us to interpret the latest occurrences and government strategy from this perspective.

For some analysts, the economic program - as the fundamental problem - is not only not at stake, but not even in danger. Nor do they believe that the PRI has lost its hegemony, even less that it could lose either the presidency of the Republic, or the governorship in Chiapas in the year 2000. According to this analysis, the attitude being taken by the interim governor of Chiapas and by the federation is simple a warlike position, and a desire to crush the indigenous. This, coupled with stubbornness, and without any other economic or political reasons. They would utilize this context to explain their actions, independently of what is going on in the world. We, however, believe that the problem is more profound and complex, and that we cannot analyze events without taking into account the current world situation and the political circumstances that are sharpening the contradictions.

The trends seem clear. Among them:

1) The official party (PRI) has been losing support and sympathy among the people of Chiapas, and, in general, at the national level over the last few years. The opposition has been gaining ground. However, the official party's new publicity campaigns - which are being talked about all over the country - could turn around over a few months time what the opposition has been struggling for for years.

2) The PRI continues in collapse and breakdown that owes little to its so-called openings to internal democracy. We cannot discount the possibility of more political assassinations.

3) Privatizations continue at an accelerated rate, as the growth of poverty is hastened. As does the elimination of all subsidies and resources for programs to fight poverty. If they do increase, it is, according to official figures, more and more due to outside loans which, paradoxically, tend to impoverish a county forced to pay its external debt.

4) Buying power continues to decline, as does employment.

5) The countryside is moving towards a devastating crisis in agriculture and for the country's millions of campesinos and indigenous. Self-sufficiency in food production continues to decline, and there is a greater dependency in this arena on the US.

6) The external debt continues to eat away at the heart of the Mexican economy. At the same time, the banking system has been swamped with frauds that are placing a weak financial system on the weakest shoulders of the increasingly more millions of poor who must bail out the bank.

7) The increased militarization is being extended across the country, and this explains the increased number of military troops, out of their barracks with better positions, the larger public budget and their presence in the state structure and apparatus, as well as their interference in the three levels of government. It no longer applies just to Chiapas, but also to Guerrero and Oaxaca, as well as states in the center and north of Mexico.

8) Violence continues to increase, as do human rights violations.

Meanwhile, as the loss of national sovereignty continues to mount, Mexico's dependency on the outside is serious: military dependence on the United States; dependency for food products on the neighbor to the north; dependency for fighting poverty, for the budget and for social policies on World Bank loans: economic dependency for a purported development which could not occur without direct foreign investment.

According to our hypothesis, the federal government - through the interim governor and the Army - has the following objectives:

1) Win the elections for governor of the state of Chiapas in 2000 and give the majority of votes to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for the presidency of the Republic. In order to accomplish this, the opposition alliance must be prevented, which could defeat the official party, and which could draw together, not just the political parties, but social organizations as well.

2) Prevent the advance of the EZLN, isolating and destroying it politically, economically and militarily.

3) Prevent the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas from continuing its pastoral line.

4) Reducing the Chiapas problem to the state level, and removing it from the national dynamic.

5) Set the conditions and bases for facilitating direct foreign investment in the fields of hydroelectricity, oil, agro-export, and so on.

6) Divert attention from the nation's fundamental problems, such as: privatization of electric energy, of railroads (a process completed on August 31), The Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA) fraud, in addition to others.

Among the mechanisms that are being used by interim governor Roberto Albores and the Army to implement the above, we can mention:

1) The launching of a lynching campaign against independent Senator, former member of the Commission of Concordance and Peace (CCOPA), former PRI, and now possible candidate for the opposition alliance in Chiapas for the next elections [Pablo Sálazar Mendiguchía]. In order to accomplish this, they revived the problem of Los Chimalapas, an area bordering the neighboring state of Oaxaca. They also took out newspaper ads and manipulated information in order to create a negative impact on his election campaign. The campaign failed.

2) See that Bishop Raúl Vera does not become the Bishop of San Cristóbal de Las Casas.

3) Extremely costly publicity campaigns for the state on television, radio and in the press, in order to create a positive image for the interim governor and his social works.

4) Campaigns aimed at tying the movement by the "ultra" striking students at the Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) to the EZLN, and to provoke a political and social lynching, in Mexico City as well as in Chiapas, of both actors who are checkmating the government. Similarly, it is trying to hinder the EZLN's relationship with other national movements against the neoliberal program and privatizations.

5) Xenophobic campaigns against, not only foreigners, but also non-chiapaneco Mexicans, leading to the municipal president of San Cristóbal de Las Casas - and the self-named "authentic coletos" of this city - as well as PRIs from the communities. Thus encouraged, they reacted by creating an atmosphere of violence, division and hostility with absolute impunity. Meanwhile, immigration officials are increasing their persecution of foreigners in the city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas.

6) Provoke confrontations between zapatistas and PRIs by way of Albores' counterinsurgent municipalities. The interim governor hopes to have established more of the 20 new municipalities before the end of the year. He is giving priority not only to those planned in his original proposal, but also to those PRI communities who want to be included in the redistricting and those which would offer a good arena for counteracting the strength of the zapatista Autonomous Municipalities. Police and military camps are now being installed in these new municipalities, offering a legal haven from which to operate. The interim governor is now promoting the Social Foundation for Chiapas, made up of businesspersons who have joined the counterinsurgency efforts. One of their first tasks will be the collecting of 20 million pesos for the seven new municipalities, which are getting under way with illegally imposed officials, and without funds or facilities from which to serve.

7) The interim governor is giving signs of distancing himself from the federation and of assuming responsibilities on his own, in order to function as a direct interlocutor with the EZLN, not with President Ernesto Zedillo. At the same time, he is asking for direct dialogue with the EZLN and is proposing a state COCOPA.

8) Promoting and supporting the campaigns of the official PRI aspirant for the presidency of the Republic, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, the former Secretary of Government. Labastida had been responsible for implementing policies in Chiapas and against the EZLN and the indigenous communities since January 1998.

9) The Mexican Army, creating a necessary counterinsurgency infrastructure. It has completed roads and highways in Ocosingo around the conflict zone, as it has also done in the Northern and Los Altos regions. The problem in Amador Hernández was an explosion as a consequence of this process. Meanwhile, the interim governor is trying to make it appear that he commands the federal Army, and that he is independent of the President of the Republic, forcing a militarized "development." The Army, meanwhile, which has, on other occasions, carried out the construction of these highways, put forward a civil construction company in order to thus justify the need for the workers' security. On other occasions, the paramilitaries, PRIs or police were up front. Nor should it be forgotten that the community of Amador Hernández forms part of a zapatista Autonomous Municipality, and it is also where the interim governor is proposing a counterinsurgent redistricting. Once more, a dispute over the political and military control of strategic regions.

10) The Mexican Army achieved new military positions, camps, checkpoints and barracks, from which they will not back off, and which has been in process since the February 1995 offensive. They are now dug in in San Cayetano, municipality of El Bosque, in San Jerónimo Tulijá, and others, despite massive mobilization by indigenous and civil society against it. A war exists in Chiapas, but the provocation to open fire is latent, and the incidents at San José La Esperanza demonstrate that. The cease-fire has already been broken by the federal Army on at least two occasions: a) the massacre at El Bosque in June 1998, and b) San José La Esperanza in August of this year, which was also part of the interim government's counterinsurgency strategy. The Army and the Federal Government, however, deny not only responsibility for the incidents, but also the very existence of the deaths and injuries.

11) The Mexican Army achieving strategic positions in political, economic and military terms, also using the excuse of reforesting the thousands of hectares burned in 1998, and who - as pointed out by many indigenous organizations and communities - were one of the primary agents of the forest fires, for counterinsurgency purposes. They are posted in Albores' counterinsurgency municipalities, at dams, oil wells and places of investment, and for the purpose of increasing the possibility of rapidly eliminating the EZLN, if it becomes necessary. And, in order to achieve the isolation of the EZLN, PRIs are also posted in the communities, with their checkpoints, with the police and immigration officials playing a fundamental role.

Chiapas is now characterized by a lack of legality and "rule of law:"

1) the installation of the state Congress at the end of 1998, following the state elections, was illegal, since seats were assigned without elections having been held in three districts. Opposition parties denounced this to no avail.

2) The actions of the Mexican Army are illegal: requests for passports and documentation, searches without warrants, takeovers of predios and ejidal lands, registrations of vehicles and documentation of non-residents, detention of indigenous on the roads, etcetera. Their actions go beyond the purported enforcement of the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law. The advances of positions they have made violate the Law for Dialogue for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas, the San Andrés Accords, Convention 169 of the ILO on Indigenous and Tribal Rights, the Second Protocol of the Geneva Convention (not signed by the Mexican government), the Mexican Political Constitution, and so on.

3) The redistricting is unilateral, and its procedures illegal, in addition to violating the San Andrés Accords.

4) The recent appointment of officials for the seven municipal councils is illegal, since there is no constitutional provision for their creation.

5) The lack of freedom of movement, and the harassment in order to impede it, in the Selva, Los Altos and Northern regions, violates the Political Constitution.

6) The creation and proliferation of armed groups and paramilitaries are illegal, as well as the direct or indirect participation by police and military forces, as confirmed by the communities, witnesses and "former military" and "former police officers" themselves.

7) The disarmament law for paramilitary groups is impugn and unilateral.

8) The State Law for Indigenous Rights and Culture is unilateral and violates the San Andrés Accords.

9) The proposal for a state Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA) is unilateral and violates the San Andrés Accords and the law for dialogue and peace in Chiapas.

10) The interim governor is illegal, since his election was not in keeping with the Political Constitution of Chiapas, which, in its Article 35, Section IV, states that, in order to be governor, one must: "Have no employment, position or commission with the federation or the state, and, if so, must resign and be separated from them at least 90 days prior to the election." Roberto Albores resigned just a few days before.

11) The expulsions of foreigners are illegal.

12) The economic contributions from public funds to the political campaigns of PRI candidates in the 1998 state elections, by Governor Roberto Albores Guillén, were illegal according to denunciations made by the National Action Party (PAN). The support for the official aspirant, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, during his visit to Chiapas in August, were also illegal, a denunciation made by another PRI, Roberto Madrazo.

13) The detention of, and violence against, the media is illegal, such as the case of Cuxuljá, where the police, in the presence of the military, attacked journalists, beat them, confiscated their credentials and threatened them.

14) As for the displacements of the population created by the Mexican Army and the paramilitaries, they are illegal because of the impunity, the deprivation of freedom of movement and of freedom of worship, among others. They also violate the human rights to education, health, land and the "Guiding Principles" of the UN "Guiding Principles for the Internally Displaced," signed by the Mexican government.

15) The deprivation of liberty of the dozens of EZLN indigenous support bases, imprisoned today in the Cerro Hueco Jail and in other prisons in the state.

16) The functioning of many PRI councils are illegal, where there is constant violation of laws, norms and municipal regulations in order to support the policies of the state government.

17) The speeches by the interim governor have provoked violence, inviting an angry reaction against foreigners, against the EZLN, against civil society that does not share the same opinions, against university students, and so on.

18) The charges brought by the interim governor against the students are illegal and violate fundamental human rights and constitutional guarantees, as do the demands by the San Cristóbal municipal president to expel actress Ofelia Medina from Chiapas.

19) The checkpoints manned by the Peace and Justice paramilitary group are illegal, as well as those manned by PRIs in the communities of Ocosingo. These actions were rejected by the interim governor in his 1998 State Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas, where he promised to enforce the law against instances of deprivation of freedom of movement.

20) The expulsion of thousands of Chamulas - without the government's doing anything about it - are illegal and impugn.

21) The police checkpoints, which the police set up in order to block the access of university students to the state of Chiapas, are illegal, as was the harassment at other highway checkpoints located in other states on the way to the Federal District.

Within this framework, and with the above actions implemented, we should not forget:

1) The Peace and Justice paramilitary group, in the Northern region, has, for the last few weeks, been experiencing breakdown, division and internal confrontations. They themselves are accusing their state PRI deputies and other leaders of mismanaging public funds. This could break out in armed confrontations at any moment.

2) The PRI aspirant for the presidency of the Republic, Roberto Madrazo, has, for his part, demanded justice from his party due to the misappropriation of public funds by the interim governor, which he used for the other PRI candidate, Francisco Labastida Ochoa.

3) The increase in paramilitary groups in the state.

4) The overflights are continuing, as are the patrols, checkpoints and harassment in more communities in the state.

5) Regarding the disappearance, presumed torture and decapitation of José Hidalgo Pérez, in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, the authorities have pointed out a former soldier as the alleged culprit. This could be the beginning once again of an escalation of violence against members of urban civil society. It should be noted that the appearance of the city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas has been changing. It has become more common over the last few months to see dozens of police officers stationed on the corners, with new black uniforms similar to the judicial police and military ones. At the same time, housing and accommodations for the judicial police and military have been proliferating.

6) A very serious political confrontation is going on inside the PRI between the candidates, which is sharpening and polarizing positions within the official party, where it would appear that President Zedillo's candidate, Francisco Labastida, is not the front runner, despite the incorporation of top former officials in his campaign team.

Campesino organizations (OCEZ-CNPA, OPEZ-BFP, ARIC-Independent, CIOAC, AEDEPCH, etcetera), dozens of civil organizations, political parties, the Diocese of San Cristóbal, unions, teachers, and many other actors at the state and national levels, have all, over the last few weeks, demanded the demilitarization of Chiapas. This has always happened, and the government has refused. The indigenous resistance has its limits, and that is what they are trying to break. We should all stop this war. What more do we need? But the demands go further, and they are repeated again: political judgment against interim governor Roberto Albores Guillén, the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords, the reinitiation of the peace dialogues and new mediation in the conflict.

These demands were raised forcefully after the Acteal massacre, in December of 1997. If the demands for a political judgment against the then interim governor, Julio César Ruiz Ferro, did indeed lead to his resignation and his being rewarded with a public position abroad, the imposition of the new interim governor, Roberto Albores Guillén, brought with it a federal and state response to the demands in terms of more military camps, police-military operations against the Autonomous Municipalities, more prisoners, more displaced, more deaths, higher budgets for the police and more officers, more harassment of the CONAI - until it disappeared - and of the opposition political parties, more arrest warrants for leaders of social organizations, and so on.

What will the response be now? The interim governor warned that he would not resign. The political lynching has been turned on him, and the response could be more dangerous for society. The apparent contradictions between the federation and the state of Chiapas, between Zedillo and Albores; a "coordinator for dialogue" overcome by the current situation, without credibility and without the capacity to create consensus in order to defuse the critical situation in Chiapas; the federal Army that has to face public opinion, denying the breaking of the cease-fire: all of these, and other indicators, give the impression of ungovernability, of a vacuum of power and the lack of political management. It becomes more and more clear that it is the federal Army that governs in Chiapas, and they are willing to pay any political cost in order to assure military positions designed for counterinsurgency. This places the civil government in the position of having to justify these actions through "development." Similarly, not one finger is lifted in the municipalities and in the new Albores municipalities without the federal Army's arrival.

Governor Albores has committed many mistakes for the federation: he put the Chiapas issue on the national agenda again, he did not fulfill the expectations of him for supporting Francisco Labastida's campaign, his campaign against Pablo Sálazar Mendiguchía did not work. He has turned intellectuals and artists against him for wanting to expel actress Ofelia Medina, as well as union members, university students, political parties, social organizations, the COCOPA. He has had to be refuted by federal officials for many of his words, and it would appear that he is standing alone. The desired investments have not appeared, the campaign of zapatista deserters did not work for him, to mention but a few.

The S.O.S. call is for Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Mexico in general. The globalization process brings with it an acceleration of poverty, the danger of political instability, the loss of national cohesion and the erosion of the fabric of social organizations. The head of the campaign effort of PRI aspirant Esteban Moctezuma - who was head of the Department of Social Development (Sedesol) - said it himself. Despite the fact that the Department stated, on August 30, that the 413.963 billion pesos in spending for 1999 was the largest in history, at the same time the Social Development Committee of the Chamber of Deputies said that the total was 8.9% of the GNP, while, in 1994, it was 9.1%.

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