THE WORDS OF PEACE

On September 7, the federal government launched a "new" strategy for "peace" in Chiapas, with "completely new" elements. The Secretary of Government, Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano, accompanied by Governor Roberto Albores Guillén and the coordinator of government bodies for dialogue and negotiation, Emilio Rabasa, read the government proposal through an open letter to the EZLN. We will make some observations concerning the proposal here.

According to the document: "The Federal Government is deploying intensive social and economic policies against poverty, of humanitarian aid to the displaced, and of support to the marginalized communities in the state, insisting on the renewal of dialogue with the EZLN. President Zedillo has reiterated that the measures with which to continue dealing with the conflicts that concern Mexicans ' will be legality, never authoritarianism; tolerance, never violent confrontations; and social responsibility, never insensitivity or indifference'."

Concerning the above, it is enough to remember the obvious: poverty in Chiapas, military harassment and the worsening of conflicts have reached such an extreme that there is fear that at any moment there could be confrontations between indigenous, and between indigenous and the federal Army. The majority of the more than 21,000 displaced who do not agree with state policies are not receiving the humanitarian aid that state and federal governments say they are sending. What the federal Government is indeed deploying are more military camps and soldiers in the indigenous communities (see Second Part).

The government proposal is based on six points. We will review each one of them:

1) "The Government of the Republic has always been convinced of the necessity of fully carrying out the San Andrés Accords, which it signed with the EZLN in February of 1996. In order to honor its commitment, it sent to the Congress of the Union a proposal for constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture. For its part, the EZLN has expressed its approval of the COCOPA proposal.

"In order to make progress towards the solution to the conflict, the Government is calling on the Senate of the Republic to determine the mechanism through which the committees can include, in their review, other legislation and information in matters of indigenous rights and culture, in the light of the Accords of San Andées Larráinzar. These documents can be sent jointly, by the Government and the EZLN. And also, that the legislative committees make it possible to listen to other points of view, those of the EZLN and of other interested organizations and persons.

"With these completely new elements, we shall be able to call on the Senate of the Republic to consider writing the constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture during the current regular session."

That is like saying: "We are making another proposal, based on all the proposals, laws, and on whatever anyone else wants to express an opinion on." In the joint communiqué from the now disappeared National Intermediation Commission (CONAI) and the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), of January 22, 1998 - where they presented 10 conditions as a strategy for disentangling the dialogue following the massacre at Acteal - they stated, concerning the first, the fulfillment of the San Andrés Accords: "The realization of the San Andrés Accords in matters of indigenous rights and culture, is the central issue in the crisis in which the dialogue currently finds itself. The renewal of the dialogue depends fundamentally on their fulfillment. The strategy for reactivating the dialogue, then, should first be legislative reforms in indigenous matters." The CONAI and the COCOPA believe that the legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture (Table 1) - based on the results of the San Andrés dialogue and formulated by the COCOPA legislators in November of 1996, at the request of the EZLN and the Federal Government - is the document that both parties must present to the Congress of the Union for its approval.

The EZLN announced its position on March 1, 1998, in a communiqué on this point, which also forms part of its five conditions for renewal of the dialogue: "By deciding (President Ernesto Zedillo) to present their indigenous legislative proposal to the Congress of the Union, the federal Executive is failing to carry out the San Andrés Accords in two senses: one, because the Accords note that they should be presented to the bodies of national debate jointly; and the other, because the Executive's proposal does not recognize the documents signed by its representatives in San Andrés. It is based upon the federal executive's conception of the indigenous problem, and not in the program of the new relationship between the Indian peoples and the Mexican nation as, and how, it was agreed at the dialogue table. These accords received the support of national and international civil society, of the chambers of Deputies and Senators, of the National Intermediation Commission and of the COCOPA. With its "new" strategy, the Department of Government is mocking everyone () The unilateral action of presenting an indigenous legislative proposal - whose approval had already been agreed to by legislators in agreement with Zedillo - without the consent of the counterpart - the EZLN and the Indian peoples - does not mean the disentanglement of dialogue. On the contrary, if it continues forward, dialogue will collapse definitively. Confidence and credibility are being destroyed through this action: one cannot dialogue and negotiate in order to reach agreements, if there is no confidence that the parties are going to comply."

Meanwhile, the federal government is casting a web and setting a trap over the historical memory of the process. It proposes that the Senate incorporate other legislation, analysis and information, which have already been widely incorporated, discussed and reflected upon in the negotiating process of Table 1, with hundreds of presentations and discussion tables in order to create consensus. It is exactly this process, in which civil society participated so broadly, that the government does not want to accept. What guarantees are there that the government would now carry out the gathering of information? In any event, it is now trying to move the scene of discussions from the Chamber of Deputies and the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), made up of legislators from the various political parties, to the Chamber of the Senate, which is controlled by a PRI majority, or, rather, by the Executive branch.

The "completely new" aspect, the addition of a new actor, the Senate, controlled by President Zedillo, is, in reality, the last bastion, where it is relatively easy to pass new legislative proposals. On the other hand, it is proposing the approval of the legislative changes in indigenous rights and culture matters during the next session of the Congress of the Union, when the appearances by cabinet members and a review of the strongly criticized Fifth presidential State of the Union will be imminent.

2) "The EZLN is called upon to draw up an agenda for the complete carrying out of the other commitments agreed to at San Andrés, especially those having to do with the development of the indigenous communities of the state of Chiapas."

That is like saying: "Now that I have already created new municipalities, that I have unilaterally implemented a state law on Indigenous Rights and Culture, that I have created Justices of the Peace, that have I granted amnesty to the paramilitaries, that I have increased militarization, do you have something to share?"

The federal and state governments have launched a legislative offensive in which they have carried out unilateral actions, and which have, in some cases, involved illegalities and a failure to comply with the commitments of San Andrés: a) the Army continues its advance, both in numbers and positions; b) the new, recently created municipalities, in some instances with imposed processes, with irregular and illegal mechanisms, such as their recently created officials; c) the justices of the peace; d) the recently approved State Law on Indigenous Rights and Culture; e) the imposition of counterinsurgent highways, such as in Amador Hernández, and now the warning signs that are being announced in the "Che Guevara" Autonomous Municipality in the community of Moisés Gandhi, through which the army wants to run its new highway; f) and the law granting amnesty to the paramilitaries, among other unilateral measures. Thus, what is still obvious to Mexicans and the public is the government's lack of will to make progress in the social, political, economic and military conditions that would renew the dialogue of peace.

3) "The Department of Government, in accordance with the Law, calls on the proper bodies for the release of EZLN members or sympathizers who are not involved in incidents of violence or rapes."

"In order to complete this process, we consider it necessary to examine, along with the EZLN, the cases of persons whom they recognize as their support bases, and who have been accused of infractions of the law, in order to review the complaints against them."

That is like saying: "I just found out there are political prisoners, and I didn't know that the ones I'd put in prison were zapatistas." The release of the zapatista prisoners was one of the CONAI and COCOPA's 10 conditions, as well as one of the EZLN's five, for the renewal of dialogue. And now we can celebrate the fact that the government has the political will to release them. The government, however, wants the EZLN to pay a very high price: to have them sitting down at the negotiation table in order to listen to what the world already knows: the names of the prisoners of The Voice of Cerro Hueco who need to be released. If the EZLN sits down to discuss this, the government can refuse to accept the list of prisoners, and another break-off in the dialogue would be very costly.

4) "The Government will carefully review the denunciations of harassment and other illicit acts that have been noted by various human rights organizations, the communities themselves or persons affected. The PGR will establish a special program in order to learn about and review these cases, providing the witnesses with the necessary protection through the office that it will establish in the state of Chiapas."

"At the same time, measures shall be taken to ensure that in no case shall groups or persons who have committed a crime go unpunished.

"Under the current conditions in the State of Chiapas, this action demands the maximizing of measures in order to avoid that the prosecution of offenders serve as an excuse for new injustices or irregularities. It is appropriate to examine, jointly, the actions that should be taken by the Federal Government, the communities and the EZLN, independently of political affiliation or social sympathies."

That is like stating: "If you sit down to negotiate, I'll carry out the law." Not allowing crimes to go unpunished is an obligation in itself of the government and the relevant law enforcement bodies. It is a task they should have completed years ago, when the communities, the statements, the deaths, the displaced, the evidence and the thousands of denunciations were more than sufficient to act according to the law. Enforcement of the law is not negotiable, nor can it be made conditional in order to establish dialogue. Justice is not a favor given by the authorities to the indigenous communities or to society. It is not a concession, it is a constitutional duty. Likewise, the process of punishing those responsible for the Acteal massacre has not been completed, in the same way that other cases have gone unpunished.

5) The Federal Government is especially interested in guaranteeing the efficacy of dialogue, and it agrees to the establishment of a new intermediation body, civil and nonpartisan, made up of Mexicans of recognized impartiality, endowed with sufficient ability to convene, to function as interlocutors and to make decisions, in order to hold

constructive meetings between, and with, the parties. It also endorses the importance of the COCOPA's coadvisory work, and it has invited it to intensify the important charge conferred upon it by the Law for Dialogue. We will proceed to reconstruct the government delegation in the Commission of Monitoring and Verification, and to request the resumption of its work.

In this point, it would appear that the government wants, in reality, to reactivate three fundamental instruments for dialogue: a) The Mediation that it destroyed in June of 1998 and which, with the currently proposed elements, would reject out of hand the return of Bishop Samuel Ruiz; b) The Coadvisory work of the COCOPA legislators, which carries within in it the seeds of its own demise: the consensus of the political parties in order to make decisions and public statements, which, with the PRI veto, has always caused this body to be ineffective; and c) the Monitoring and Verification of the accords that have not yet been carried out.

The reactivation of the COSEVER was also one of the 10 proposals of the CONAI and the COCOPA. At that time they stated that it depended, in large measure, and in the first place, not so much on the governmental representation in the body - that had not been discussed or analyzed, despite the demands of some of the members - but rather on the matters on which they acted, which could, in fact, be the 10 conditions themselves. The government never responded to this demand. In addition, in a public communiqué (April 1, 1998), members of the COSEVER -incumbents, replacements and invitees of the EZLN - stated the reasons for which that Commission had been inactive.

6) The government representation that will be able to meet with the EZLN will have sufficient decision making capacity and will to negotiate. It will be open to creating a negotiation agenda jointly with the EZLN, that will include various measures in order to give immediate and urgent attention to the communities who have been most affected by the conflict, such as the return of the displaced to their communities of origin and a

mechanism for permanent communication between the parties.

That is like admitting: "I deceived you before. Now I will send someone who will negotiate seriously." This is one of the five conditions the EZLN presented for the renewal of dialogue. We celebrate the government's political will to dialogue and to negotiate. The government is, however emphasizing immediate responses, and not the causes. Not the problem of how the displaced can return. There, the indigenous stand alone, instead of the government enforcing the law against the paramilitary groups that displaced them, and against those who support, help, back and finance them. Similarly, the withdrawal of the military camps, who have also been the cause of the displacements.

The government tried once again to get the EZLN to sit down at the negotiating table in the midst of the following: even days after the Fifth Presidential State of the Union - where important issues on the national agenda were omitted during President Zedillo's speech, such as Chiapas; several weeks since the violence in the Northern region, provoked by the divisions within the heart of the Peace and Justice group, which could erupt in violent incidents; 24 hours from when an official campesino organization created violence in the municipal seat of Palenque, leaving injuries and one death, with accusations of bad management of public funds by the PRI municipal president; a few weeks since the start of one of the Army's largest military incursions in Ocosingo and Altamirano; a few days from the breaking once again of the cease-fire by the federal Army, which resulted in wounded in the community of San José La Esperanza; a few weeks from when the tension had begun in Amador Hernández, etcetera.

It is difficult to believe in the government's willingness to dialogue and to carry out its word. How is it possible to expect a response from the EZLN when it is having to evade the federal Army, which is pursuing them throughout the entire Selva Lacandona - in order to avoid the spilling of blood? And we might ask ourselves: Why is the government making this proposal now? They have always held that the EZLN refuses to accept the calls to dialogue because it wants to influence state and federal elections in the year 2000 in a way that would impact negatively on the interests of the government and the official party. From this, we could formulate a hypothesis: if the government were not anticipating a defeat, rather than a strengthening in the elections, they would be able to equally continue with their policies of wearing down, without attempting to reach dialogue. But the opposite makes us think that the purpose of this proposal could be to keep the Chiapas conflict from being one of the most important stumbling blocks affecting the year 2000 elections.

In summary, among the 10 conditions that the CONAI and the COCOPA presented in January of 1998 in order to disentangle the suspension of the dialogue, and the EZLN's five conditions, the government should now carry out the following agenda, that has been demanded for many years now:

1) Release the zapatista indigenous prisoners.

2) Withdraw the forward military positions that the military forces made after the Law for Dialogue and Negotiation (see Second Part).

3) Eliminate interim governor Roberto Albores' unilateral actions: the state indigenous rights and culture law, redistricting and the amnesty law for paramilitary groups.

4) Enforce justice in the Acteal massacre and indemnify the material losses.

5) Carry out the San Andrés Accords, changing the Political Constitution of the Republic of Mexico in accordance with the proposal made by the PRI, PAN, PRD and PT legislators who made up the COCOPA.

6) Name a new coordinator for dialogue with the capacity for negotiation and decision-making.

7) Enforce the law against paramilitary groups and those who support them.

8) Make a serious proposal in order to continue with Table 2, Democracy and Justice, a process that was cut short one step before definitive accords were formulated.

Once these commitments are carried out, one will be able to speak of political will, and then the following steps would be possible: a meeting between the federal Government and the EZLN in order to define the immediate agenda and to make up a new Mediation.

On the other hand, this government proposal tells us that the strategy being implemented by interim governor Roberto Albores Guillén is not working: to try to reduce the conflict to Chiapas, to be the person who is the interlocutor with the EZLN, to establish a state coadvisory and mediation, among others. Left to his own, the situation in Chiapas reached such an extreme that the Chiapas conflict once more returned to the national agenda and as a priority.

Losing historic memory could be very costly for the peace process. When the government launched the February 1995 offensive, the federal Army went in and achieved more military positions in indigenous areas. Once the objective of military advancement had been met, it was "willing" to negotiate the rules of dialogue from its new position, not without many difficulties and violence. During the Table 1 and Table 2 negotiations, the violence and provocations by the government and the federal Army achieved their mission: the suspension of negotiations. The peace process has, thus, had at least two characteristics: 1) a parallel increase in violence, in provocation and in the crisis of social indices (greater division, more displacements, more prisoners, more paramilitaries, more soldiers, etc.); and, 2) the failure to carry out what was agreed. Something similar is happening now. The legal and military strategy against the EZLN and society is being reinforced, and the counterpart is asked for a new dialogue.

Next week, during September 15, 16 and 17, campesino and indigenous organizations are calling on society for a march from the municipal seat of Ocosingo to the community of Amador Hernández in the same municipality, in order to demand the withdrawal of the federal Army, the resignation of Albores and a jointly agreed upon transition government. Among the organizations are: the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO), the Front of Political Parties of Ocosingo (FREPPO), the Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC), the Emiliano Zapata Campesino Organization of Ocosingo (OCEZ), the Multi-Ethnic Autonomous Regions of Chiapas (RAP-ANIPA), the Association of Debtors to Credit Institutions of Cintalapa (ADICCIN), the Emiliano Zapata Proletariat Organization (OPEZ-BFP), the Association of Debtors of Credit Institutions of Chiapas (ADITOCH), the Student Movement of Revolutionary Internationalists (MERI), the Union of Independent Coffee Growers (UPIC), the Coordinator of Coffee Growers of Soconusco (CCS) and the UNORCA of Chiapas.

Soon , at the national level, and with the participation of Chiapas, civil society will, in an organized manner, and with dozens of civil organizations (NGOs), campesino, indigenous organizations, etc., will draw up and discuss the civil agenda aimed at building a national program. It would appear the organizations are once again finding sources in order to channel the same demands and to strengthen their social power.

The paper war is now going to intensify, that of the struggle for the credibility of the evaluations concerning the country, of the truth and the lie in the public arena of the media, in order to create consensus. We will speak of these on another occasion. Nonetheless, on September 8, in an event unprecedented in the history of the country, the four aspirants from the official party for the presidency of the Republic, participated in a televised public debate, where they accused each other, were at least able to reach a consensus that could be a response to the Fifth Presidential State of the Union: what has happened up to this point is the creation of more poverty, marginalization and injustice in the country.

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