In his Fifth State of the Union report, President Ernesto Zedillo whitewashed the Army's image by referring to the enforcement of Plan DN-III in the Coast and the Sierra during the natural disaster caused by the rains in September of 1998. He did not, however, mention the excessive presence of the armed forces in Chiapas. We will now discuss this process.

The government's strategy has been the same for the Chiapas conflict as for the strike by students at the Autonomous University of Mexico: applying the policies of exhaustion, orchestrating clashed between groups affiliated with the government and those opposed to it, a lack of willingness to resolve the problems, the carrying out television campaigns to negate the just demands, while the government makes efforts to convince the public that in both cases they are driven by legal actions aimed at pacification.

The government is trying to win the public to its side, through a strong propaganda effort, deployed on the internet, radio, television and in the press. This is part of their policy of reinforcing the demands of state actors, who are urging the government to take a hard line and who want a more active role in the chiapaneco conflict, in order to fence in the EZLN's national struggle.

It is in this milieu that Governor Albores Guillén has been increasingly repositioning state police forces in the Selva, and where they are taking a more active role, so much so that the state police are now in at least five locations in the Selva. There is a state government Political Commissioner (Irán Camacho Zenteno) in Amador Hernández, and Governor Albores is demanding the state's "autonomy" from the federal government in order to resolve the conflict. It is this logic that led him to call for the creation of a state COCOPA, while, at the same time, and in a threatening tone, he broadcast a speech in the community of San Quintín, close to La Realidad (where Subcomandante Marcos can presumably be found) saying that "the EZLN is a paper tiger and we're going to show that in actions, I'll assume the risks" (La Jornada newspaper, 8/12/99). In order to legitimize their actions and words, the state government has vainly made many efforts, organizing marches, rallies and demonstrations in their support. But things have not gone well for them, with, in many cases, not more than a hundred persons showing up.

The counterinsurgency is, thus, advancing at different timetables and times. What is evolving today has many aspects, but we shall only mention a few. One such is the policy of community division, and the introduction of roads as part of the creation of a war infrastructure. Another is the wearing down of sectors opposed to the government, and especially to isolate the EZLN. This policy is, of course, being dictated from the highest levels of the federal government, ordering the state government and all the police forces and institutions to enforce a policy of "divide and conquer" in Chiapas.

In those places and regions where there is no police or military presence, it is the municipal presidents who are carrying out this policy. They order PRI representatives to cut off electrical and water service, to control the sale of basic goods in the Conasupo stores. Everything is deployed against the zapatistas, against PRD activists, organized civil society, independent social organizations, against catechists and against everything that is opposed to the regime. Along these lines, special mention should be made of the building of new Catholic chapels by PRI activists, who are trying to separate themselves from the parishes belonging to the Diocese of San Cristóbal. They argue that they do not want "to get involved in politics," but what they are trying to do is to set the stage that will, in the midterm, be favorable for the deconstructing of the Diocese pastoral line, and which will allow the entrance of religious groups that are against the pastoral line, such as the "Apostles of the Word," the "Amartulis," "Legionnaires of Christ," etcetera.

In the majority of cases, the state government utilizes the municipal presidents to fan the flames of internal conflicts, especially in those places where the PRI is in power. The state press reports news items every day in which the affected communities and sectors denounce municipal presidents and PRI representatives in the communities for exacerbating the conflicts, whether it be cutting off electric or piped water service to those in civil resistance, trying to force them to change their positions and to join the PRI. In the majority of these cases, Public Security Police put themselves at the service of the PRIs, lending them protection when confrontations occur. An example of this took place in the community of El Portal, municipality of Comalapa, in July, when PRIs showed up with weapons and fired on 40 EZLN support bases when they were trying to reconnect the water service that had been cut by PRIs. A group of Public Security police officers were present during these incidents, and they did not act to disarm the PRIs. Instead, they allowed them to fire, wounding 2 persons, and they then detained 3 persons who were put in jail. Incidents such as this happen every day in Chiapas.

Another aspect has been the selective delivery of funds to only those communities that belong to the PRI, ignoring the opposition.

The Roads and the Army

The building of roads is part of the counterinsurgency policy, since - if the government wanted to create development in the communities - it should continue the San Andres negotiations until it reached Table 3 (Wellbeing and Development) in the negotiations between the Government and the EZLN. It should be remembered that the negotiations were suspended on September 2, 1996, because president Zedillo failed to carry out the accords signed at the First Table (Indigenous Rights and Culture) on February 16, 1996. Zedillo refused to honor what he had signed, and he proposed new legislation in the matter.

As progress is made towards a peaceful solution, militarization should decrease. The opposite occurred, however: paramilitarization increased, new violent groups were emerging that acted against EZLN support bases, and the number of displaced grew.

However, as everyone knows, the EZLN - through the Autonomous Municipalities - began a policy of resistance, conditional on the carrying out of the San Andrés Accords. The highways are being built as a war infrastructure, and it is being done in order to provoke the zapatistas, while saying "they [the zapatistas] are opposed to development." The recent incidents created by the topographical studies for the building of a road in Amador Hernández, in Ocosingo, demonstrate this. There are other, very similar cases, such as the branches of roads they are trying to build between El Edén and Francisco Villa, between La Esperanza and Guadalupe Tepeyac, and one other between the community of Veracruz and Santo Tomás, all of them in the municipality of Las Margaritas. Other examples are those in the communities Santa Martha and Betania and the stretch between Las Tacitas-La Sultana in Ocosingo. The community of Moisés Gandhi, the municipal seat of the Che Guevara Autonomous Municipality, denounced attempts by the PRI and the Army to cross the Autonomous Municipality from Cuxuljá and past the community of Virginia.

The stretch of road between Amador Hernández and San Quintín has not been suspended The topographical studies for the building of the road have simply been diverted towards the community of Nuevo Chapultepec. The common - and strategical - element of the roads in Ocosingo is that they all lead to San Quintín, where there is a very large air strip and more than 3000 soldiers in the largest military operations center close to La Realidad. Similarly, the other road works in the municipality of Las Margaritas - that have been, up to this point, suspended because of the zapatista resistance - connect with the road that goes from Las Margaritas-La Realidad-San Quintín. The roads they are attempting to build would appear to be the closing of the pincers on the EZLN General Command.

The conflict going on in Los Chimalapas, in the municipality of Cintalapa, is also due to the building of a road between the municipality of Ocozocoautla, Chiapas and Cozoleacaque, Veracruz, where the army recently established itself in the communities of Rodulfo Figueroa and Cal y Mayor, in the municipality of Cintalapa. It is also one of the excuses the state government is using to attack Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía and to strike at him prior to his being declared the official candidate of the Opposition Alliance for the year 2000 elections.

Along with the motive of building roads, is the excuse of reforestation and the fight against drugs. Sufficient motives for the federal Army, Public Security Police and other police forces to have been repositioned in other locations of strategic value.

According to the count made by CIEPAC, so far this year, in Ocosingo alone, the Army has taken up new positions in about 30 locations, particularly in the Montes Azules Biosphere in the Selva Lacandona. One of the places where there was the greatest increase in checkpoints and camps was in the Cañada of Palestina, entering at Palenque, until it connects with the Cañada of Taniperlas. Police and military forces have been installed in a total of 35 sites, with the municipalities of Cintalapa, Mazapa de Madero, La Trinitaria, Ocosingo and San Cristóbal de Las Casas being among the most notable.

Because of this, the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Dignified Peace in Chiapas - which has kept alive the hopes for the renewal of negotiations - has become superfluous in the current situation. It has served the government for strictly decorative purposes, with their words of dialogue and negotiation, while their actions speak of war. The only aspect of the law that is in effect is the existence of the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), since the cease-fire had already been broken on January 12, 1998, when Public Security Police fired on social organizations of the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO) when they were holding a march in that municipality, killing Guadalupe Méndez of the municipality of Altamirano. Soldiers recently detained three indigenous and wounded two others in the community of San José la Nueva Esperanza in the municipality of Las Margaritas.

The COCOPA has been the only place to which social organizations and sectors affected by the war have been able to take their protests. But the COCOPA has many limitations as a coadvisory body. It is not a mediation body, and therefore its scope of action is much reduced. One of the largest stumbling blocks is that everything is decided by consensus. It is enough for just one of its members, therefore - generally legislators from the official party of the PRI - to not be in agreement, in order for them to not take actions for peace.

Nonetheless, recent events in Amador Hernández, the introduction of more than 5000 soldiers into the Selva Lacandona - and especially into the Montes Azules Biosphere - have managed to put Chiapas on the front pages of the national and international press. Once again, those social actors concerned with what goes on in Chiapas are going to re-emerge. The caravans, the international protests, like those in Spain, Argentina, the United States and others, are present once again. Once again the political parties, NGOs, organized students, the Church, are appearing on the on the scene, in order to protest what is happening in Chiapas. Instead of isolating the EZLN, it is again securing the support of national and international sectors. Their communiques are once again appearing, impacting at all levels, denouncing what is taking place. The national and international press are showing interest in interviewing Subcomandante Marcos.

The government, however, in the middle of an election campaign, is trying to move all the pieces it has within its reach in order to legitimize Francisco Labastida Ochoa as the official candidate. Thus the Episcopal Commission for Reconciliation in Chiapas made a visit to Chiapas in August, in order to meet with the state government, the Bishops of the Diocese of San Cristóbal, and, lastly, with representatives of some of the displaced from the Northern and Los Altos regions of Chiapas.

The government is trying to have the Bishops be the ones to convince the displaced to return, without taking into consideration the causes that gave rise to the forced displacements, such as militarization and paramilitarization. The visit by the Bishops to Chiapas was manipulated by the government. The day after their meeting with the government, local newspapers ran photographs on the front page of the meeting with the state government, giving the false impression that they supported the government's policies. The visit by the Bishops was also the smokescreen put up over the criticisms being made by PRI presidential aspirants of Roberto Albores Guillén, for his having put the entire machinery of his government at the disposal of Francisco Labastida Ochoa during his trip to Chiapas.

Given the current situation, those actors in civil society must reassert themselves and make concrete proposals for the solution in Chiapas, based on the 10 CONAI-COCOPA points, which will allow the negotiations to be revived.

Following the wide participation by civil society in the March 21 Consulta, it was noted that that civil society is alert to what is going on in Chiapas. However, as long as there are no reasons or proposals to motivate them, they remain immobile. They act only in intermittent waves, in response to the risks of the renewal of war.

Today, civil society must move towards the building of an intermediation with credibility and the trust of the actors in the war (federal government-EZLN), which will seek alternative measures for the definitive solution to the chiapaneco problems, without ignoring the national problems.

Note: You can find a map with the new 1999 military positions in Chiapas on the web page.

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