THE CRISIS FORETOLD

In previous bulletins we assessed the crisis in Chiapas through the first half of 1998 in the political, economic and social arenas.  Let us review just a few of the issues from the economic arena:

Head of cattle had declined by 50%;  90% of the lands which had been taken over were re-taken by public forces, and the majority continued to be unproductive;  70% to 80% of the coffee crop had been damaged by the fires, and 70% of the 73,000 producers had been affected, with a loss of more than US$100,000,000, while others put it at US$160,000,000, with coffee making up 40% of the national total;  the production of maize, the primary crop, dropped 50%, and there was a national loss of 2 million tons;  while other crops, such as beans, were dealt severe blows.

The transportation sector is going through a serious crisis, with an increased number of gypsy units, which also strengthen the informal economy and reduce fiscal collection;  unemployment rates are high, and self-employment in the conflict zones has declined due to the presence of the armed forces and the displacement of at least 15,000 indigenous;  20% of the industries have closed;  state tax collection, as well as municipal, is running at a deficit, leading to budget cuts;  it has been difficult to control the diversion of resources and corruption;  many municipalities are in civil resistance over paying for electricity and land taxes;  at least 172 organizations of El Barzón are in arrears, as are those in the restaurant industry;  the 15,000 internal war refugees are competing for land with 18,000 Guatemalan refugees;  some diseases, such as AIDS, have increased;  many schools have been closed due to the conflict;  more than 150,000 hectares were devastated by the fires in Chiapas during 1998, causing the loss of great numbers of  bio-diversity resources, flora and fauna in danger of extinction.  Only the tourism industry has seen a growth of between 40% and 70% .

Storms battered the state early in the year.  In the Northern Zone, in the municipalities of Sabanilla and Tila, 500 sown hectares were affected, and 100 homes were damaged;  in Tumbalá, 2 communities were affected;  in Pichucalco, 3 communities;  800 persons were affected and 150 homes damaged in Tila and Amatán;  in Chicomuselo there were 100 victims, with 114 houses damaged in 11 towns;  in Pijijiapan, 176 homes were damaged, 2 communities affected, there were 1000 victims and 200 fruit trees were destroyed, without any government aid being received;  in Villa de Acalá, the storms caused damage to at least 100 homes.

Acteal was a massacre foretold, as was the "war strategy" which was implemented this year.  In the same way, nature's fury announced itself, and little had been done in the way of contingency planning, since, in response to this, the interim governor had months previously inaugurated a State Prevention program for Hydro-meteorological Phenomena, because at least 17 phenomena, cyclones and hurricanes, in the Pacific Ocean, and 11 in the Atlantic were expected.  It was announced that, as a consequence of these storms, 46 municipalities could be affected by floods, including Cintalapa, Tuxtla, Chiapa de Corzo, Soyaló, Tecpatán, San Cristóbal, Villaflores, Bochil, Pichucalco, Jitotol, Ostuacán, Sabanilla, Ocosingo, Tumbalá, Tila, Motozintla, Huehuetán, Tapachula, Tonalá, Arriaga, Pijijiapan, and others.  These storms would cause more flooding, since, due to the deforestation and the fires, the rainfall would not be retained, and would, consequently, seriously affect soil erosion.  The National Water Commission confirmed the risk of flooding in at least 30 communities.  However, the previously mentioned program was not carried out in time, nor were even the most basic measures that are promulgated by UN natural disaster experts, announced.

THE COUP DE GRACE

From September 6 to September 12, Chiapas experienced its worst meteorological disaster.  It is difficult to quantify the impact of this catastrophe with any certainty, where, according to some sources,  it will take more than 25 years to rebuild the damaged zones, and it will be weeks before the exact number of deaths can be known.  As the days go by, the number of dead, of victims, of destroyed houses, among other consequences, increase by the hundreds from one day to the next.  We can make a general assessment based on official information and on what has been released by the media, up to this point:

The magnitude of the rains:  The rains caused at least 50 rivers to overflow their banks, and, in comparative terms, 24% of the average annual rainfall in Chiapas fell in only five days.  As of September 13, it was reported that approximately 100 communities were still isolated, and at least 10 municipal seats were flooded.  Other sources confirm that, as of September 17, about 80 towns and ejidos on the Chiapas Coast were still covered by the waters;  at least 400,000 residents were unprotected;  the rain had swept away an average of 40 to 50 tons of land per hectare, and at least $2 billion would be required for reconstruction in the damaged zones, when the government had paid, from 1982 to 1996, US$140 billion in foreign debt service for the country.

The geographical impact:  Approximately 36 municipalities (31% of the total) were affected by the rains:  Mapastepec, Pijijiapan, Angel Albino Corzo, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, El Bosque, Huixtla, Mazatán, Huehuetán, Suchiate, Motozintla, La Concordia, Amatenango de la Frontera, Villa Corzo, Copainalá, Villaflores, Chicomuselo, Ciudad Hidalgo, Escuintla, Union Juárez, Tuzantán, Acacoyagua, Cacahoatán, Tuxtla Chico, Arriaga, Acapetahua, Tonalá, Mazapa de Madero, Villa Comaltitlán, Tapachula, Chiapa de Corzo, Siltepec, Amatenango de la Frontera, El Porvenir and Frontera Hidalgo.

These municipalities embrace the three Dioceses of Chiapas, which correspond primarily to the Diocese of Tapachula, followed by the Diocese of Tuxtla Gutiérrez and, lastly, to San Cristóbal de Las Casas.  They also take in almost half the Electoral Districts, of which there are 24 in the state;  7 Economic Regions out of a total of 9 (in the order of the most affected;  Soconusco, Sierra, Isthmus-Coastal, Frailesca;  and, to a lesser degree:  Centro, Altos and the North).  The President of the Republic himself recognized that the damaged zones were the equivalent of 24,000 square kilometers and the combined land areas of the states of Morelos, Querétaro and Tlaxcala.  Other sources indicate that no less than 340,000 hectares remain buried under mud, water and rocks.

The people:  All the municipalities which were affected together take in approximately 1,200,000 people, and some put this figure at 1,500,000.  That is, 33% to 42% of the total population of Chiapas, which is 3,584,768.  There are some municipalities which were affected in their totality, such as in Pijijiapan, municipality governed by the PRD and which was buried under the mud when the 10 rivers which go through it all flooded.  In other cases, the destruction of towns was almost complete, or they disappeared from the map, such as with Motozintla, seat of the municipality of the same name, which was destroyed and buried under the mud.  In some official statements - which always tend to minimize the figures - 90,000 victims were recognized in the Coastal region alone, while President Zedillo confirms that at least 400,000 persons have not been unable to receive regular supplies of food and fuel by land.  In some communities, whole families were swept away by the currents or buried under the mud.  In the course of just a few days, the number of dead rose from 100 to more than 200, then to more than 400, and, finally, to more than 600.  Without a doubt the number of dead will rise as the work of clearing the mud from the houses and towns continues, and the whereabouts of the missing, which vary from 100 to 1000 depending on the source, will then be ascertained.  In Mapastepec, for example, the townspeople confirm that at least 100 persons are under tons of mud and rocks in some communities, and, in another, Valdivia, the fate of its 8000 residents has still not been established with any certainty.

Health:  The health infrastructure was destroyed almost in its totality by the floods:  medical facilities, medicine, equipment, mobile units, and so forth.  According to official sources, no cases of cholera have been seen, although they could be soon, given the precarious conditions of the victims' health.  However, respiratory infections, skin infections, conjunctivitis, gastrointestinal illnesses, and even epidemiological outbreaks such as cholera, are being reported in some regions, contradicting official reports.  In some areas it is being reported that dead animals, floating in the rivers, are beginning to decompose.  In a similar vein, there are reports in the municipalities of Motozintla and Pijijiapan that the stench of death is seeping into the air.

Health authorities report they are attending to the victims in the 110 reported shelters, and they have enlisted the help of 200 medical-public health teams, which include 1340 physicians and nurses, according to official sources.  They also report 6 medical clinics, which were flooded or cut off from communication, have now been restored, leaving only 28 still not functioning.  Sanitation officials are considering the possibility of declaring a sanitary quarantine and, as of a few days ago, they reported 40,000 medical consultations had been made, that is, only 10% of those most directly affected.

Food:  Food became scarce almost immediately following the tragedy of the floods.  Despite calls by officials to not raise prices, they rose considerably, by as much as 200%.  The CONASUPO reported a total of 20 tons of maize in order to meet a 30 day supply; in addition they were expecting a ship with 5 tons of beans.  In some communities, due to their isolation by land, the floods and the destruction of bridges and roads, helicopters had to deliver food to the victims, given the impossibility of even landing.  Despite the fact that each helicopter was making up to 100 flights per day, they have not been able to cover all the affected communities.  Desperation, looting and confrontations between the victims owing to the lack of foodstuffs has even led to denunciations and protests concerning the lack of fair distribution of food, water and medicines.

Education:  The educational system was disrupted, many school and mobile facilities remain buried under the mud with all the educational infrastructure.  Around 3500 schools are being utilized as shelters, and according to other sources, at least 1000 schools were severely damaged or buried under thousands of cubic meters of rocks, sand and mud.  The Secretary of Education reported that approximately 325,000 children had to suspend their educational activities.  The reactivation of education, the rebuilding of the educational facilities and the distribution of the 300,000 free textbooks, which have been recently announced, will involve an expenditure of millions of pesos for the region.

Employment:  Thousands of victims lost their jobs, their means of production, tools, land, crops, and so on.  In response to these circumstances, the government announces the initiation of a temporary jobs program, which is trying to create 40,000 sources of employment aimed at repairing the damages;  however, up to this point, only 2000 day laborers have been employed, working on the re-building of 46 roads.

Production:  The head of Agriculture and Livestock reports he has knowledge of at least 100,000 affected hectares, of 15 to 20,000 hectares of maize just in the Frailesca zone and of almost 90,000 of coffee in the Sierra and Soconusco.  There was almost the same amount of damage, in hectares, to those crops which had managed to survive the devastating fires of the first half of the year, in less than 4 days of rains.  According to some analysts, it will take at least 25 years to rebuild the homes and economy in the region, especially the coffee, which was left completely destroyed, one of the primary sources of currency for the country, with Chiapas providing 40% of national production.  The Coastal region produced most of the state's major products, such as mango, plantains, melon, among others, and which were left damaged.  The only coastal highway for the moving of products to the Republic's interior, was put out of service, as were the railway lines.  Puerto Madero and its "industrial park" were destroyed.  This outlook will mean a setback for direct foreign investment, already precarious, as we saw in the "Chiapas al Día" Bulletins No's. 124 and 125.

According to Anselmo Pérez Mejía, leader of indigenous producers from the Mam ethnic group, more than 200,000 hectares of crops, with a value of more than one and a half billion pesos, were lost in the Coastal zone.  He states that there were 180,000 hectares of coffee cultivated there, of which 95% were affected;  as for maize production, he states the loss was more than 60,000 hectares;  as for mango and plantain production, the second most important crop in Chiapas, the loss was 15,000 cultivated hectares, affecting 100% of the 6 agro-industrial processing plants in the region.

According to coffee growers in the Custepeques region, 15,500 quintals are at risk of not getting to market, which would mean a loss of 21 million pesos and leave 500 families without income.  Municipal authorities have reported that in this municipality of La Concordia with 26 ejidos, 80% of the 8500 residents have still not received any aid.  In the municipality of Suchiate, it is reported that at least 80% of the sesame and maize production, as well as some 4000 hectares of plantain, have been lost.

The affect on cattle production has not yet been precisely calculated in the 394,191 head of cattle, 84,510 pigs and 6500 sheep.

In the municipalities which make up Soconusco (Acacoyagua, Acapetahua, Cacahoatán, Escuintla, Frontera Hidalgo, Huehuetán, Huixtla, Mapastepec, Mazatán, Metapa, Villa Comaltitlán, Suchiate, Tapachula, Tuxtla Chico, Tuzantán and Union Juárez), 50,000 hectares of maize, 7301 of soy, 1873 of cotton, 200 of melon, 45 of beans, 75,180 of coffee, 14,000 of cacao, 15,627 of banana and 6886 of sugar cane are cultivated, which were all severely affected.  All of this would imply the stagnation of investments coming into the state for agro-export purposes, and which would presumably have been one of the most significant sources of employment in the state.

As for fisheries, the first estimate is of a 30% loss of the already few fleets, with damaged motors, and an 80% loss in fishing equipment, such as nets and trammels, and a large part of the facilities for shrimp hatcheries were severely affected.

Ecology:  Flora and fauna decimated by the currents and mud, eroded and buried sown fields, crops and ecosystems, impacting profoundly on an ecological level.  The Department of the Environment acknowledged the consequences have been dramatic, but the circumstances have prevented an environmental evaluation.

Housing:  It is calculated that some 30,000 families lost their homes.  In the municipality of Motozintla alone, in the Sierra zone and adjacent to Guatemala, at least 3000 homes were left completely destroyed, many of them with mud up to their roofs.  Some sources estimated there were around 5000 persons in different shelters, a few days later they spoke of 30,000 victims in various shelters and, then, of 50,000 in 123 shelters.  It will take 40 years for some residents to rebuild their homes once again and to recover all they lost.  In Tuxtla Gutiérrez, water will be rationed for 5 months due to damage to water lines.  In the Coastal, Sierra and Soconusco regions, damage to the potable water and sewage systems, which had taken a tremendous amount of work to install in some communities, were damaged and, in some cases, irreparably so.

Infrastructure:  Up to this point, damage to at least 712 kilometers of federal highways alone has been identified, of which 444 will have to be completely rebuilt, not including neighborhood and rural roads;  25 bridges collapsed, and the access to 18 others were affected;  there were 68 blockages due to landslides, and there was flooding in more than 45 places of the asphalt cover.  The most important railroad lines which were damaged are Motozintla-Huixtla, Arriaga-Las Cruces, Tuxtla-San Cristóbal-Comitán, Tapantepec-Talismán, among others.  There was damage to 833 kilometers of the 3559 kilometers of rural and feeder roads in the Isthmus-Coastal and Soconusco regions.

In the railway infrastructure which crosses the entire chiapaneco coast, and which is the only one in existence, on a 250 kilometer stretch, 32 damaged areas were identified, rails were washed out by the currents and there were 5 collapsed bridges.  More than 100 towns were left without telephone service;  650,000 persons were without electricity;  postal and telegraphic service was suspended and, as of September 14, 9 municipalities were still without electric lights.

Authorities calculate that it will cost at least 800 million pesos to repair the damage to the communications and transportation infrastructure alone.  This would be the equivalent in Chiapas of:  80 million dollars, or three times more than the budget "announced" by President Zedillo in the "Social Accord for Well-being and Development of the Sierra Region in Chiapas" for 1998;  7 times more than the budget for the "National Fund for Social Businesses (FONAES)";  almost 3 times the PROCAMPO budget;  19 times the budget for the "Temporary Jobs Program";  almost 4 of the "Alliance for the Countryside" budget;  double the budget for the "Credit for the Word" program;  20 years worth of budget of the "1998 Agricultural Program and Development for the Northern, Selva, North Selva and Los Altos Zones":  30% of the budget for the "Agreement of Coordination for Political Stability, Community Reconciliation, Social Development and Economic Growth between the State Government and 42 Municipalities";  50% of the "Program of Education, Health and Food (PROGRESA)" for combating poverty;  114 of the budgets destined this year for the "Program for the Region Zoque Northern Zone";  14 times the budget for the "Program for the Fund for Social Municipal Structure," for just this year, among others.

This means that perhaps much of the budgets previously announced over the last weeks for different programs in Chiapas will now be channeled and diverted into rebuilding the zones affected by the meteorological disaster.  The most incredible thing is, given the budget cuts in the country, the economic crisis which Mexico is experiencing, and the underdevelopment, the Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit has earmarked one billion pesos (100 million dollars) for Chiapas, for the rebuilding of federal highways, from financial resources which had been allocated for other states in the country and which "are not going to be used for the last three months of 1998," and he explained this will not affect other states, since it is "presumably a surplus."  Now it would appear that there is even leftover money.  One day later, in contradiction, the Treasury Secretary stated, in response to the lack of public resources, the rebuilding of schools, hospitals and bridges would have to wait until next year's budget.

Other sources report that, in the 23 main coastal locales, and in 250 rural communities in the zone, the people remain without piped water, affecting some 700,000 residents.  The Sierra and Frailesca zones are not doing much better.  The Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) announced they will give special treatment in the payment of electric bills by communities which were damaged, municipalities which, since 1996, had been carrying out civil resistance in the payment of this service.

In summary, Chiapas has been set back decades in an economic growth and development which was already impoverished and meager.

Note:  As of October 15, CIEPAC will indefinitely suspend the issuing of this analysis service on the Chiapaneco reality.  We appreciate the comments which some of our readers have sent us.

"THE INSUPPORTABLE LIGHTNESS OF THE LAW:  IMPUNITY"

(excerpt, part XVIII)*

Article 6: Legal procedures.

1.  The current article will be applied to the trials and penalties imposed for legal infractions committed during an armed conflict.

2.  No one shall be convicted, nor shall any sentence be carried out, in regards to a person declared guilty of an infraction, except by a court which offers the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.  In particular:  a)  the proceeding shall establish that the accused is informed without delay of the details of the infraction of which he is accused, and shall guarantee the accused, in the actions prior to the trial and during its course, all the necessary rights and means of defense;  b)  no one shall be convicted for an action which does not fall under his own individual legal responsibility;  c)  no one shall be convicted for acts or omissions which, at the time they were committed, were not illegal under the law;  nor shall a more serious sentence be imposed than was applicable at the time the infraction was committed;  if, following the commission of the action, the law establishes a lighter punishment, the convicted person shall benefit from that;  d)  all persons accused of an infraction shall be presumed innocent as long as his guilt is not established in accordance with the law;  e)  all persons accused of a crime have the right to be present while being judged;  f)  no one may be forced to testify against themselves nor to confess their guilt.

3.  All persons convicted will be informed, at the time of their conviction, of their rights for legal and other kinds of appeal, as well as the deadlines for exercising those rights.

            In a study concerning torture, a report from the Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, which was delivered to the special UN investigator, there is an account of six events which occurred in 1995 against campesino-indigenous persons, and whose treatment by the police and military included "arbitrary detention, the taking of the victim to a place where there were no witnesses, intense mistreatment, psychological torture, interrogation about the EZLN, confession as to who the zapatistas were, information about their members, declarations of the whereabouts of their arms."

            Since the beginning of 1997, six other cases were presented, against indigenous and campesino shopkeepers, who were treated in an arbitrary manner by judicial police and police dressed as civilians.  The case of the Jesuits Jerónimo Alberto Hernández López and Gonzalo Rosas Morales stand out, who were accused last March of having participated in an ambush against public security forces.  It also speaks of the detention of PRI and PRD activists in San Pedro Nixtalucum in the same month, and the torture of 27 persons by public security and Mexican army forces.   (Muñoz, A.,  La Jornada,  8/18/97,  p.5)

            Various independent organizations in Ocosingo accused the state government of being responsible for repressive acts which took place in Ocosingo, in which "unarmed people were cowardly" attacked. (…) the state government cannot guarantee the impartiality and effectiveness of the investigations, since they had direct responsibility for the commission of these crimes.   (Balboa, J.,  La Jornada,  1/13/98,  p. 6)

            "They were detained at four in the morning (in the Nueva Veracruz ejido, Marqués de Comillas) without arrest warrants, and they raided their homes," members of the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO) noted, and they said the main commander of the state Judicial Police, Francisco Cruz, was present during the action.  They said they still do not know the whereabouts of the five campesinos.   (Balboa, J.,  La Jornada,  4/26/97,  p. 16)

            The new spiral of violence against the rebel communities is expanding like a stone thrown into the water.  They talk about Hugo and Ciro, detained by soldiers of the Mexican army in Vicente Guerrero, beaten severely and finally jailed a few days ago, for no reason whatsoever.   (Bellinghausen, H.,  La Jornada,  12/1/97,  p. 5)

            An hour before the incursion by 70 soldiers of the Mexican army into Morelia, four campesinos who were travelling towards the city of Altamirano, were stopped by the military and the police.  The officers interrogated them while pointing their guns at them. They made them kneel down, they covered their eyes and they put them on a vehicle where they covered the detainees with large sheets of canvas (…) The soldiers threatened to kill them if they didn't reveal the names of the zapatista leaders in the community.  The four were photographed, and they tried to photograph one of them with a ski mask which the soldiers had brought, but the campesino refused.  Before freeing them five hours later, their captors took from them four machetes, 5000 pesos and a photograph of one of them.   (Bellinghausen, H.,  La Jornada,  1/5/98,  p. 6)

            One of the detainees related:  "from there they put us in the car, tied my eyes, very tightly.  They asked me if I was a zapatista and they had wanted me to say no, but I am, and I said so.  They covered my face with some canvas and took us to the jail at Altamirano."   (Bellinghausen, H.,  La Jornada,  1/6/98,  p. 11)

            The PGR agents harshly interrogated the indigenous who had taken refuge in Acteal, threatening them with dogs, without the indigenous having any help from lawyers, the fear grew that the PRI groups would block the highways and leave isolated, and in evident danger, the thousands of displaced, EZLN support bases and those from Las Abejas group.   (Bellinghausen, H.,  La Jornada,  1/13/98,  p. 12)

The Mexican army detained nine chol indigenous in the municipality of Sabanilla (among them were two minors), and they set up new roadblocks in the northern zone of the state of Chiapas, rural authorities confirmed (…) the farm workers were "illegally" detained, after they had gone to the Department of Agriculture offices in Yajalón, to pick up fertilizer, pigs and coffee seed, promised by that agency.   (Balboa, J.,  La Jornada,  1/26/98,  p. 5)

"The Army has demonstrated, clearly and responsibly, their determination to combat impunity, no matter what its source.   (Ernesto Zedillo, President of the Republic,  2/19/98)

4.  A death sentence shall not be decreed against persons less than 18 years of age at the time of the infraction, nor shall pregnant women be executed, nor mothers of young children.

5.  At the cessation of hostilities, the authorities in power shall grant the widest possible amnesty to persons who have taken part in the armed conflict, or who find themselves deprived of liberty, interned or detained for reasons related to the armed conflict.

*Excerpt from the document "The Insupportable Lightness of the Law:  Impunity;  Three Months from Acteal," by "Alternative Popular Communication, Working Group," from 4/11/98

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