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The Floods: The Worst Natural Catastrophe in Chiapas, Part II
THE POLITICAL X-RAY The municipalities which have currently been affected by the natural disaster, in the Sierra and Coastal zones of Chiapas, form part of an opposition movement which is not new, dating from the 30's and the government of Lázaro Cárdenas. When the Transitional Government in Rebellion headed by Amado Avendaño Figueroa was established in 1994, these municipalities participated very actively in the civil resistance: blocking highways, refusing to pay electric bills, refusing to recognize the authorities named by the government and the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), in protest of the imposition of the former governor Eduardo Robledo Rincón. The resistance had three main organizing modes: the independent social organizations which, even up to this day, are coordinated by the Broad Front of Organizations for National Liberation (FAO-LN), made up of 23 organizations with a presence in the Soconusco; the second were the Fronts of Civil Resistance, approximately 7, and which primarily take in the Isthmus-Coastal and Sierra zones; and the third was the participation by those two large movements in the 1995 electoral processes. As a consequence of the 1995 electoral processes, the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), the third largest national party and second in the state, won the following municipalities: Pijijiapan, Escuintla, Mazatán, Suchiate, MaZapa de Madero and Amatenango de la Frontera. The PRI and the government were able to establish themselves in Villa Comaltitlán, Mapastepec, Tuzantán, Acacoyagua and Huehuetán; certainly the resistance movement and popular protest were quite strong, but they were weakened by police repression. The National Action Party (PAN), the second largest party nationally and third in the state, governs the municipalities of Tonalá and Huixtla, with all the rest of the municipalities under PRI control. A large part of the social movement does not participate in the political parties, and are now part of the civil resistance which has organized the Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities. This movement, which has grown in the Coast and the Sierra, has as a point of reference and center of coordination for the resistance, the auxiliary rebel office in the community of Belisario Domínguez, municipality of Motozintla, which is within the jurisdiction of the municipality of "Tierra y Libertad," formerly Amparo Aguatinta. Sixty percent of the community of Belisario Domínguez was destroyed by the natural disaster. THE CONDITIONS FOR THE NEXT ELECTORAL PROCESS Next October 4 there will be elections in Chiapas choosing 111 municipal presidents, 24 Local deputies and 16 Multi-denominational Representatives; contending will be the parties with a federal presence: PAN, PRI, PRD, PT, PVEM; and with a state presence: the Democratic Chiapaneco Party (PDCH) and the party of the Chiapaneco Civic Front (PFCH). Infrastructure: A large part of the populace lost their voter registration cards, the political party campaigns were suspended when the roads and highways were destroyed, making it impossible to gain access to distant locales. It was more difficult to get the polling booths to isolated places and, similarly, the election results will not be delivered in the time period mandated by the Electoral Law. The population which was directly affected must first see to their primary needs, such as recovering their lost goods and the rebuilding of their homes, before they will be able to be concerned with the election process. In addition, widespread outbreaks of illnesses such as conjunctivitis, diarrheas, flu, cough, fevers, have begun to appear, according to the Emergency Health Service, which reports that in Pijijiapan alone there are more than 600 cases of conjunctivitis. Displaced: The situation of the victims of the natural disaster is very similar to that of those displaced by the political violence in Los Altos, the Selva and the Northern zones, because the majority of them fled due to violence by the paramilitaries, who burned their belongings, among which were their voter registration cards. In Los Altos zone alone, there are around 10,000 persons, and in the Selva and the North there are another 10,000 displaced. The majority of them do not have registration cards. They cannot easily get out to work, because the paramilitaries prowl about the camps; nor did they take part in selection process for candidates, since their living conditions do not allow it. Paramilitaries: If we add to this the control of roads and highways by the paramilitary groups which belong to the PRI, in some 20 municipalities where 12 groups are operating, it is almost certain the PRI will gain victory, because there will be pressure to vote in favor of the official party. It is enough to mention that, just in the municipalities of Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbalá and Salto de Agua, all the PRI candidates are members of the alleged paramilitary group "Peace and Justice," imposed by death threats during the selection process. Local businesspersons and PRI activists who do not belong to Peace and Justice were displaced and threatened with death in order to give up seeking office. The paramilitaries primarily move about during two particular time periods, during the harvest seasons for coffee, maize, beans, etc., depending on the region, in order to destroy the economy and the resistance of opposition indigenous communities; and during elections, in order to control the municipal presidencies, which they use for reinforcement and more support. The most obvious case is in the municipalities of Tila and Sabanilla. They also receive support from official levels trying to regain the political seats the PRI has been losing. Militarization: Added to the lack of conditions for the election process, is the excessive militarization and police control in Chiapas, comprised of approximately 60,000 soldiers and some 5000 Public Security police forces, located in 257 camps and checkpoints in the state, located principally where there is the greatest opposition to the PRI and the government. The military presence alone, in schools, at the outskirts of communities, in permanent and intermittent checkpoints in strategic places, intimidates the population. In addition, it is expected that many of the soldiers will be able to vote in the zones where they are posted. Repression: For the last four months the state government has been carrying out a series of repressive actions against opposition municipal presidents, primarily where the PRD has control, such as in the municipalities of Ixtapa, Jitotol, Nicolás Ruiz, Soyaló, Ocosingo, etcetera; or where the presence of some campesino organizations is strong, such as the CIOAC in Soyaló, where this organization participated actively in the last election process, causing the PRI candidate to run his administration from another community, since the municipal seat had been taken over some months before. Other mechanisms have been arrest warrants which officials threaten to carry out against Nicolás Lopez Gomez, Santiago Lorenzo, Juan Vázquez and Porfirio Encinos, leaders of the COAO in Ocosingo, the removal from office of the municipal president of Altamirano, etc. In addition there have been incarcerations of campesino leaders in different municipalities where the opposition is predicted to win. PROCAMPA AND PROGRESA: The buying of votes for patronage continues as always, the delivery of resources in exchange for voting for the PRI. Some specific examples are: in municipalities of the Sierra, such as La Grandeza, Siltepec and Bella Vista, officials from different government bodies and from the PROGRESA Program coordinated to recruit people for the PRI for 190 pesos per person, doubling the amount if that person would, in their turn, recruit two others. During the 10:00 AM Mass on August 23, in the municipality of Siltepec, the priest there complained that the Department of Health in the municipality was trying to use the catechists in this campaign. In the municipality of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Oxchuc, opposition indigenous have denounced that officials from the Education, Health and Food Program (PROGRESA) for the "war on poverty," were asking people for their voter registration cards and their code, before giving them their credits. In Nicolas Ruiz, the Comuneros in Assembly decided to choose their candidate for municipal president for the PRD, while the local PRI leaders were collecting voter registration cards in exchange for money and chickens. The municipal president of Huixtla also denounced that aid for the victims was being channeled from the Department of Government's office in exchange for voting for the official party in the next elections. In the Coastal zone, humanitarian aid is being utilized for campaign purposes by the PRI and the Labor Party (PT), as denounced by the "Fray Bartolomé de las Casas" Human Rights Center and the "Fray Matías de Cordoba" Human Rights Center in Tapachula, with the PRI candidate in Tonalá storing the aid in his campaign office. These are some of the conditions prevailing in the state which are not favorable for the next election process. However, the positions of the various actors in Chiapas are diverse; each one turning it to his own advantage. Nonetheless, owing to the poor conditions of the schools, roads, the lack of voting credentials by those displaced by political violence, as well as by those victimized by natural disasters, the inaccessibility of the roads, which will prevent unimpeded communication for the delivery of the polling booths, the entire state of Chiapas is now in conflict, due to the natural disasters as well as to the political violence of the paramilitary groups and the armed conflict in Chiapas. Photo ID's must be revalidated, and polling mechanisms must be distributed properly throughout the entire state. This is an opportunity for the political parties and civil society to assume an active role in the creation of new bodies for electoral safeguarding, and to undertake new forms of citizens' participation in the political electoral process. If civil society does not participate, the state government as well as the State Electoral Commission will continue acting on their own and will continue imposing PRI candidates. However, it may be hoped that in some places where alliances have been formed between campesino organizations and opposition political parties, these may be victorious, such as in Chilón, Sitalá, Altamirano, Oxchuc, San Juan Cancuc, Amatenango del Valle, Chanal, Siltepec, Ixtapa, Soyaló, Bochil, Jitotol, Reforma, Pichucalco, Venustiano Carranza, MaZapa de Madero and Mazatán, among others. In other municipalities where the majority are Zapatistas or Zapatista sympathizers, it is expected they will not participate in the electoral process, but rather will continue to name their authorities through uses and customs, and they will not legitimize the electoral fraud. However, they will continue strengthening their autonomy through their own dynamics. THE REACTIONS In one week, President Zedillo made 4 visits to the affected regions and warned that he would punish and censure any partisan use of public resources. At the same time, he stated that this was the worst natural disaster since the 1985 earthquake. As of September 15, it was reported that the Mexican Army had 5261 soldiers working in the region, added to those already in the area, totaling 8239 soldiers, with 78 helicopters and 20 large capacity and light aircraft which had been able to rescue many people. The soldiers are working in brigades, rebuilding roads and dealing with mudslides and clean-up. The Navy reported it had 9 helicopters, 20 cargo planes, 19 vehicles, 11 fleets, 883 boats, which, added to those of the 22nd Naval Zone, totaled 2091 units. The Mexican Red Cross deployed their personnel to the zone with the support of 300 young volunteers, and the National Water Commission reports that 1500 of their workers are engaged in distributing 2 million liters of water daily. The National System for the Complete Development of the Family (DIF) states that this government body has 500 workers, 434 community kitchens and 100 tons of food to supply these kitchens, in addition to 70 shelters. The Nestle Company donated 107 food products, and other businesses similarly donated humanitarian aid, such as the Pulsar Group. More than 700 tons of supplies and thousands of liters of gasoline and fuel, as well as materials for the repair of electricity infrastructure, arrived by way of the Guatemalan border. The Business Center of Chiapas lent machinery, vehicles, tools, grills for cooking in the shelters and gas. Thus the federal and state governments, the Mexican Army and Navy, private business, civil organizations, the Church and the Red Cross, all mobilized in response to the needs of the victims. France decided to donate 500,000 francs (US$83,300) in humanitarian aid, while Pope John Paul II donated US$50,000 for the victims. The Secretary of Tourism noted that the disasters "curiously, were not concentrated in tourist areas such as the Mayan World," while presenting the National Crusade for Quality and Excellence in Tourist services. The Bishops of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Raúl Vera López o.p. and Samuel Ruiz Garcia, called for solidarity with the victims. Financial donations may be made to Caritas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, A.C., at BANAMEX, Branch 386, in the Master Account 055249-2, noting the "deposit and its origin" to that institution's address or phone number: Calle Julio M. Corzo 16-A, Barrio de Santa Lucia, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas; telephone and fax: (967) 86479; email: <caritasdesc@laneta.apc.org>. The National Action Party (PAN), which governs several municipalities in the region, denounced the way in which (state governor) Albores Guillén's government was distributing aid to the victims, using political criteria and in open support of the campaigns of Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) candidates. Meanwhile, members of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) similarly denounced the distribution of humanitarian aid in some towns in exchange for voting for the PRI in the next election. Stealing, corruption and accusations concerning the distribution of humanitarian aid have caused discord among the victims. On September 8, Subcomandante Marcos released a communiqué in which he stated that "the government only remembers Chiapas when it needs to make demagoguery and improve its public image. Most certainly (President) Zedillo will come to the southeastern coast to hide the dead, to promote aid, to have photographs taken, to dole out croquettes and to conceal the omissions and negligence." Further on he declares: "There the government knows how to kill the indigenous, but not how to keep them from dying (…) That is how it is with the indigenous in Mexico: they only exist and are named when they are dead," referring to President Zedillo's silence in his Fourth Government Report of last September 1. PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE Assessments by society and by the government concerning the country, and especially concerning Chiapas, continue to vary. Thus, since the Acteal massacre in December of 1997 and the nine months of 1998, Chiapas has suffered heavy blows; for some of them it was the month of human rights, or the fight against "foreign interference" for others (the expulsions of foreigners), or the month of the dignity and the autonomy or of the re-establishment of the "state of law" (of the police-military operations against the autonomous municipalities), the month of resistance or of the "rule of law" (of the prisoners), the month of the martyrs and of the dead or of the "regrettable losses" (the massacres of Acteal and of El Bosque), the month of the betrayal or of the "carrying out" (of the unilateral proposal by the President for a Law on Indigenous Rights and Cultures), the month of the end of Mediation or of the "self-dissolution" (the end of the CONAI), the month of the silence and presidential "autism" or of the democratizing "advances" (the Fourth Presidential report), the month of the unprecedented devastation of the forests or of the "little ecological consciousness" of the campesinos (the forest fires), etcetera. For some, the Fourth Presidential Report and Independence Day made the month of September the "month of the homeland," while for others the month will go down in the history of Chiapas and of the country as the worst catastrophe because of the floods. The month of October will be another key moment for the state. The government is the primary supporter of the elections being carried out. The month of the elections?…of democracy?…of governmental "autism"? Solutions to the armed conflict in Chiapas are becoming complicated. Through the path of dialogue without credibility, without mediation,…suspended? Interrupted?…betrayed? without being carried out; through mobilization and political pressure in order to achieve the just demands, while being threatened with jail by Governor Roberto Albores through his Accord for Peace and Reconciliation, which prohibits such demonstrations; with the political-electoral path very weak, and without optimal conditions for guaranteeing the expression of the chiapanecos' true voice; with the economic path and life completely destroyed, that productive heart of the state which the government had counted on, as the regions which would lift Chiapas out of poverty and generate jobs, foreign investments, better living conditions for the people and, thus, the solution for the causes which created the armed conflict with the EZLN uprising. If the resources which were announced to "combat poverty" were slim prior to the country's budget cuts and the devaluation of the peso, which during the last few days has risen to 10 pesos per dollar, among other economic crises, the catastrophe of the floods has set back economic, political and social growth in Chiapas by many years. Thus the causes which gave rise to the armed conflict have become sharper and have crossed the borders of the poorly named "conflict" zone to the Sierra, Soconusco, Frailesca, Central and Coastal zones. Not just the chiapaneco population has been affected. The Guatemalan refugees dispersed along the border with Guatemala are also suffering from the devastation, as also are the thousands of economic migrants seeking work in the productive regions of the Soconusco. This is how the last rung of salvation for the government's policy collapses, which had put all its hopes, resources and talk into the productive region in the state in order to combat the causes which had given rise to the armed conflict. The massacre at Acteal and other serious events in Chiapas had merited the focus of the government's speech and 7 visits by President Zedillo, but, little by little, it also became buried under the mud of silence, to the point of their serious omission in the Fourth Presidential Report. Thus it is possible that the 4 presidential visits this week and the serious consequences of this catastrophe, which not only have repercussions in the political, social and economic life of Chiapas, but also of the country, will be buried and forgotten months from now, along with the poor and the indigenous who are once again lamenting their dead, their homes and their hopes for life. In the middle of this tragedy, the Chiapaneco people received the news that the price of tortillas was going up by 15%. Other events occurred during these days: the visit by Amnesty International to Chiapas; the alleged paramilitary group "Peace and Justice," through their leader and ex-military man, Marco Albino Torres, again denied that they were an armed group; in the municipality of Yajalón, a heavily armed group attacked a group of campesinos; tariffs for transporting cargo rose 23%; the government again called on the EZLN to dialogue; the visit by 50 diplomats to Chiapas was suspended; the EZLN, through Subcomandante Marcos, accepted the invitation for a proposed meeting some days ago, signed by thousands of persons who asked for dialogue in order to organize the national consultation concerning the acceptance or not of the proposed legislation by the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA) on Indigenous Rights and Cultures, accords signed in San Andrés at Table 1 in the negotiations of February of 1996. "THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF THE LAW: IMPUNITY" (excerpt, Part XIX)* TITLE III: THE WOUNDED, ILL AND DEFEATED Article 7: Protection and assistance. 1. All the wounded, ill and defeated, having taken part or not in the conflict, will be respected and protected. 2. Under all circumstances they will be treated in a humanitarian manner and they will receive, by all measures possible and in the shortest possible time, the medical care which their condition demands. There will be no distinction made among them on any basis other than medical criteria. "In some communities, whenever someone goes to a government doctor, they ask a lot of questions in order to find out what group he is in, and if he doesn't tell everything, they won't take care of him and they won't give him his medicine or they only give him simple medicines. They make the women be sterilized and if they don't want it, they won't take care of them any more." (…) "In the clinic near here they make the women be operated on. If the woman doesn't agree to the planning, they scold her and won't give her a consultation. If the woman agrees, the ambulance comes to her house to take her; but whenever we get sick with anything, there's no ambulance for the sick person." (…) "Two women were going to deliver, and they took them to an IMSS Health Center. There they asked them what organization they belonged to, they talked about it because they said they were EZ. "The doctor wants to make some notes so he can take care of his patients better,' they said. The man and the woman are in the EZ and the doctor didn't like that and he took away all the medicine, that's why we're fighting for another doctor for the town. The woman gave birth to a dead child." (Health workers. Systemization of the contributions from the First Meeting of Health Workers and Agents. Moisés Gandhi, 2/20/97, p.13). "In the neighborhood of Victoria (in the municipality of Tila) there is no doctor's office: "when the children get sick they have to die, although they want to go to the doctor in Limar, they can't, because Peace and Justice operates there" (…) ten pregnant women have lost their babies because of not having received timely medical care." (Castellanos, L. Journey to the Center of Rage. Doble Jornada. La Jornada, 3/2/98, p. 11). The women, barefoot and covered in woolens, tell, in tzotzil (and a health worker who is tending to the wounded translates) how a gentleman, very old, was wounded in the highway, and when the Public Security cars left with the prisoners, they went by again to run him over, at the top of his stomach. He was in agony for almost an hour. They picked him up and carried him to his house. (Case of S. Pedro Nixtalucum. Bellinghausen, H. La Jornada, 3/16/97, p. 18). The old man Mariano Díaz Pérez is buried in the mountain. He had a fever and cough for four days, until, on the fifth day, the hemorrhaging started, and then death. He had left Xcmuman, fleeing from the paramilitaries, and he arrived in Polhó two weeks ago looking for refuge. Here, he only found his end. The old woman of 70 years of age is the fifth of the displaced in the 14 communities of Chenalhó who has died since December 23 of curable illnesses. The other four were children. Every day the health workers take care of up to 250 patients, but some of them do not manage to make it to the improvised clinic in the center of Polhó. (Gil Olmos, J. La Jornada, 1/15/98, p. 7). "Our poor compañero was unhappy, he was very sad and he was frightened by the shoot-out he heard on November 17 when he had to leave, and that is why he died." The deceased, Vicente Pérez Tzacut, was from Yiveljoj, and, since the middle of November, he had been displaced in X'oyep (Henríquez, E. La Jornada, 2/24/98, p. 5). Article 8: Search. Whenever circumstances allow, and especially after combat, all measures will be taken, without delay, to search for and recover the wounded, ill and defeated in order to protect them from pillage and from ill treatment and to assure them necessary assistance, and to find the dead, preventing them from being removed and seeing that their remains are given a decent burial. Two hundred meters from where we were talking, the cadaver of Miguel Gómez Hernández was rotting, closed up in his house. He is the man who was shot in the road on Saturday and was run over by one of those police trucks parked over there. Less than 30 kilometers from there, in a parish in the same municipality of San Juan de la Libertad, Miguel Gómez' son would later say: "We want to get his body. We are worried that the dogs will get in and eat it." (Case of S. Pedro Nixtalucum. Bellinghausen, H. La Jornada, 3/17/98, p. 21). *Excerpt from the document "The Insupportable Lightness of the Law: Impunity; Three Months from Acteal," by "Alternative Popular Communication, Working Group," from 4/11/98 RATE OF EXCHANGE: Divide peso figures in the Bulletin by 10 to get an approximate US$ equivalent.
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. CIEPAC is a member of the, Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade (RMALC) www.rmalc.org.mx, Convergence of Movements of the Peoples of the Americas (COMPA ) www.sitiocompa.org, Network for Peace in Chiapas, Week for Biological and Cultural Diversity www.laneta.apc.org/biodiversidad, the International Forum "The People Before Globalization", Alternatives to the PPP http://usuarios.tripod.es/xelaju/xela.htm, and of the Mexican Alliance for Self-Determination (AMAP) that is the Mexican network against the Puebla Panama Plan. CIEPAC is a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Economic Justice http://www.econjustice.net and the Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean (EPICA) http://www.epica.org.
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