The Alianza por Chiapas (Alliance for Chiapas) was formed by 8 political parties, and, with its candidate of Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, defeated the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) (Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP)) with a total of 535 860 votes (51.5% of the total number of votes). The PRI obtained 475, 267 votes (45.68%) and the Partido Democracia Social (Social Democracy Party) received 3, 922 votes (0.3%). Nullified votes amounted to 23, 598 (2.26%). The total number of votes cast was 1 040 407.

The difference in number of votes cast for the Alianza por Chiapas and those for the PRI was 60 593, or 5.82%. Participation in the election was 49.75% of the electorate (i.e. a 50.25% abstention rate). In the federal elections of July 2, participation in the election was 52% of the electorate of Chiapas.

From the point of view of the 24 electoral districts in the state, the Alianza por Chiapas won 15 (Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23 and 24) and the PRI obtained the majority in 9 (Districts 6, 7, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22). Of the districts won by the PRI, the number of votes over the Alianza por Chiapas ranged from 804 votes in District 11 (with its head in Pueblo Nuevo Solistahuacán) to 19 440 in District 22 of Chamula (which includes the municipalities of the Altos (Highlands) including Chalchihuitán, Chenalhó, Larráinzar, Mitontic, Pantelhó and Zinacantán).

From the perspective of the 111 municipalities in the state (the 7 new municipalities recently created by internal governor Roberto Albores Guillén did not participate in these elections), the Alianza Opositora (Opposition Alliance) obtained the majority of the votes in 53 municipalities, against 58 won by the PRI (with the greatest margin in their favor in the municipalities of La Trinitaria, Tzimol, El Bosque, Tecptán, Acapetahua, Escuintla, Chicomuselo and El Porvenir).

The Zapatistas voted in some regions but they abstained in others. It should be pointed out that the PRI lost many municipalities in the northern region, including Catazajá, La Libertad, Palenque, Salto de Agua, Tila, Tumbalá, Chilón, and Yajalón. In the district of Ocosingo which includes the municipalities of Altamirano, Chilón, Ocosingo and Sitalá, the PRI won by a difference of only 1 035 votes (curiously there was a 1 771 of the 69 571 votes were nullified).

This historical event in Chiapas was not only marked by the defeat of the PRI, but also by the fact that it happened despite incredible cases of corruption, violation of electoral laws and fraud, amongst other means used by the PRI and a diverse number of state government and many municipal governments governed by the PRI. If these fraudulent means had not existed, the difference in percentage in favor of the Alianza por Chiapas hypothetically would have been more than 15 points.

There was no district in which electoral infractions and other anomalies did not occur. For example, in the rural districts, partitions without curtains that would have allowed for a free and secret vote were observed. There was distribution of dispensations, cookies, gasoline, cash, housing sheeting, and refreshments.

In addition, men were observed inducing their wives to vote. In other cases, the PRI tried to avoid installing voting sites in locations where their defeat was certain. In other places they closed schools with padlocks to prevent the installation of voting stations. In the municipality of Simojovel, the person in charge of the election station was murdered days before the election.

In the municipality of Zinacantán, there was a report that one person voted three times; in other places there were photocopies of credentials; gathering and transporting of voters to voting stations, including by the police; collective voting; use of municipal and state public funds to support PRI campaigns and electoral fraud; pressure to close voting installations before the stipulated hour; and threats, intimidation and aggression against representatives of political parties at voting installations, electoral workers (supervising or working at voting stations), and national and foreign election observers.

In other regions voters under the age of majority and others voting without election credentials were observed. PRI party members started rumours along the lines that support by government programs to combat poverty would be lost if the opposition won. Also, activists with radios and infrastructure from some municipal chairs were distributed to monitor the actions of voters. In some rural communities telephone service was suspended and in Oxchuc and Ocosingo military patrols were seen.

In addition, there was stealing from ballot boxes by PRI sympathizers and the seizure of one representative of the Alianza por Chiapas. Some ballot boxes were full, in others the electoral list was shaved or the results were altered, votes were annulled or counted illegally. PRI members also called voters in the community to vote by lists by loudspeaker and verified votes before they were deposited in the ballot box. In San Quintín, municipality of Ocosingo, where one of the largest military bases closest to La Realidad is located and where it is assumed that the EZLN command is, a military soldier acted as secretary of the voting station.

The PRI launched an extensive campaign against observers, against the Alianza por Chiapas and against Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía as a religious evangelical. The state government spent substantial resources on announcements and propaganda in the press and on the radio. The PRI opposed the broadcasting of polls during the election days, and also refused to allow the installion of new voting tables that were intended to avoid alterations of records and ballot boxes.

The Consejo Estatal Electoral (CEE) (State Election Council) also collaborated. There were functionaries who resigned under pressure just days before the elections. Information on the location of voting stations was not broadcasted. Training for workers at voting locations was poor or non-existent. Bureaucracy and delays for the delivery of credentials to national and foreign observers were to such an extent that many could not arrive in the country. Also, changes in the location of ballot boxes without prior warning were observed; special voting locations were not established for displaced persons; up to a few days before the election, electoral workers were lacking; the CEE did not promote the vote; and, the inadequate training the CEE gave to electoral workers did not include information on electoral infractions.

Thus, the examples of irregularities are endless and for some these were the dirtiest elections in the history of Chiapas. Because of this, it is undeniably impressive that despite all the fraud, the PRI has lost, even in the circumstances that less than 50% of the electorate of Chiapas participated in the elections.

FACTS ON THE STATE ELECTIONS:

• Budget of the State Election Council for the election of the state governor held on August 20: 128 162 387 pesos.
• Total number of governors in Chiapas in 175 years: 161.
• Total number of interior governors in 175 years: 101.
• Total number of governors who have been selected by direct, secret, popular vote in 175 years: 15.
• Total election roll in Chiapas: 2 059 378 citizens.
• Cost of the vote per citizen of Chiapas: 62 pesos 70 centavos.
• Total number of district councilors: 240.
• Total number of electoral workers at voting stations in the state: 28 000.
• Total number of representatives of political parties present at voting stations: 15 000.
• Number of candidates that contended for governor: 3 (Sami David for PRI; Pablo Salazar for the Alianza por Chiapas (an agglomeration of 8 parties); Mario Arturo Coutiño Farrera for the Partido Democracia Social).
• Total number of electoral public servants: 1 500.
• Total number of voting stations installed in Chiapas: 4 118.
• Total number of state electoral districts: 24 (District 1- Tuxtla Gútierrez; District 2- Tuxtla Gútierrez; 3- Chiapa de Corzo, Acala, Ixtapa, Suchiapa, and Soyaló; 4- Venustiano Carranza, Nicolás Ruiz, Totolapa, San Lucas, Chiapilla, Amatenango del Valle and Socoltenango; 5- San Cristóbal de Las Casas and Teopisca; 6- Comitán, La Trinitaria, Tzimol and Villa Las Rosas; 7- Ocosingo, Altamirano, Sitalá and Chilón; 8- Yajalón, Sabanilla, Tila and Tumbalá; 9- Palenque, La Libertad, Catazajá and Salto de Agua; 10- Bochil, Simojovel, El Bosque and Huitiupán; 11- Pueblo Nuevo Solistahuacán, Tapilula, Jitotol, Pantepec, Rayón and Tapalapa; 12 Pichucalco, Reforma, Juárez, Solosuchiapa, Ixtacomitán, Sunuapa, Ixtapangajoya, Ostuacán, Ixhatán, Chapultenango and Amatán; 13- Copainalá, Tecpatán, Chicoasén, Osumacinta, Ocotepec, Coapilla, Francisco León, San Fernando; 14- Cintalapa, Jiquipilas, Ocozocoautla, Berriozábal; 15 Tonalá, Pijijiapan, Arriaga y Mapastepec; 16 Huixtla, Mazatán, Huehuetán, Tuzantán, Villa Comaltitlán, Escuitla, Acapetahua and Acacoyagua; 17- Motozintla, El Porvenir, La Grandeza, Siltepec, Mazapa de Madero, Bejucal de Ocampo, Amatenango de la Frontera, Bella Vista, chicomuselo and Frontera Comalapa; 18- Tapachula; 19- Las Margaritas and La Independencia; 21- Tenejapa, Cancuc, Chanal, Huixtán, Oxchuc; 22- Chamula, Chalchihuitán, Chenalhó, Larráinzar, Mitontic, Pantelhó and Zinacantán; 23- Villaflores, Angel Albino Corzo, La Concordia, Villa Corzo; and 24- Cacahoatán, Tuxtla Chico, Union Juárez, Metapa, Frontera Hidalgo and Suchiate).
• Total number of sections that compose the 24 electoral districts: 1929 (616 urban, 1 111 rural and 202 mixed).
• Total number of localities in the 1 929 sections: 25, 021 (172 urban and 24 849 rural).

Sources: Consejo Estatal Electoral (www.cee-chiapas.org.mx), Alianza Cívica/Chiapas, the press, LaNeta (www.laneta.apc.org/sclc) and CIEPAC.