The state of Chiapas covers 75,634.4 square kilometers, 3.8% of national territory. The state has 118 official municipal governments (seven of which are the result of political counter-insurgency by ex-governor Roberto Albores Guillen to counteract the influence of the EZLN’s autonomous municipalities). The state has a population of 3,920,515, 1,931,495 males and 1,989,020 females (Statistical Agency of the Secretary of State).  Chiapas houses 33 "Protected Forest Areas.”  The federal government controls 16 of these areas, encompassing 932,521 hectares, with ecological reserves, national parks, natural  monuments, protected areas of flora and fauna. The state government controls 17 areas, with 282,836 hectares of land, including recreation centers, state reserves and private reserves (www.chiapas.gob.mx) http://www.chiapas.gob.mx).

A large part of these reserves include lands that belong to indigenous people engaged in civil resistance, who are demanding autonomy.   Therefore, the theme of land ownership has become linked to environmental problems, and land disputes among many actors.  Collectives of small farmers and indigenous people use 17% of the land in Chiapas.  37% of this land has not been registered by the government’s certification program for communal land rights (PROCEDE), which is to say that the land has not been privatized.  76% of the economically active population receive their primary income from cultivation of the land, and 83.7% of communal land owners (ejidatarios) have no income.  In the best of cases, those with an income mostly earn the minimum wage (Agricultural Statistics. Year 2000. Procuraduría Agraria).

According to statistics from the Secretary of Agricultural Reform (SRA), in 1992 when the federal government reformed the 27th Article of the Constitution, 27% of national agriculture was concentrated in Chiapas. Officials who represented the interests of large landholders and ranchers prohibited land redistribution for the benefit of small farmers.  Nevertheless, in order to not affect the rancher’s property, federal and state governments came and went but never truly modified the structure of land tenancy.   Instead, the government adopted the policy of sending people who solicited land to colonize deeper into the Lacandonan Jungle. Due to this strategy, we currently have the conflict in the 32 communities living in the Montes Azules Ecological Reserve (which contains 331,200 hectares).  Previous governments created this problem, and the present government must work for a just solution in which the human rights of the indigenous and small farmers are respected.  Currently, it appears that the government prefers to expel them from the land, to the benefit of transnational corporations like Novartis, Monsanto, Dupont Pulsar and others dedicated to biopiracy, with the complicity of “International Conservation” and its allies.

In Chiapas, various organizations of small farmers are fighting for small pieces of land and find themselves in constant confrontations that have led to negative, and sometimes, tragic results.

Recent history begins with the start of armed conflict in January 1994. The federal government realized that small farmer’s organizations were working together and beginning to gain more power, and was pressured to name a special commission to attend to and to mediate their demands.  The members of the commission were Andrés Fábregas Puig, Eduardo Robledo Rincón y Eraclio Zepeda Ramos. At that time, 182 organizations made up the State Advisory Board of Indigenous People and Farmers (CEOIC). While the farmers' organizations pressed for land, productive projects, freedom for political prisoners, etc., the government responded by paying off a few leaders, giving them new Dodge Ram trucks in order to provoke conflicts between the organizations.

Prior to this came the dialogue of San Andres between the EZLN and the government, and the division of the CEOIC:  the independent CEOIC that chose to support the peace talks and bring their demands to the table, and the CEOIC official who chose to negotiate with the government on the side and to separate from the rest of the farmers' movement.  It is fitting to mention that later a faction of the CEOIC decided to negotiate with Dante Delgado Ranauro, a federal government representative, while only a tiny group decided to remain at the negotiating table along with the EZLN.   This shows a lack of political clarity and understanding of the political moment and strategies of the two negotiating parties (EZLN, Federal Government).

The Zapatista uprising gave rise to a resurgence of new indigenous and rural organizations that are still active in Chiapas (some 500 rural, Indigenous, cooperative and civil society organizations). At that time, some groups chose to directly confront the ranchers and the state by occupying lands; they took approximately 2,800 plots of land. Within the zone of Zapatista influence, 50 properties were taken in the municipality of Las Margaritas, 100 in Altamirano and 240 in Ocosingo.   However, when the ranchers tried to reclaim their lands, they demanded and continue to demand payment for 642 plots that were seized. These ranchers have chosen to approach the current government of  Pedro Salazar for their payment and indemnification, treating the state government as the intermediary with the federal government in order to resolve their demands. To add further pressure, they have formed the Coalition of Ranchers of Ocosingo, replete with PRI members and the municipal presidency, in order to harass the Zapatista communities in the zone.

The archive of the secretary of Agricultural Development of March 1997 indicates that among the families that appealing for ownership of seized lands in the municipality of Altamirano, were the following: Pinto Kanter, Kanter Gómez, Alfonso Kanter, Kanter Solís, Kanter Castellanos, Kanter Solórzano, Ruiz Kanter, Kanter Alfonso, Pinto Albores, Albores Aguilar, Albores Luis, Albores Domínguez, Albores Guillen, Albores del Carmen, Guillen Nájera, Albores Agueda, Macal Castellanos, Aguilar López, etc. In the municipality of Las Margaritas  many of the same family names appear:  Kanter, Méndez, Avendaño Argüello, Avendaño Aguilar, Tovar Culebro, Recta Alvarez, Aguilar Hernández, González Tovar, Morales López, Monzón Tovar, Cordero Albores, Altuzar García, Gordillo Noriega, among others. In the municipality of Ocosingo the same families : Aguilar Trujillo, Rocha Aguilar,Aguilar Argüello, García Aguilar, Penagos Aguilar, Albores Aguilar, Albores Cruz, Aguilar Castillejos, Díaz Aguilar, Aguilar Sánchez, Hernández Aguilar, Alfonso Castellanos, López Solórzano, Fernández Kanter; Hernández Kanter, Domínguez Bermúdez, Cancino Domínguez, etc. The majority of these ranchers were granted cattle raising loans in order to purchase purchase lands in other municipalities of Chiapas, such as Playas de Catazajá, Pichucalco, La Independencia, la Libertad, Palenque, Arriaga, Reforma, Venustiano Carranza, Tzimol, Chicomuselo, La Trinitaria.  In the state of Tabasco, they purchased lands in the municipalities of Macuspana, Balancán, Teapa, La Libertad, Emiliano Zapata, etc. In the state of Veracruz, the ranchers of Chiapas saw benefits in the purchase of cattle ranches in the municipalities of : San Juan, Hidalgo, Las Choapas, Jesús Carranza; in the state of Yucatán in: Tizmin y Panaba; and in Campeche in the municipality of El Carmen.

According to sources from the Special Representative of the Secretary of Agricultural Reform (SRA), in 1994 the Chiapas state government government made moves so that the SRA would transfer the means of purchasing land to the government. For this reason, Fund 94 was created, directed by the governor at that time, Javier López Moreno; Saúl Prado, Rodolfo Ulloa y Rodolfo del Pino were members of the commission. In “direct form”, they purchased 40,000 hectares, at 175 million pesos, for the benefit of 16 farmer organizations, primarily the National Farmer Confederation (CNC), Farmer Solidarity Magistrate (SOCAMA) and others which belonged to the PRI.  A total of 12,000 farmers received land, and they were divided in 270 groups.  (Catorcenal Sur Proceso No. 55. March 30 2002).

Independent farmer organizations at that time protested these actions, among them the Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Farmers (CIOAC), Farmers Organization “Emiliano Zapata” (OCEZ-CNPA) because other groups received the most land (SOCAMA and CNC).  Due to these protests, the government created Fund 95.  This fund, with 794 million pesos, purchased 160,000 hectares containing 2,300 plots for 67 rural organizations, for 930 groups that solicited land. More than 242,000 hectares were reportedly purchased by the government for those rural groups. However, as was usually the case, they paid for non-existent plots, "self-invasions," the necessary studies were not undertaken, officials sold out rather than hand over  inspections, and did not implement resolutions. (Ibid pag. 17).

Nevertheless, it is the duty of Pablo Salazar and Vicente Fox’s governments to investigate the irregularities committed by previous administrations, and to hold former government officials accountable along with leaders of social organizations who were accomplices, among others. The ball fell in the government's court to demonstrate willingness to make changes that would benefit farmers and to carry out the justice of the Mexican Revolution by continuing investigations of large landholders and estate farmers, who continue to possess large areas of land.  There are 2,800 farmers who have solicited in the hopes of gaining a tiny plot of land and to avert the continued application of PROCEDE.

In 1994 and 1995, the most expensive lands were in the mountainous and coastal zones, at 5,900 pesos per hectare, the least expensive were those of the isthmus coastal zone, at 3,700 pesos per hectare. Many of these lands were purchased from their owners, but the majority were not legalized because of the need to re-study the lands to determine reliable figures. There was also a need for the social organizations to continue the necessary legal procedures in favor of the farmers, and these organizations were already suffering due to the armed conflict. 

The prevailing conditions in Chiapas are grim: the government’s lack of will for true dialogue and their non-compliance with the three conditions set by the EZLN to re-start the dialogue, threats of displacement of people from the ecological reserves, confrontations between the EZLN and various farmer organizations over land disputes, the resurgence and recycling of old and new actors, who play within the political terrain set by the government and those who prefer to play according to their own rules. We must remember that Chiapas still suffers from a war, with the EZLN trying to maintain control of its territories, building long-term solutions for the communities, while the government, following the logic of Ernesto Zedillo, seeks to reduce, confront, divide and isolate the EZLN so that it will not be an important actor in the transformation of the nation. With this logic, the EZLN will not fall into the game of "small dialogues."  For those who seek to pressure them into dialogue with rural organizations who are in conflict in its territory, an understanding of the magnitude of the conflict in its real state is needed, not only the function of the EZLN but also the causes that provoked the armed conflict.

Land is one demand from the San Andreas dialogues, by the EZLN and the indigenous people of the country.  Still today, demands have not been resolved for all of the organizations, even those in conflict with Zapatismo.  The problem remains and resurges, and it is not because of the lasting policies of Zapatismo, as some have tried to explain, but because of the intensification of the war's causes. That is, while there is no solution to the causes which generated the armed conflict, pending a process of serious dialogue, of respect and willingness to seek solutions, the problems that were laid out during the San Andreas dialogues will continue to explode in conflicts in various ways in Chiapas and in other parts of the country. This explains why the EZLN was unable to negotiate with the state government, nor with anyone related to the government, while there was non-compliance with the accords of San Andreas, while 17 prisoners on hunger strike are not freed and while the federal government fails to abandon a military solution in Chiapas.

Meanwhile, the solution to the problem of land in Chiapas, for the EZLN and the rural organizations (ARIC´s, ORCAO, CNPI, FIPI, RAP, OPEZ´s, OCEZ´s, CNPA´s, etc., and the remainder of the country with similar demands), lies in the opportunity of evaluating the armed conflict in its entirety: its causes, its recycling and in the re-articulation of the actors along with the implementation of the Plan Puebla Panamá and of neo-liberalism in Chiapas. In this sense, indigenous people must be considered as independent actors with their own project, with autonomy in their territories and rights to the natural resources therein, resources very much in the interest of the multinational corporations.   We are all awaiting the verdict of the Supreme Court of Justice of the nation with respect to the constitutional complaints that have been presented.  However, if bureaucracy rules, along with government “administration” of the conflict,  and exhaustion of the actors, the question remains: Within civil society, what must we do to ensure that the EZLN becomes the actor that combines, convokes, provokes and conducts, together with other actors of the country, the changes we need for a more democratic and just society in Mexico?

Many actors on the national and international level, journalists, NGO's, churches, etc. await word from the Coordinating Committee of the EZLN, from Subcomandante Marcos, in regards to what is currently taking place in the Chiapanecan communities and the events of 9/11 in the U.S., along with the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, in Palestine, and all other areas, etc. that accumulate.   The answer lies with the communications and denunciations from various autonomous municipalities about what is taking place in Chiapas, what civil society and national and international pacifist groups say about the Mideast war.  We must understand the EZLN in its paradox, in the logic of peace, not of war, in light of construction, when the enemy speaks of destruction, in view of peace, when the enemy speaks of war.

Without seeking to justify, but rather to understand, now is the moment to look at Zapatismo according to its logic, strategy, methods, in its actual state, location, dimension, in its journey, in its silence. To paraphrase Zapatismo, I believe that now is the time for us to bring forth our words, even while the EZLN decides to remain silent.   It is time for us to become bridges of communication for the various actors, time to confront isolation with an alternative that responds to people’s interests.  We must build the networks needed to protect and execute the alternatives from where we find ourselves now.

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