The EZLN will attempt to bring its political proposal for the entire nation to local lands.  Inclusion, dialogue, a world where all worlds fit, and tolerance will reign in the land of the Caracoles.  This will be the most complicated and difficult bet.  For it, the EZLN has to separate military logic from civil logic.  The EZLN will also bring to the land ethical and moral principals and values.  Its proposal is a message to the governments and armies of Latin America and the Caribbean where the temptation is for new military coups and dictators to waylay weak and/or illegitimate democracies.  The United States views Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, and others as part of its interests that it needs to protect.  In this context, the EZLN declares that those who bear arms cannot govern, that those who are willing to kill cannot direct the destiny of a nation.  In this way, the EZLN withdraws from being the voice of a space for construction of the gathering of local forces.  The Caracoles will listen to all organizations in the region. The political and civil forms of the Councils of Good Government will have to consolidate and strengthen their internal structure with alliances, because the vultures are circling all around, waiting to destroy indigenous autonomy.

Military Structure

The Zapatista army is also modifying its strategy with regard to the army itself:

1)  Beginning August 9th, 2003, “they will clean up all the Zapatista detentions and eliminate all fees to travelers in roads and highways in rebel territories.  They will only check those vehicles that could be trafficking wood, drugs, or arms, which are prohibited in rebel communities.  They will also prevent, at the demand of the women, ‘the introduction of alcohol’.”

2)  “As of now, the detentions and checkpoints will only be installed in cases of red alert.  It will continue to be our work and our duty to protect communities from aggressions of bad government, of the paramilitaries, and all those who wish them harm.  For this we were born, for this we live, and for this we are willing to die.”

3)  “The Zapatista National Liberation Army cannot be the voice of he who commands, or the government, even though he who commands, commands obediently and it would be a good government.  The EZLN speaks for those from below, for the governed, for the Zapatista communities that are its heart and its blood, its thoughts and its path.  We will defend them, and for this we are the Zapatista Army, the Votán-Zapata, the guardian and the heart of the community.”

4) Subcomandante Marcos defines the new position: “So, beginning now, I will no longer be the spokesman of the Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities.  They already have someone who speaks for them.  In my position as military leader of the Zapatista troops I report that, as of now, the Autonomous Councils cannot fall back on military forces for the work of the government.  They should, therefore, strive to act as do all good governments, that is, they should use reason and not force to govern.  The armies should be used to defend, not to govern.  The work of an army is not to be political or an agent of the public ministry.”

The La Realidad-Tijuana Plan

The EZLN will focus on defense in a manner “coordinated and conjoined with” national sovereignty and opposing in a manner “frontal and radical the imminent privatizations of electric energy, petroleum, and other natural resources.”  Against the PPP, the EZLN hurled the La Realidad-Tijuana Plan that symbolizes all Mexicans uniting, from the extremes of the Mexican Republic, from south to north.  This plan includes accords from the local level, which the Zapatistas proposed to be signed, that were then extended by “independent” organizations.  Among these are: 1) respect for the independence and autonomy of social organizations; 2) promotion of forms of self-governance and self-administration in all national territory; 3) propel rebellion and civil, peaceful resistance against the arrangements of bad governments and political parties; 4) the formation of a “network of basic commerce” between communities and fomentation of “basic consumption both locally and with national commerce;” 5) “form a network of information and culture” at the local, regional and national level to demand from news sources truthful and balanced information; 6) organize the defense and promotion of local culture, sciences, and universal arts.

The EZLN declared seven basic demands: 1) the defense of ejidal property and communal land; 2) the protection and defense of natural resources; 3) a worthy job and a just wage for everyone; 4) decent housing; 5) free public health services; 6) alimentation for everyone; 7) clothing for everyone; 8) free and non-religious education for children and teens; and 9) respect for the dignity of women, children, and seniors.

The Reaction

Distinct sectors of society did not wait long to react to the path that the EZLN had chosen.  The rejection came quickly from political parties.  Most notably, the legislators from PAN were especially belligerent, referring to the Zapatista initiative as illegal and unconstitutional, for which they demanded the prohibition of the Autonomous Municipalities and their Councils of Good Government.  Meanwhile, the bishop of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas made a call that the government approve the San Andres Accords and avoid violence.

The national and trans-national business sector came to view the indigenous Zapatistas and their new strategy as a threat to commercial investments, for which it was decided that they should be annihilated.  Meanwhile, many civil organizations, national and international solidarity groups greeted the initiative with goodwill and maintained the expectation that the new mechanisms will make communication and relationships easier.  For its part, the National Indigenous Congress announced that it would enter into the EZLN’s initiative to promote indigenous autonomy in all the country, thereby putting into practice the rights of indigenous communities.  Nonetheless, some indigenous and peasant organizations in Chiapas view the new Zapatista strategy with distrust because it could mean a loss of leadership in the local political scene, even though the EZLN has shown respect to those organizations.

Federal Government

The Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Santiago Creel Miranda, affirmed that the actions of the EZLN would be respected by the federal government as long as they respect freedoms of expression and association in strict adherence to the Constitution and laws of the Republic.  He noted that “as long as there is this contact [between the government and the EZLN] and there is willingness on both parts, through the Cocopa as intermediary, the situation should stay as it is and as it has been going up to this point, and of course the Law of Amnesty, that also defines the terms and conditions to deal with the problems in Chiapas, independently of the rest of the legislation.”  He also emphasized that the federal government would not use armed forces as long as there is no change in the state of justice and human rights: “When I refer to respect for the state of justice, it is to be vigilant of the two specific norms for the conflict zone and the Constitution, that also establishes guarantees of freedom of expression, of association, and of assembly.”  The secretary added that “we will always be simply attentive to the decisions they make and the resolutions they adopt, and we will take them into account with all decisions taken.”

The Fox Administration applauded that the EZLN promotes amongst its sympathizer communities “a new form of political organization, de-militarizing its structure.”  Moreover, he made a “respectful” call to the EZLN to resume dialogue that would permit the advance in the construction of a dignified and just peace that the indigenous people of Chiapas demand and deserve, and he added that “he will value the signals emitted by the Zapatista Army, thinking that it could be a base from which to seek mechanisms to reestablish the negotiation process,” and that dialogue cannot be considered neither defeated nor finished, but the way to understanding.  The federal government declared that its good will remains “unalterable.”  Nonetheless, even if the call was sincere on the part of the federal government, after nine years the Zapatistas no longer believe in it and have closed absolutely all dialogue with any government.

For its part, the Coordination of Dialogue and Negotiation in Chiapas considers negotiation necessary to surmount the “conditions of marginalization and poverty that we refuse to see” that prevails in indigenous communities.  Because of this, it is not possible to speak of peace or democracy without the participation of everyone.  The Coordination also declared its satisfaction with the Zapatista call with respect to indigenous and diverse sectors of society, without placing importance on organizations, political parties or religion; it could make possible the establishment of dialogue and mutual understanding.

LEGALITY OR LEGITIMACY

In order to not be seen in direct conflict with the EZLN in front of the public and to avoid the use of armed forces, the federal government acted in a conciliatory and tolerant manner, recognizing that the Councils of Good Government could be compatible with the Constitution.  The federal government minimized the Zapatista proposal, transferring the solution to the state arena, in that it would be this level of government where the compatibility and legality of the laws of the state of Chiapas.

For some intellectuals, writers, centers of human rights and civil organizations, the Councils of Good Government are not in opposition with the Constitution; moreover, they fulfill international agreements signed by the Mexican government.  For the Network Community Defenders of Human Rights, the Human Rights Centers “Miguel Agustín Pro” and “Fray Bartolome de las Casas,” and the Mexican Academy of Human Rights, the new forms of Zapatista governments find their foundation in Agreement 169 of the ILO and the Vienna Convention that establish that no State can plead internal reasoning in order to follow the rights established in Agreement 169 of the ILO.   [1]

Even though the Councils of Good Government do not create another level of government stipulated by the Constitution, the federal government could argue its unconstitutionality because it “creates parallel municipalities” to those “constitutionally established.”  Nonetheless, the problem is not one of legality or illegality.  The Zapatistas are not fighting for power, but for dignity.  At its base, the problem is one of legitimacy of human rights, especially those of indigenous communities, which have not been recognized by economic powers, political powers, and political parties in the current state laws and the Constitution.

The Mexican Constitution reads: “National sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the community.  All public power comes from the community and is instituted for its benefit.  The community at all times has the inalienable right to change or modify the form of its government” (Article 39 of the national constitution).  If, on the other hand, the will of the Mexican people is constituted in “free and sovereign states” (Article 40 of the Constitution) and these in “free municipalities” with no intermediary authority between them and the Government of the State (Article 115 of the Constitution), the Autonomous Municipalities would not violate the Constitution.  Therefore, the interpretation of legality that would be given to the Zapatista proposal will be marred by political and economic interests.

With these changes, the new political, economic, social, cultural and military proposal of the EZLN is institutionalized.  The thread that will secure the life of the Autonomous Municipalities will be “Insurgent Radio, the Voice of the EZLN” broadcast on shortwave band of 49 meters, in 5.8 megahertz where Subcomandante Marcos will have his voice.  And here, once again, is the right to information by means of deeds.  This radio, according to national laws that grant a monopoly to just a few companies, is illegal according to this point of view.  Nonetheless, the San Andres Accords agreed that it is the right of indigenous communities to have their own mechanisms for communication and information.  (Even the radios of the National Indigenous Institute were to pass directly to the indigenous communities.)

THE STAGE

With the Caracoles, the EZLN will seek equilibrium in development and benefits to indigenous communities, impart justice, keep watch that the Accords are met, and offer a clear channel to communicate and relate with other political actors.  With this new structure, the EZLN is giving solidity to its internal consolidation and clear channels to communicate with national and international civil society: “In this way, the ‘civil societies’ now know with whom to come to agreement for projects, peace camps, visits, donations, etc.  The defenders of human rights now know to whom they should turn in their denunciations and from whom they should expect a reply.  The army and the police now know who to attack (just by taking into account that if we have plunged into this, we are part of it).  The means of communication that say that they will pay informants, now know who to slander and/or ignore.  The honest means of communication know now where they can go to solicit interviews or reports in communities.  The federal government and its ‘commissioner’ now know what it is they have to ignore.  And the Power of Money now knows who else it should fear.”

The EZLN itself is not disappearing; the Zapatista armed forces will keep watch for good internal function of the new structure and will continue to defend from external enemies.  The functions of the Zapatista army will not be those of police or of public ministry for the Autonomous Municipalities.  (This was a proposal of the federal government, that the Zapatistas integrate with municipal police or soldiers of the Mexican army.)

With all this, we can surmise some conclusions and tendencies:

One.  The EZLN will place its thumb in the wound of the private transnational investments not just in the framework of the PPP, but also in the free trade agreements between Mexico and Central America, the FTAA and the agreements of the WTO.  For the EZLN, the PPP as a “separatist project for southeastern Mexico” will not pass into the rebel Zapatista territories, “the Zapatistas have the necessary means and organization to impede the completion of said plan.”  The PPP is something distinct from the point of view of the Zapatistas for three reasons: a) “this area has already been mined; the PPP’s only intention is to impose policies to prevent the social revolts from getting worse;” b) “the plan claims that we accept that in the north and center of the country things are already decided and that nobody opposes them.  This is false.  The routes of resistance and the rebellion cross the entire nation, and flourish also where modernity appears to have triumphed completely;” c) “in the mountains of southeastern Mexico, we will not permit, for any reason, its implementation.”

Therefore, redefining the EZLN’s strategy creates danger for current investments in Zapatista regions, such as the great monoculture plantations for the exportation of huge transnational corporations of African palm, rubber and eucalyptus.  Amongst these business interests, we can point out the case of International Paper, Kimberly Clark, and Monsanto with its transgenic corn and soy.  For its part, Coca Cola is interested in water; Pulsar in land; Syngenta, Pioneer, and Dupont the control of seeds and agrochemicals; and Nestle in control of coffee and milk.  In this way, other companies also seek appropriation oil fields, petroleum or extraction of other minerals; or are waiting for privatization of electric energy, water, and the formation of repression on indigenous lands to come with the PPP’s arrival.  In other parts of the region, with the PPP transnational companies such as Union Fenosa, Iberdrola, Endesa, Siemens, and Edf are already investing.

Two.  With the threat that the EZLN poses to transnational capital, the federal government will not cease in its intent to undermine indigenous autonomy as it has up to now, despite its conciliatory, tolerant and understanding discourse, with the goal of calming the nerves of foreign investors, principally multilateral and commercial banks such as the Interamerican Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank, who will center their strategy on the privatization of Chiapas’s strategic resources.  [2]

Among the instruments that we foresee the federal and state governments using will be the paramilitary groups that patrol indigenous regions.  They have not been dismantled, nor have the hostile actions by the Mexican army against the Autonomous Municipalities ceased.  [3]   Therefore, the violence will not cease, much less when the Zapatistas, who thus far have not responded to the aggressions, declare that they will react from now on.  The General Command of the EZLN sent a message to the paramilitary groups in the sense that there will be no more impunity for their actions and they diagnose that “particularly in the highlands of Chiapas, in the municipalities of Chenalhó, Pantelhó, and Cancuc, the paramilitaries are in feverish activity that speaks to imminent plans for aggression.  The paramilitaries have indicated as priority objectives for its future attacks the encampments of the displaced of San Pedro Polhó, the so-called “Campamento Ocho” and Acteal, and for some nights they have been meeting to get drunk and fire shots in the air to make themselves brave.  The army and state police units stationed in the area have closed down so they can later allege “we didn’t hear anything.”  So, the “environment” is now very similar to that which preceded the massacres of Acteal, Chenalhó, Chiapas, in which 45 men, women, and children were cruelly assassinated by the paramilitaries.

Three.  Politically, the system of political parties and the electorate are strongly threatened.  The political parties will see participation in electoral processes greatly reduced in the Zapatista regions.  If the Councils of Good Government do function and respond to the needs of indigenous communities (even those that are not Zapatista), they will convert in a lightning rod where they can find solutions to juridical problems, to community conflicts, to problems of health and education, etc.  We will not forget that the EZLN has announced a complete rupture in dialogue and meetings with political parties.

With this panorama, we can foresee greater force by the state and federal governments to break the Autonomous Municipalities and their Caracoles through the use of economic resources as part of the low-intensity war.  Millions of pesos, through the IADB and the World Bank, will be destined for supposed projects of development, health and education for the state.  The programs supported with great financial resources of the multilateral bank and other governmental programs to supposedly end poverty, such as “Oportunidades,” Procampo, Alianza para el Campo, Capitalización del Campo and Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales, with the goal of privatizing indigenous and peasant lands, will continue to be the tools that attempt to deepen division between indigenous communities.  There are three elements (religious, political and economic) that are identified as major causes of division in the communities: the proliferation of religious sects; the political parties, especially during electoral periods; and the governmental projects and programs that distribute economic resources or material goods.

Unlike the experiences of some Central American guerrillas, the Zapatistas do not seek to create “liberated zones,” but rather zones inserted in the local realities to attend to and dialogue democratically with local actors, without the use of the army for anything but defense against that which threatens it… These could also be called “zones politically liberated from bad government.”  In this way, military logic is kept separate from civil logic.  This is neither separatism nor balkanization, as the federal government has argued in an attempt to justify its use of military force and the fact that it has not complied with the signed accords.  The balkanization of the state comes from another source.  The World Bank seeks decentralization of federal structures and institutions under the guise of municipal and state empowerment, while walking the path of breakdown and privatization of the role of the State.  In this way, government and indigenous communities each go their own way, but they will meet again in the near future.  Nonetheless, as the functions of the State pass to private hands, the confrontation will pass from indigenous communities-State to indigenous communities-multinational corporations.

MUNICIPIOS AUTONOMOS ZAPATISTAS (2003)

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