II) STRATEGIES AND TASKS FOR THE NEXT STAGE

Global Strategy against the Advance of “Free Trade”

1)  With the analysis of context and evaluation completed up to this point, we can clearly separate out a series of challenges and tasks, and the need to re-establish our strategy beginning with Miami.

The first thing we need to reconstruct is the strategy against the advance or the scenes of “free trade” in general and against the official process of the FTAA in particular.  As for the first, it would perhaps be better to say that we practically haven’t had a strategy.  If “free trade” as such constitutes one of the divisive principals of neoliberal globalization and advances on various paths and stages, we should not suppose that it is possible to combat it on just one.  The Continental Social Alliance (CSA) was created around the struggle against the FTAA, and it has been correct and convenient not to add more ideas to an alliance so ample, so diverse, and so delicate.  Nevertheless, as we saw in Cancun, the agenda, the themes, the alliances, and the actors are necessarily mixed.  The WTO is the most global stage for dispute of “free trade” and is derived from or connects regional or bilateral initiatives with those great powers that compete against each other.  The CSA participated as such and correctly decided to become involved in the battle of Cancun, but in a rather timid manner.  In the case of bilateral or regional trade agreements, the CSA as such has had little response, despite the evident links between these and the advance of the CSA.  Clearly, the CSA cannot be jumping from one side to the other and hope to respond quickly to every bilateral negotiation; this is a matter for local or regional forces, but it is also true that to not act on these bilateral scenes weakens the objective of fighting against the FTAA.

It is no longer possible to continue with a strategy concentrated exclusively against the FTAA and not act against in other contiguous and linked stages.  It is also true, however, that it is not possible to be in involved in every single case.  The center, the focus of attention for the CSA should continue to be the FTAA, as stopping it is the contribution to which it is called, but the CSA should adopt a strategy that permits it to work in other areas.

To begin, we hope to have a global understanding of the issue of “free trade” as such.  It is very common to hear governments such as the Brazilian and even inside our own movement that the problem is the FTAA but not “free trade.”  But as we know, every word can be perverted.  The abstract concept can lend itself to diverse interpretations, including positive ones.  The truth is that, like “globalization,” “free trade” has a very specific meaning in today’s world; “free trade” is neither free, because it is determined by the interests of giant corporations, nor does it imply just commercial interchanges, since included in this concept is the grouping of world economic rules and their ruling multinational corporations.  “Free trade” is one of the divisive principles of neoliberal globalization, that imposes conditions that are absolutely unjust and unequal, especially on developing countries.  Yes, we are against “free trade” with its concrete meaning in today’s world on its various stages.

Without removing the focus of attention and priority from combating the FTAA, the CSA should propose to operate more permanently in the arena of the WTO, and arrange and support actions with national and regional forces to confront free trade agreements, which now includes entering into the sphere of relations with the European Union (EU).  Only in this way can we direct an integrated and effective struggle against the plague of “free trade” that is advancing every day undermining the sovereignty of nations, creating more obstacles to development, and sinking the people into greater misery and unemployment.

This strategic plan should be based, nonetheless and in the first place, in a general perspective before the particulars, which will allow us to create coherency and respond to the problem without having to run every time this happens.  The plan would take on a global campaign against “free trade,” placing ourselves with all the international forces beyond America with those whose interests coincide with ours and developing particularly in our continent, demonstrating that no accord between countries based on this model can be beneficial.  The campaign revolves not only around a specific agreement, but would get to the heart of what is at stake with “free trade.”

But even beyond the opposition of these agreements, it is fundamental to advance an alternative proposal to this model.  Combating “free trade” wherever it presents itself naturally creates the need to present an alternative vision.  And we would not be talking about an extensive document, like that of Alternatives for the Americas, that is continually constructed, but a systematization in the most simple but integral and convincing manner, which would be the central elements of our objections to the current model and our alternative proposals.  We should try to create a simple concept that may easily be identified as a distinct model and that facilitates its dispersion and popular use.  Below this concept, we would draw up a letter of principles that, in whatever scenario, a community and a government should contemplate so as not to sacrifice their future and have a fair exchange with other nations, because from that point on we would share that we are not against exchange and international economic agreements.  This would be a tool with which social forces can use to face off with their governments in diverse negotiations, arrive at a public opinion and a central instrument for an international campaign.

For lack of a better alternative concept that can be summarized in two words, we prefer “fair trade with development rights” to “free trade” (“fair trade” is not sufficient to define an alternative to an entire economic model and in certain forms what this model is denying nations is the possibility of development; from there, we can add many surnames like sustainable, equitable, etc., but the name would then stretch out for miles.)

“Fair trade with development rights” is based on the idea that all trade agreements or international economic integration should:

Start from the consideration of economic asymmetries and inequalities in development of the signing nations in a specific manner that favors less developed countries.

Include specific compensatory economic mechanisms, such as more favorable terms and conditions, greater access to the market, funds for development or even forgiveness or reduction of external debt.

Recognition of the rights of the poorest countries to exclude from negotiations or protect areas of their economy that have a strategic character for their development (such as energy) or are vital for survival, such as some agricultural sectors that are indispensable to guarantee food sovereignty, as well as the right to aid producers tied to these sectors without it being considered unfair to competition.

Recognize the right of developing countries to exclude from negotiations or protect the services that constitute basic social rights, such as education, health, and social security, as well as natural resources indispensable for life, as water is.

Recognize the right of every country to sovereignty over its biodiversity, its natural products, public health, and cultural patrimony over whatever regulatory disposition of intellectual property, commerce, or investment.

Differentiate between the agreements of commercial trade and those that intend to regulate investments; in the latter case, all agreements about investments should leave a clear impression of the right of each country to regulate foreign investment according to its own national interests, to not place the interests of private corporations over those of the nation, to protect and support its producers in conditions of unequal competition without this being considered discriminatory against external investors.  Under no circumstances should the exercising of this right subject a nation to sanctions.

Establish the principle of complementariness before that of indiscriminate competition between nations, to give priority to the exchange of cooperation for the development, trade, and productive investments that compensate for the deficiencies of the other, satisfying real needs and promoting the welfare of the population.

Consider the social dimension implicated in all economic processes, including specific arrangements in the body of the agreements to protect and promote human rights, labor rights, cultural rights, gender equity, etc., and to place those rights above the market as the objective of economic activity.

Consider the democratic dimension, or not causing social exclusion and closing the spaces for participation, consultation and decion-making on the part of society as a condition to sign any agreement that jeopardizes the destination of their nation.

This platform of criteria or basic principles could also be posed as “negative,” that is to say, “any agreement that does not take into account the following principles is not acceptable will only result in grave damage to the signing country….”

As you can see, these are some tentative formulations that divide out and simply systematize what we have all been writing in distinct texts.  They are to be discussed and enriched, although the idea would be to create a document that is not too extensive; actually, the idea would be some list of top ten points that facilitates its dispersion and use.  Perhaps each of the ten points could have an annex for further information and development of the theme.  The idea is that something like this could be a useful tool for both public opinion and some government agencies, as much on the global stage as on the regional and bilateral, or agreement by agreement, placing us as much in fundamental opposition of the “free trade” agreement as promoters of an alternative model that is accessible and popular, without demanding that society read our books to understand us.  This means designing an extensive campaign for global propagation, but also arriving in each country to summon each government to comply with it.

2) On the other hand, in the sense of a global campaign and strategy, it is clear that there are transversal themes that are extremely sensitive that cross through different stages, such as privatization, water, food sovereignty, services, etc.  These should be taken as sectors for specific campaigns that have a high possibility of having an impact.  There exist international coalitions that are already acting on these sectors and it would be a good “indirect” way to confront the agreements with a greater social penetration.

3) This brings us to emphasize the need to seek greater ties with the concrete social and national agendas that are creating anti-neoliberal movements throughout the continent.  On of the greatest problems in the majority of American countries is the lack of connection, practically a divorce in many cases, of the global and national agendas.  It is necessary to insert the struggle against “free trade” (be it the WTO, FTAA, or free trade agreements), in the specific popular struggles that occur everywhere against privatizations, in defense of water, in defense of rural lands, in defense of labor rights, etc.

4) And this drives us to discuss if we should once again take up an initiative that was left behind after it was one of the two “feet” on which the CSA was going to walk, along with the document of Alternatives: we are referring to the Continental Social Letter.  If you recall, the idea was not that the Alternatives would include social demands, but that we would take up the initiative with a Social Letter that was amply discussed and consensual amongst social organizations of the continent and that would serve as a type of platform or base for basic rights that should be respected, included and promoted as a condition for any integration process and as a counterweight to the reality of economic integration and globalization.  The idea was that this would serve as the “glue” of the Social Alliance and as a path to bring the Alliance to act precisely in concrete scenarios of social struggles and not just in the abstract against trade agreements.  The discussion stayed in the air, even just the concept, the reach, the design and the process that the Letter should have.  The question is, would it be useful to revive this initiative in the restructuring of our global strategy?

5) If we think about it, all this drives us to another pending discussion in the CSA, which is if we should and if we can trans-grow the agenda of the Alliance to other scenarios, issues, and concerns that go beyond the strict hemisphere and the FTAA.  This is not something absent or that we have completely ignored, but it is necessary to discuss and take on very conscientiously if the Alliance is going to expand its agreed-upon framework, without losing members and to the contrary perhaps gaining more, if there exists a solid consensus amongst distinct social and national actors.  If this were the case, this would give the Alliance a larger role, more active and more ambitious from here perhaps in other scenarios.  But from there, it also means more work, more demands, more complexity, greater need for coordination, etc.

6) In particular, some of the issues posed up to this point signify that, in the short-term, we must develop a policy and a plan to act on “derailed” but not dead WTO negotiations; on how to act and support our counterparts in relation to pending bilateral agreements, such as that of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and others that are threatening to close soon, such as the Andean agreement with the EU; the Latin American summit meeting with the EU that is scheduled for May in Guadalajara, Mexico, and the bilateral agreements with the EU that already exist.

7) The CSA also needs to discuss, and make a decision, regarding how to get involved in the international campaign on trade that has already been discussed in meetings, such as that which occurred in Delhi in November and in the World Social Forum in Mumbia.  In particular, the CSA needs to discuss the idea of calling for a week and/or day of action against free trade in April 2005.  In our case, in relation to the FTAA, it could be too late, but….

Strategy on the “Final Path” of the FTAA

13) Assuming a strategy more global or integrated, according to what can be seen, should not bring us to dodge or ignore what is becoming the central issue of the Continental Social Alliance: stop the FTAA, understood as the strategic framework in which the State and large North American corporations intend to accommodate the pieces of the puzzle of “free trade” that is advancing throughout the continent, to impose on this an economic supranational constitution below its hegemony, in terms of its competition with other economic powers, and to the detriment of the sovereignty of ethnic minorities and the social rights of the majority.  The FTAA does not mean anything more than the subordinate integration of Latin America and the Caribbean into the North American economy, with an indiscriminate opening exchange for almost no advantage, and lowered standards of work and life in both the South and North.

The CSA should, then, endorse its posture against the creation of the FTAA, even if it is “lite” or “a la carté.”  Even in this initial “lite” version, the FTAA would represent the imposition of an unfavorable standard for developing countries and the acceptance of an inevitable new continental pact headed and hegemonized by the United States’ interests, even if at first it seems more like a political agreement without all the implications of the original economic agreements.  Moreover, the “flexible” or “a la carté” FTAA implies, as it says, that even though the train of the FTAA starts with its cars half-empty, nothing impedes them from filling along the tracks, especially if bilateral negotiations that place developing countries at an even greater disadvantage than multilateral negotiations continue advancing.  In any case, we should question the fact that if the FTAA is not going to be what it intending from the beginning, why would it even be necessary to create this supposed “super-area”?  Why else would it be necessary to create a “continental area” if it is not to complete with other economic blocks?  In whose interest is this?  Is it in the interest of Latin American countries to be part of a block allied with the United States against the rest of the world?  What is the reason to grant a privilege to a subordinate integration to the United States to the detriment of our relationships and trade with other Latin American countries, making it impossible to create blocks amongst countries with common interests and realities, to the detriment of the development of relationships and trade with the rest of the world?  Faced with the threats and the nonsense of the FTAA, the CSA should continue raising an alternative development model for trade and cooperation amongst the nations of the continent.

8) Now, in accord with the endorsement of this objective and according to, in whatever version, we maintain the period of 2005 for the beginning of the FTAA, How can we frustrate, stop, or at least restrain the FTAA in this crucial year of 2004?  What combination of strategies and actions should we and can we carry out, after all that we have done, to achieve this?  It seems evident that it will be necessary to elevate and take to their extremes the distinct tactics that we have posed up to today and place them in an ever more concrete terrain.

To begin, we must effectively note the change in the political-governmental scene.  The changes in government throughout South America create greater possibilities than in the past.  The rise of the “Group of 20” even with all its limitations, what occurred in Cancun and Miami, would seem to indicate that what we should do in a sense is “turn” on our tactics and give a greater importance to the actual negotiations, above all those negotiations of certain governments (something that in reality has already been occurring).  This also means that it is becoming correct to snub or even boycott the official “forums of civil society” as what they are, a simulated exercise.  Perhaps we should in this last period decide to participate, but not as para-state NGOs or giving them recognition, but placing all the accumulated weight of social representation to clearly object to the negotiations and underpin in this manner the few or many obstacles that some negotiators place against the FTAA.

This tactic of “impact” should not be ingenuous or forget, nevertheless, that the objective and the expression of social movement cannot be the same as those of governments, notwithstanding how “close,” “allied,” or “friendly” they may be.  A government can mediate its intentions with diplomacy, but the social movement should maintain clearly its objectives and not lose itself in political tactics.  Even, as in every negotiation, if at the end one never obtains everything they seek, it is necessary to start from the roof, not the floor, of our aspirations.  This perhaps means that we should have a “double” strategy, that of open struggle for the satisfaction of our demands and that of giving “weapons” to the negotiators to place all luck of obstacles in the procedures, time-frames, or specific themes, even if it does not seem to question the FTAA in its totality.  The important thing is that the FTAA does not endure.  On this point, the ten-point plan that we have referred to should play a role.

In the short-term, in this sense, the Puebla meeting of the negotiating committee and those that follow it are of great importance and we should really invest our energies in having a great impact there.

15) Of course, this orientation means that the pressure and kind of impact that we win country by country is of greater importance.  Nonetheless, it seems evident that we should especially focus our efforts on some countries like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador and part of the Caribbean.  This means that, without falling into an unlimited or unjustified endorsement, we should help on some level the existence and strength of a block of Southern countries as a counterweight to the North American agenda.  Without falling into a “Latin Americanist” vision that does not respond to the current reality, we should support and foment the idea of the importance of a Latin American block to negotiate any relationship with the North.  In fact, we would have to reflect on the pertinence of promoting an Agreement or Area of cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean as a pre-condition to negotiate with the North as part of our alternative proposals.  In a more concrete manner, we should seek in our impact work to move more countries of the area to a posture closer to that of Venezuela, in the sense of postponing the FTAA’s timelines (without this being a public posture of the CSA).

This means that we would need to strengthen and polish our “intelligence” team on the negotiations and the negotiators, as well as define with greater precision the core ideas or themes that would provoke greater inter-governmental contradictions.

16) In this period, the development of a strategy for parliaments and national congresses becomes more relevant, as well as a strategy for hemispheric parliamentary entities.  Thus, this would be a strictly democratic or procedural framework, the congresses can play a role in obstructing the passage of the FTAA.  It is necessary to develop with more energy and seriousness the work that we have proposed to constitute a continental parliamentary front or block against the FTAA, or at least a solid nucleus that would allow for amplification and bring effectiveness, with the necessary alliances, to the interior of congresses to oppose the FTAA or at least a form that keeps the FTAA in negotiations.  This also means in concrete terms assembling a lobbying team that develops this work towards congresses.  On a national level, the constitutions of each country are necessarily the frame of reference.  On a hemispheric level, it is necessary to study what would be the concrete proposal that we could take the organisms such as COPA translate the objections that have been raised until now into something more concrete.

17) Nonetheless, in the democratic sphere, the most important thing for this period, according to the central best that the CSA should continue to make social pressure something above and beyond any tactic towards governments, but it is not in these but in the communities where we place our trust, it is the popular consultation that we have done of our own account to the greater demand of official plebiscites in all those countries where that figure exists, as the Brazilian campaign is being conducted.

18) In the same direction, it is clear that if we really want to stop the FTAA or influence the course of events in this crucial year of 2004 it will be necessary to put ourselves forward and seriously elevate the level of our actions.  As we have summed up before, what we represent and what we have done up to this point has not been sufficient that governments – even the more progressive in the South, without speaking of the prevailing right in power in North America, including Canada and Mexico, or the rest of the neoliberal governments of the region that are anxious to serve the United States – hear our voices.  Just with greater participation by society, with greater movements and with more convincing actions can we now aspire to efficiency.  This requires action more in the function of the struggles that in our distinct countries are working to deliver us from the distinct evils of neoliberalism, connect the struggle against the FTAA to the resistance against privatizations, to the defense of sovereignty and the rights of the people.  Bolivia is here clearly an immediate example of what can cause a revolt of the people, and even there the new government is not taking on what the people who put it in power said about the FTAA.  Of course, the situation in each country is distinct, and we cannot artificially invent national situations at will and we should be realistic when we sit down to make our plan, but we should assume with all consciousness that in this decisive period discussion of mobilizations and greater actions are on the table.

19) Possibly, in this period we should move towards the immediate horizon of the Ministerial Summit that will occur in Brazil in mid-2004.  Buenos Aires continues on the agenda as the Summit of the Americans that will determine the FTAA possibly in 2005 and perhaps our plan should arrive to that point, but for now this is all brewing and this would represent an extreme scenario.  So, if we want to change the course of events, the ministerial summit in Brazil would be the immediate central point and we should plan an important parallel action in the continental campaign.  Truly, we should seek to advance a simultaneous continental action that is more coordinated and effective that what has been done up to this point.

Note: If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to: ciepac@laneta.apc.org and indicate whether you wish to receive the bulletin in plain text or as a Word 7 for Windows 95 attachment.

Note: If you use this information, cite the source and our email address. We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their comments on these Bulletins. CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to continue offering you this news and analysis service. If you would like to contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your remittance to the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C.
Bank: Banamex
Account number: 7049672 Sucursal 386
San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, México.
You will also need to use an ABA number:
BNMXMXMM

Thank you! CIEPAC

Telephone:
in México: 01 967 674 5168
from outside Mexico:: +52 967 674 5168