Between psychosis and realities: attempting to understand the problem in order to resolve it.

In Mexico and in Central America, the supposed invasion of the gangs induces panic in the populations and multiplies the number of repressive laws and police initiatives to repress them.  This manner of confronting the problem is destined to fail because considering the gangs to be just a problem of security and public order is to commit an error of simplification.  Better understanding these gangs would help us to avoid general panic and more effectively face the problem.  Analysing the causes of this youth phenomenon, which have deep roots in the serious social and economic situation in Mexico and Central America, could lead to the design of solutions to the problem that go beyond simple repression, a method that is as useless as it is ineffective, taking into account the structural contradictions of countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico.

De-Constructing Terror

In the past months, local and national newspapers in Chiapas and in Mexico have given ample information about the criminal activity of gangs.  The  newspaper articles related to insecurity in cities such as Tapachula, Arriaga and Ciudad Madero, give the impression that we are in the middle of a real gang invasion in Mexico.  These reports often present the gangs as the only ones responsible for the high crime rates in the Sierra and Coastal Regions of Chiapas.

Newspapers and magazines have dedicated eloquent headlines to the gangs:  there are titles such as “Out of Control” (1) and “The Gangs are Invading Us” (2), accompanied with photos of youth full of dark tattoos and frightening expressions, and texts that describe with great flourish the macabre details of the gang’s crimes.  Almost without exception, the media sensationalize the problem of “gangs”.

Local and national officials and politicians from different parties have not delayed in getting in on the issue, endorsing a superficial standing and invoking more police, control and repression.  Police officials or officials from other state security forces energetically denounce the lack of resources that limit their actions, always concentrating attention on the need to repress the phenomenon.  One federal deputy declared in the Cuarto Poder newspaper of December 1^st that, “the Federal Government should also contribute to the fight against the problem by assigning more resources and trained personnel to the distinct agencies responsible for border control and security, such as the Public Security Secretary, the General Attorney of the Republic and the National Immigration Institute” (3).

Along with the political promises of stronger police control other measures are already being talked about.  They are already discussing lowering the penal age limit, co-ordinating actions with Central American countries and approving more severe laws against gangs, taking as an example the nations of Central America where a simple body tattoo is motive for suspicion and imprisonment.  

Moreover, after gang actions that had a great impact on public opinion, the police of Chiapas carried out operatives in which they detained hundreds of presumed member of gangs from the Chiapas coast.  On November 20^th, during the celebrations of the Mexican Revolution in Tapachula, as secondary school students paraded, members of the two main gangs in Mexico, the “Salvatrucha 13” gang and the “Barrio 18” gang, had a confrontation.  Upon hearing supposed gunfire (although not one of the 32 gang members detained on that occasion was carrying a gun), “chaos” erupted.  When order was restored, 57 people had been treated for “nervous crises” but not one was injured by the gangs.

Two days after the rumpus, a rumour of a possible attack on secondary schools by the “Salvatrucha” gang in Tapachula brought about a wave of terror in the city.  At several schools, students fled from classes and many parents went to the school to get their children and take them home.  It was, nonetheless, a false alarm.

These events are only two examples of the hysteria that the presence of gangs in southeastern Mexico has provoked.  A strong police operative was used to respond to this climate:  on November 23^rd along, 26 people were detained by 400 mobilized police, these are in addition to the 32 people already detained on November 20^th (4).  In the days following the Revolution Day quarrel, a total of almost 200 presumed gang members were detained.(5)  In addition to fighting against different groups that are declared enemies due to territorial control, the gangs mainly dedicate their time to assaulting the undocumented immigrants that arrive in Mexico from Central America en route to the U.S.A..  Robberies and crimes against the undocumented immigrants are very common along the coast of Chiapas, a region through which many immigrants must pass.  This criminal phenomenon is so common that an institution called “Immigrant Protection Southern Beta Group” – part of the National Immigration Institute – was created to “protect” immigrants in the area.(6)  Along the southern border, it is normal to attribute crimes against undocumented immigrants to gangs.

But are we certain that gangs are responsible for such a great number of crimes?

The same Southern Beta Group informed us that, “51% of these crimes are committed by agents of diverse Mexican security forces and 49% by common criminals; in only two of every nine cases are the aggressors gangs”. (7)

This attempt to reconsider the “gang threat” in Mexico does not mean to underestimate the phenomenon:  these transborder gangs that have extended from the United States to Central America, and now, Mexico, constitute a serious and growing problem, but certainly they are not guilty of all the bad that has been attributed to them.

Approaching the problem without phobias and without panic, which are often not justified by real events, is the only way to find better solutions than those that have been put forward in Central America and Mexico. 

A Critique of Anti-Gang Measures in Central America

While Mexico insists on imitating the legislative and police measures taken in Central American countries against the gangs and in co-ordinating actions among the nations, the terror unleashed against the gangs in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador have had serious consequences.

“Using the gangs as cannon fodder … Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, between July and August 2003, have announced, almost at the same time, repressive measures entitled, Plan Escoba (the “Broom” Plan), Operation Liberty and Plan Mano Dura (the “Heavy Handed” Plan).  The gangs have been assimilated with criminal organizations, and as such, belonging to a gang constitutes a crime and minors are judged as adults”(8).

In El Salvador, the person who encouraged the repressive strategy was Mauricio Sandoval, the director of the National Civil Police between 1999 and 2003, owner of numerous communications companies in the country and manager of the National Republican Alliance (ARENA in Spanish), the winning party of the last elections in El Salvador.  Speaking of measures against the gangs, Sandoval  declared himself in favour of the idea to have the International Convention of the Rights of Children, not apply in El Salvador, it could have validity in stable democracies but not in El Salvador (9).  The repressive measures taken before the elections with clear intent of electoral propaganda had scant results:  as of  February 23^rd, 2004, the Salvadorian police had detained 10 178 presumed gang members, of which 95% were freed due to lack of proof.  Obviously homicides and crimes in the country did not cease during the raids. 

Moreover, the increase in social tension in the country drove the reactivation of the paramilitary groups that had been activated during the war in El Salvador in the 80s and the 90s.  It is suspected that, behind the horrible assassinations of youth were members of the “Sombra Negra” that, between 1992 and 1993, dedicated itself to executing activists and ex-guerrilla fighters (10).

To face this repressive wave, the gangs adapted.  They travelled to Mexico recruiting younger and younger followers, making themselves less visible, hidden by hoods and entering into greater contact with organized crime.  A repressive policy that means to satisfy the immediate needs of public security demanded by the calls of people worn out by so much criminality, does not get to the primarily social roots of the problem.

Analysing the Causes and Taking Suitable Measures

Studies and research done in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador and collected in the text, Maras y Pandillas de Centroamérica, (The Gangs of Central America), carried out by various research teams in these countries point to the principle causes of gang expansion in Central America and they try to put forward measures, not police actions, that could get to the roots of the problem and contribute to the containment of the phenomenon in Central America, in this way preventing a greater expansion of the problem in Mexico.

Youth gangs in Central America are not a new phenomenon, however the number of youth affiliated, the degree of violence and the hegemonic position that has reached the gangs since the nineties, make these an important element in understanding the Central American situation.  Really, the two gangs that today are provoking social alarm (the “Mara Salvatrucha” and the “Mara 18”) aren’t originally from Central America rather they are “export products” from the United States, in particular, Los Angeles.  In this city, since the 60s, the “Mara 18” (then known as the “18^th Street Gang”) was powerful in its neighbourhood and when the young “Mara Salvatrucha” tried to enter the territory of the “Mara 18”, a gang war between the two was unleashed.

Since the end of the war in El Salvador and in parallel with ever restrictive American immigration laws, the deportation of Latinos, and above all of undocumented people from El Salvador, to their country of origin, began.  Many of the deported youth had been members of gangs in the United States, hence, the mass deportations had an important role in the evolution of the “Mara 18” and the “Mara Salvatrucha” in Central America.  Gang culture, imported from the United States, found Central American conditions to be favourable to their development and expansion, contributing to the growth of gangs in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and, recently, Mexico. 

The gangs are groups of young with an identity well marked by rituals and clear symbols.  Tattoos declare their affiliation with one of the two gangs or they indicate important moments in the private or community life of the gang member (a first girlfriend, the number of crimes committed, etc.), including the tests that they had to go through to get into the gang (for example, a new gang member may have to put up with a violent beating from all of the other gang members for a certain amount of time or sleep with a gang member or commit a crime, etc.).

Solidarity within the gang is the supreme value and the group recognizes the authority of a hood.  One can only leave the gang for reasons that are recognized as valid:  getting married, having children, joining a church, etc..  If the personal decision to leave the gang is not accepted by the group, the repentant gang member may be persecuted and even killed. 

The gangs carry out extortion, sell drugs, rob vehicles and assault others, though their main raison d’etre is the war against their enemy gang for territorial control, as indicated by graffiti. 

It is important to understand the elements that have made gang expansion easier in order to effectively attack the problem.  In this way, it is essential to research the environment of the gang member youth, accepting that the problem is a product of social and environmental conditions and not the result of the genetic or psychological conditions of the gang members.  Researching the social environment means analysing the many variables that are linked in complicated ways.  Several studies carried out in Central America indicate the conditions that influence the existence and development of gangs.  What is clear is that, in the first place, there are relations between some socio-economic variables and gangs.  In particular, there is data confirming the relation between gangs and education, family income, the crowding of families in homes and the state of infrastructure in neighbourhood (streets, hygiene, etc.).  Some data seem particularly significant:  taking into account and together with research done in communities in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in places where there is gang activity, the average level of education achieved is 4.33 (while in places where gangs are not a problem, the average is 5.41).  The average family income in communities affected by gangs is $257 (U.S.) whereas in communities without gang activity it is $320 (U.S.).  Places with gangs register higher rates of crowding within the homes and there are streets and other public works in poor condition.

Moreover, these variables appear to be associated with the levels of violence in the communities.  These indices also seem to be related to the development of gangs:  where the incidence of violence is greater, the development of gangs is greater.  Gangs, violence and the socio-economic variables analysed, seem then, to be part of the same vicious circle.

Although the relation between poverty and gangs may seem obvious, recently analysed indicators don’t always show a relationship between the indicated conditions and the development of gangs.  For example, the relation between family income and gang presence doesn’t always hold.  While in Honduras the poorest neighbourhoods are the ones with the gangs, in El Salvador it’s not exactly the neighbourhoods with the lowest income with the gangs.  Given this, it is better to talk about social environment and community poverty rather than family or individual poverty. 

To better understand the complexity of the conditions that favour gang development, it is necessary to introduce the concept of social capital, understood as the relations among people that permit co-operation with the goal of achieving common objectives.  The variables of social capital that appear to have the greatest impact, positive or negative, in the presence of gangs, are interpersonal trust, community participation, the presence of positive public spaces for gathering and the existence of  “perverse” public spaces.   It is clear that all elements that diminish the ability of a community to build social networks able to collectively confront the needs of youth for support and identity and able to regulate behaviour, favour the development of gangs. 

Interpersonal trust in the community inhibits the appearance of gangs.  In the same way, “positive” public spaces for gathering and fun (public buildings, plazas, etc.) facilitate positive relations among people and also neutralize the appearance of gangs.  On the other hand, “perverse” public spaces such as bars, brothels, etc. stimulate violence and the rise of gangs.  Local public administration also appears to play an important role:  stimulating interaction among people in the community, optimally administrating community resources and controlling negative factors (brothels, etc.), municipal authorities closer to the needs of the population than state or federal authorities, can indirectly influence the evolution of gangs.

Thus, that a community is poor is not motive in itself for it to be a seedbed for gangs, just as a lack of trust among the people in a community is also not sufficient.  Poverty and institutional abandonment mixes with the scarcities of community gathering places, the absence of control over places that generate violence, the lack of mechanisms for participation and with the insecurity generated by violence.  Faced with such a complexity of conditions that jointly lead to the development of gangs, it is clear that the simple police measures are useless and damaging.  In the police operatives, the authorities enter a community, repress, control and later withdraw leaving the community even more disjointed, more suspicious and less trusting.

Similarly, many problematic communities today are in the hands of churches that mix assistance with fundamentalism, trying to resolve the problem through personal conversions but without transforming the living conditions of the people.

What is necessary is a weaving of programs and policies that are committed to local organizations and governments.  Instead of insisting on simple repression, it would be important to once again value the community’s role in the control of the problem through a wide range of measures.  Combating poverty and misery is fundamental but it is a long and difficult assignment, so mitigating their effects may be a more realistic goal.  Reducing the conditions of abandonment and isolation in many communities, modifying the social environment of youth and providing them with skills and opportunities, facilitating their social integration – these are the challenges of public authorities, especially the local authorities.  And what are the practical measures to take?  They consist of multiplying programs for youth and improving infrastructure, services and participation in the neighbourhoods.  These local measures must be inserted into a wider political framework that corrects the inequality and that provides a remedy to the injurious poverty of Latin America.

Confronting the problem of gangs in a holistic way, getting to the social roots of the problem, with policies and programs in which the state and local authorities fulfil their important role, represent the only way that Mexico can control and resolve this phenomenon without making the same errors committed in Central America.

It is a shame that in these months, Mexico is copying to a “T” the repressive measures that have already failed in Central America.  Making matters worse, the neoliberal policies implemented over the past 20 years don’t leave space for effective public interventions at the local or the federal level.  Without a complete understanding of the phenomenon and its structural causes, it is almost inevitable that the gangs will continue to develop fed by the grave social contradictions that Mexico shares with Central America.

Notes

(1) Front page of “Milenio”, No. 330, January 12, 2004.
(2) Front page of  “Cambio”, year 3, No. 100.
(3) From: “Cuarto Poder”, December 1^st 2004.
(4) Facts from the “Cuarto Poder, November 21, 23 and 24 2004.
(5) Pandilla de globalización, (The Gangs of Globalization) La Jornada November 30th 2004.
(6) With respect to this institution refer to the “Chiapas Today” bulletin No. 157, May 28, 1999, CIEPAC, A.C.
(7) Invasión o viendo maras con tranchete?  March 9 2004. from: http://ciss.insp.mx/migracion/ .
(8) Philippe Revelli, Dietro la violenza delle gang in Salvador, in Le Monde Diplomatique March 2004. Italian edition of “Il Manifesto”.
(9) Philippe Revelli, Dietro la violenza delle gang in Salvador, in Le Monde Diplomatique March 2004. Italian edition of “Il Manifesto.
(10) Alberto Nájar, La vida en territorio mara, (Life in Gang Territory) in Masiosare, Sunday, March 7 2004. www.jornada.unam.mx/mas-maras.html .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Cuarto Poder”, November 19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29 2004; December 1, 2004.

- “La Jornada”, November 23-27-30  2004; December 3-6  2004.

- “El Proceso”, 7/12/2002-28/02/2004-6/03/2004-5/06/2004-12/06/2004-4/09/2004-8/11/2004.

- Cruz J. M., Pandillas y capital social en Centroamérica, in “Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica”, the Central American University of San Salvador.

- Revelli P., Dietro la violenza delle gang in Salvador, in “Le monde diplomatique”, Italian edition, March 2004.

- Najar A., la vida en territorio mara, in Masiorare 324° Sunday March 7, 2004.

- Regional presidents sidestep constitutions to make war on gangs, in “Noticen” Vol. 9, N.° 5, Latin America Data Base (LADB), University of New Mexico.

- La mafia salvadoreña invade Chiapas, in “Milenio.com”, 21/9/2003.

- Liebel M., Pandillas y maras: señas de identidad, in “Envío” year 21, No. 244, July 2002, UCA-Managua.

- “Milenio”, No. 330, January 12 2004.

- “Cambio”, No 100, year 3.

-Invasión o viendo maras con tranchete? March 9, 2004. in: http://ciss.insp.mx/migracion/

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