Bulletins of CIEPAC
"Chiapas day by day"

Summary:
US journalist John Ross recently unleashed a storm of controversy with an article that criticized the EZLN's Red Alert. CIEPAC asked two intrepid travelers with a unique viewpoint to comment. This Bulletin is the reflexion of one of them.

I laughed at a story Ernesto Ledesma of CAPISE told us: when John Ross showed up at the Tierra Adentro Café in San Cristóbal de las Casas a couple weeks ago, he asked with ironic timidly whether he was welcome there or whether he would be run out. Ernesto, ever a gentleman, replied But no, my good friend, what are you talking about, this isn't the old left of enlightened vanguards and infallible ideologies, we are multiple and diverse, all of us rebels in our own way, a world where many worlds fit... Alright, perhaps he didn't say that exactly, but it must have been something similar, or at the very least he must have thought it. In any case, the fact is that John Ross, Daniel Nemser, and I found ourselves talking quite amicably in Tierra Adentro several times towards the end of July. John would stroll in every day parsimonious and smiling, wearing his Palestinian kaffiyeh under a leather vest, a black beret and his long white beard, to polemicize amiably with mordant cordiality.

But in spite of this welcome, John's question, half joking and playful, was not entirely irrelevant. Recently, John Ross has managed to earn the animosity of a good number of sympathizers of the Other Campaign and the ire of many others. Author of important books and articles about Zapatismo, John has become, in the last few months, a tenacious critic of the Other Campaign. In particular, his recent article "A Report from the Red Alert"⁽¹⁾ caused a wave of indignation in some Zapatista circles.

The reaction is understandable, though not entirely justifiable. For many of us, the Other Campaign represents one of the most innovative and creative experiments in the redefinition of democracy and the most daring attempt of our times to rethink our world: a new way of doing politics, a new understanding of social relations. This, in a context of growing fanaticism on a world level along with an increasing sense of disenchantment with electoral democracy. And at the very moment when the movement confronts its first serious challenges, at a moment when it becomes the victim of State brutality, surrounded by media manipulation which oscillates between completely ignoring and strategically demonizing it, the compañero John comes along, with his prestige as a long-time follower of the Zapatistas, to throw wood on the fire.

But since criticism-and self-criticism-is not just useful but necessary, I think it's better to drink a cup of Zapatista coffee with the man and engage in dialogue with an open mind, than to suffer paroxysms of indignation.

In his article, as in our personal conversations, John's criticism is centered in the logic-as well as the presumed consequences-of the red alert announced by Delegado Zero this past May 3, in the wake of the repression at Atenco. John highlights two fundamental critiques. First, that declaring a red alert in Zapatista territory because of Atenco, with the consequent disruption of the functioning of the communities, makes no sense, since one thing has nothing to do with the other. And second, that, since the decision came from the military structure of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), it reinserts the organization's inherent verticality into the much celebrated horizontality of civilian Zapatismo. The result, according to John, has been the disarticulation of the Other Campaign and "mass desertions" of its adherents.

At the end of May, compañero Daniel Nemser and I began a trip through Mexico, from Sonora to Chiapas [see their blog in English and Spanish at http://pinguinozapatista.blogspot.com/], in order to understand the situation of the Other Campaign before and after Atenco-in the states through which Delegado Zero and the karavan did and did not pass-as well as to participate in the national assembly of adherents in Mexico City and the march on July 2, to understand the people's movement in Oaxaca, and, finally, to witness the situation in Chiapas in the context of the Other Campaign and the red alert. This investigation allows us to make certain observations about John Ross' criticism, based on our first-hand experiences.

John is not alone in criticizing the logic of the red alert: we heard complaints from people in Chiapas as well as the rest of the country. However, the vast majority of the people we spoke with in Chiapas understand the red alert to be a necessity of self-defense. And the fact that the decision comes from a military structure does not pose a contradiction, since the alert responds precisely to a military logic. The alert is not merely a symbolic act of solidarity with the political prisoners of Atenco from several thousand kilometers away in Chiapas-though it serves this function as well-, but an intelligent and calculated strategy of defense against the real danger of State repression. Both Onésimo Hidalgo of the Center for Economic and Political Research and Community Action (CIEPAC) and Michael Chamberlin of the Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (Frayba), along with many others closely linked to the local situation, understand that the weakest link in the Other Campaign is Chiapas. From 1994 on, the Mexican government has done everything it can to localize the conflict to the indigenous communities in that state, severing the national reach of the struggle. The Other Campaign's attempt to extend Zapatismo to the entire country represents a threat to the government that becomes more and more intolerable as the movement grows. A military action in Zapatista territory could disarticulate the Other Campaign by localizing the conflict once again in Chiapas and forcing Delegado Zero to return to the jungle.

Several facts back up this hypothesis. First, there is no doubt that one of the principal goals of the repression in Atenco was to strike at the Other Campaign, at a moment when it was beginning to become a thorn in the government's side-as Delegado Zero's discourse became increasingly harsh, as denunciations of expulsions, extortions, and the brutality of the system were heard over and over again, contrasting sharply with the empty rhetoric of the political campaigns, as indignation turned into resistance in places like La Parota and, evidently, Texcoco. Many victims of that repression are members of the Other Campaign who were not involved in the conflict on May 3rd and were simply in Atenco on May 4th as human shields in an evidently fruitless attempt to prevent State violence. The fact that many of them were beaten, raped, tortured, and interrogated explicitly because of their supposed links with the EZLN, confirms the claim that the repression was in great part directed toward the Other Campaign.

The violent and highly alarming expulsion of the Zapatista community of Ch'ol de Tumbalá, in the Caracol of Roberto Barrios (several days after John Ross' article was published) demonstrates the communities' vulnerability and the real threat of State violence. Though it's debatable whether this represents simply a continuation of the low-intensity war that's been occurring since 1994-which many have forgotten-or a stepping-up of repression in the context of the Other Campaign, what's clear is that the red alert responds to a threat that is far from imagined.

But the most serious claim that John makes has to do with the supposed disarticulation of the Other Campaign after Atenco. Our visit to the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Zacatecas revealed a much more complex and ambiguous picture than the one painted by John. In places like Ciudad Obregón and Hidalgo del Parral, Delegado Zero's visit would have clearly helped to bring disparate groups together and attract new actors. In both places the Other Campaign is incipient-the compañeros are dedicated and talented, but for various reasons the Other Campaign hasn't stuck, and the visit of Marcos and the karavan might have given it the necessary push. At the same time, in both places there is a perception that the cancellation of the visit caused the less dedicated, those who were more interested in merely taking a picture with Marcos than in constructing alternatives, to drop out. And in Zacatecas, the suspension of the campaign and the crisis in Atenco served not only to bring previously dispersed groups together but also to transform the movement into a true political force. Up to that moment, efforts had been concentrated in preparing for Marcos' arrival; but after Atenco, the organizations, collectives, and individuals who make up the Other Campaign in Zacatecas became a clearly articulated, broadly diverse, creative political actor.

Similarly, the cohesiveness and success of the Other Campaign in the states through which the karavan did pass vary depending on the local context, just as Atenco affected them in different ways. In Guanajuato and Oaxaca, we saw a great deal of division. In Querétaro, however, we witnessed an impressive level of organization.

It's not clear to me how John came to the conclusion that there have been "mass desertions." Perhaps it has to do with the comparison between the estimated 25,000 protesters ⁽²⁾ in Mexico City's zócalo, or central plaza, on May 1 and the 5-10,000 who participated in the march on July 2-organized hastily the day before. It is possible that the number of adherents has decreased since Atenco, although I don't see how this could be quantified. At the same time, the feeling of suspension and immobility is understandable, compared with the continuous movement of the Campaign before Atenco. It is important, however, to understand that this is a new phase of the movement: the moment for organization, for direct action, for the transformation into political actors. The karavan represented a moment for listening. Though this moment has not ended, the events in Atenco sparked, perhaps prematurely but necessarily, a new organizational phase, less visible perhaps but certainly more consistent. An evaluation of the Other Campaign in this moment cannot be based on quantitative claims (even if this were possible), but rather on careful qualitative analyses. Someone we met told us that the members of the Other Campaign "are the best that Mexico has today." This might sound like hyperbolic self-aggrandizement, but traveling throughout the country with the Other Campaign left us with just this impression.

In the end, it seems to me that John Ross' criticisms have much to do with an ideological difference: whether the struggle for change happens from within or from outside the system. Though he recognizes the problems with the PRD and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, John is convinced that this path represents a true avenue for change and a source of hope for the nation. As he told us, he believes that a PRD victory would be "a victory for the people." Attacks against the Other Campaign for being partly responsible for the supposed "victory" of Felipe Calderón do not come exclusively from John; many perredistas share these feelings with surprising bitterness. The virulence of the criticism of the PRD voiced by Marcos and the Other Campaign is perhaps questionable. However, the basic point here is that the Other Campaign is searching for an alternative that goes far beyond the logic of the "lesser evil." For the Other Campaign, the positioning in relation to the electoral dispute-the decision, for example, to support or ignore the movement against the fraud-is a strategic question that has to do with an evaluation of the scenarios most favorable for its own growth, and not with a choice between a corrupt pseudo-left and a violent ultra-right. The Other Campaign cannot and should not waste time or energy on these issues; others are already sufficiently occupied with them. The goals of the Other Campaign are far more transcendent: constructing a new political and social reality for the country, reinventing democracy. It is understandable that those who continue to believe in the electoral option cannot see this. But doesn't matter much: their moment of deception will arrive. The Other Campaign will then have to leave its doors open to sincere activists who are willing to look into "other" alternatives: "Come on in, John, have a cup of coffee and let's get to work, cause we've got a lot to do."

(1) John Ross: A Report from the Red Alert, Zapatistas at Critical Crossroads; July 31, 2006

(2) "Hasta morir si es preciso," La Jornada, 2 May 2006.

Alejandro Reyes is a member of Radio Zapatista, www.radiozapatista.org, (KPFA, Berkeley/San Francisco) and a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley.

Translated by Daniel Nemser.